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Abstract 
Risk disclosure has received considerable interest and attention in recent times. 
The aim of this research is to examine risk information disclosure in annual reports 
with the aim of establishing trends. Further, this research empirically examines the 
influence of four firm factors on the level of risk disclosure in the annual reports. 
These factors are firm size, leverage, industry and US-dual listing. In addition, the 
research examines the association between risk disclosure and the company's cost 
of equity capital (and information asymmetry) after controlling for firm size and 
market beta. 
The annual reports of a sample comprising 52 UK non-financial companies, drawn 
from the FTSE-100 index, for three different periods (1998,2001, and 2004) were 
sought, collected, and analysed. Content analysis was applied and risk disclosure in 
the annual report was measured according to the number of sentences disclosed 
and trends were analysed over the six-year period. Risk disclosure sentences were 
classified according to four main quality dimensions: type of risk, the nature of the 
evidence, the type of news disclosed, and news time-frame. A four-stage dividend 
growth model was used to measure the company's cost of equity capital. Bid-ask 
spread and stock volatility were also used as proxies for information asymmetry. 
Only when investors perceive that the information is relevant, risk information 
disclosed in the annual report can lead to a reduction in the cost of equity capital. 
The study found, in aggregate, a trend of increasing amounts of risk disclosure in 
the annual report. Risk disclosure was found primarily qualitative; good and 
neutral; and non-time. There is minimal disclosure of quantified risk information 
and bad news information. These results suggest that accounting rules and 
regulations, in addition to recommendations from accounting institutions, have 
influenced the increase in the level of risk information disclosed, though without 
ensuring the quality of the disclosed risk information. US-dual listing and industry 
are found to be significantly related to risk disclosure, but firm size and leverage 
are found to have insignificant association with the level of risk disclosure. These 
findings suggest that the extent of annual report risk disclosure is driven more by 
regulation than by the market. 
The findings reveal that for the largest UK companies with high analyst following, 
no relation was found between risk disclosure level and cost of equity capital. 
However, the study found that both quantitative and bad news risk information are 
significantly and negatively related to stock volatility. Moreover, a significant and 
negative association was found between bad news risk disclosure and bid-ask 
spread. This suggests that firms with greater bad news and quantitative disclosure 
enjoy a reduction in information asymmetry as measured by proxies for 
information asymmetry. Overall, the analysis suggests that UK companies make 
substantial risk disclosure but the usefulness of this disclosure is limited. 
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1.1 Introduction 
In recent times, corporate reporting on risk has gained considerable 
attention giving rise to an urgent investigation into international 
accounting disclosure. The mainstream literature suggests that there is 
limited disclosure on risk information available in companies' annual 
reports (e. g., AICPA, 1987,1994; Schrand and Elliot, 1998, ICAEW, 1997; 
and for evidence see ICAEW, 1999b; Lajili and Zegal, 2005; Woods and 
Reber, 2003; Abraham and Cox, 2007, Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Konishi 
and All, 2007) and that the various users of financial reports are 
increasingly demanding more relevant information in order to enable 
them to assess the risk profile of a company (e. g., ICAEW, 1997,1999b, 
2002; Solomon et al., 2000; Linsley and Shrives, 2000,2005). This increase 
in users' demands for information has motivated a considerable debate on 
the topic by regulators, institutional bodies and other interested parties 
whilst simultaneously gaining a central role in current accounting 
literature. A number of proposals on improving business reporting have 
called for more relevant disclosure of risk information in company annual 
reports (ICAEW, 1997,1999b, 2002; AICPA, 1994; CICA, 2002; ASB, 1993, 
2003,2006). Enormous business losses of some large corporations around 
the world together with a number of well-publicised business scandals in 
recent years have reinforced this debate. 
In the accounting literature, several theories have been developed over the 
years to explain the phenomenon of disclosure as a whole, and to explain 
the variation in disclosure between companies. Examples of theories 
include agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), signalling theory 
(Spence, 1973) and capital need theory (Choi, 1973). Based on theoretical 
argument, prior research (e. g., Gray, 1988; Hossain et al., 1994; Roberts et 
al., 1998) also explains different factors, including financial, non-financial 
and social responsibility factors behind disclosure differences. 
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It has been argued that companies' disclosures on risks and how these 
risks are identified, managed, analysed and evaluated should assist users 
of corporate reports to understand business profiles and risk profiles thus 
enabling them to make an accurate assessment of a company's financial 
conditions and performance (ICAS, 1999; Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; 
Solomon et al., 2000; Lev and Zarowin, 1999). In turn, companies would 
reap the benefits by being transparent about the risks and uncertainties 
they face. For example, it is claimed that greater disclosure reduces 
information asymmetry and investor uncertainty, thereby having a 
positive effect on the firm's cost of capital (ICAEW, 1997,1999b; Botosan, 
1997; Hail, 2002). In addition, confident and well-informed investors are 
an essential factor in achieving and maintaining an accurate assessment of 
a company's stock (Deumes, 2008). Disclosure is also important and 
critical for the functioning of the capital markets and, by extension, for the 
stability of the economy (Akerlof, 1970; Lev, 1988). 
The present thesis will examine the literature on corporate risk disclosure 
and extend this further by undertaking an empirical investigation into the 
corporate risk disclosure of UK non-financial companies. The initial 
purpose is to gain insight on the amount, type and nature of risk 
information disclosed by companies in their annual reports. The present 
research examines in detail the current risk disclosure practices and 
trends over a six-year period. Three different periods (fiscal years 1998, 
2001 and 2004) are analysed. Furthermore, the relation of risk disclosure 
to firm-specific characteristics is examined. In addition, the present 
research examines the impact of risk disclosure on the company's cost of 
equity capital. 
The core aim of the present chapter is to provide the context for this 
research thesis. In essence, the thesis focuses on the subject of corporate 
disclosure while honing in on corporate risk disclosure in particular. In the 
ensuing sections of this chapter, an overview of the research is provided 
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followed by justification for the research and a discussion of the aims and 
objectives. This is followed by a summary of the research methods 
employed. Finally, the structure of the thesis is outlined. 
1.2 Research Overview 
In the past few decades, the business environment has witnessed dramatic 
changes driven by fundamental changes in technology, society and world 
politics. Globalisation activities of capital and product markets have 
increased. New countries' regulations have developed and emerged. The 
legal systems by which companies operate have become more complex 
and competitive activities have intensified with new businesses emerging 
all the time. The rise in volatility worldwide has affected credit markets 
dramatically. Financial products and services together with business 
transitions and structures have become even more complex. The increased 
economic and political uncertainty across the globe has created concerns. 
The failures of some major companies (e. g., Johnson Matthey, BCCI and 
Barings, Enron, Maxwell, WorldCom; AIG, Lehman Brothers) have 
exacerbated already difficult economic conditions and shaken the 
confidence of both investors and regulators. 
There has been increased public demand for firms to make even greater 
disclosure of corporate information, especially those related to risks and 
uncertainties. A number of sophisticated and well-structured approaches 
to risk management have been developed over the recent years to help 
managers manage different type of risks (Linsley and Shrives, 2000), 
hence, reducing the quality gap in internal risk management reporting 
systems. However, companies' external reporting was lacking an adequate 
disclosure on risks and uncertainties. The literature (e. g., Beattie and Pratt, 
2002; Solomon et al., 2000; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Linsley and Shrives, 
2000; Epstein and Palepu, 1999; Schrand and Elliot, 1998; ICAEW, 1997, 
1999b, 2002; Eccles and Mavrinac, 1995; AIMR, 1993; AICPA, 1987,1994; 
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CICA, 2002; IASB, 2005; Beattie, 2005) suggests that corporate reports are 
lacking sufficient relevant information for users to help them assess a 
company's risk profile and make informed decisions. There was 
recognition that financial reporting standards developed by bodies such as 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the UK's 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) or from civil law codes in continental 
Europe fell short of providing sufficient relevant information to the users 
of corporate reports. Thus, while the internal reporting gap has been 
narrowed, the external reporting gap still remains high. This has created 
an information problem, known as 'information asymmetry'. Information 
asymmetry is caused by agency conflict which arises because of the 
separation of ownership between managers and owners of the business, 
and occurs when managers who hold information withhold it from owners 
for certain reasons, including commercial sensitivity and uncertainty 
about measurements. Information problems comprise a key issue in 
corporate disclosure literature. It is a key issue to the extent that it may 
disturb the functioning of the capital markets leading to their partial or 
complete breakdown (Akerlof, 1970). 
The increasing demand for information has compelled regulatory 
authorities and professional bodies worldwide to examine the quality of 
financial reporting. Regulators and accounting institutions around the 
globe have been considering new laws and formal codes of best practice in 
corporate governance. Countries such as USA, UK, Canada, Netherlands, 
Italy, Germany and others are well advanced in this regard. As a result, risk 
disclosure is nowadays increasingly required by law and formal codes of 
best practice in corporate governance worldwide. 
In the UK, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
(ICAEW), in connection with the regulatory authorities, has been leading 
the change with the development of new codes and frameworks to 
strengthen corporate governance and restore investor confidence. The 
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codes of corporate governance, from Cadbury through Greenbury and 
Hampel, to the Combined Code on Corporate Governance and, most 
recently, the Turnbull guidance have embedded risks and conflicts of 
interests within publicly quoted firms. The agenda of corporate 
governance emphasises the need for companies to maintain a sound 
system of internal control and risk management procedures and 
prioritises the disclosure of risk information. However, it was not until the 
publication of the Turnbull report in 1999 that the framework of internal 
control, risk management and risk disclosure remained implicit and at the 
description of individual company management (Solomon et al., 2000). 
The Turnbull report explicitly emphasises the need for internal 
management procedures and calls for listed companies to report on the 
effectiveness of their systems of internal financial controls and encourages 
them to report externally on their key risks. 
Likewise, the long debate on the Operating and Financial Review (OFR) in 
the UK, together with other pressures from accounting law and regulatory, 
have underpinned the reporting of risk and placed companies under more 
pressure to report openly on risk and uncertainty. 
Similarly, several proposals and reports have been published by 
accounting institutions to promote better disclosure by listed companies 
in order to increase transparency in financial reporting. For example, the 
ICAEW (1997,1999b, 2002) has been trying to further encourage listed 
companies to disclose relevant and meaningful information by drawing up 
more demanding information to improve the quality of information that 
helps users make rational decisions. The institute (ICAEW, 1999b) calls 
company directors to act in order to reduce the gap between internal and 
external reporting, that is to reduce the gap between what internal 
processes tell them (the managers) and what the annual report tells 
investors. Companies who are not prepared to disclose relevant 
information, the institute argues, should reconsider whether they wish to 
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be listed. The institute sees great merit in better risk reporting, and claims 
that there is no real reason to justify secrecy when listed companies want 
to build relationships with the providers of capital, and that greater risk 
disclosure would lead to a reduction in the cost of equity capital (ICAEW, 
1997,1999b). 
Thus, the abovementioned scenario of events and debate on risk 
disclosure are a motivation for research on risk disclosure in annual 
reports of UK companies with a view to particularly examining its nature, 
its determinants and its effect on the company's cost of capital. It is 
expected that further insight will emerge regarding corporate risk 
reporting. 
1.3 Research Justification and Aims and Objectives 
The topic of risk reporting has been of interest to accounting researchers 
as the result of recent debate and requirements. While a selection of 
studies have investigated the topic, the focus of these studies varies 
considerably. Previous studies have almost exclusively examined 
quantified risk disclosure in financial statements and focused on specific 
categories of risk (Li and Gao, 2007; Dunne et al., 2007; Seow and Tam, 
2002; Linsmeier et al., 2002; Jorion, 2002; Rajgopal, 1999; Thornton and 
Walker, 2000; Roulstone, 1999; Linsmeier and Pearson, 1997). Other 
researchers have moved towards more comprehensive risk information 
and examined risk disclosure in annual reports (e. g., Linsley and Shrives, 
2005,2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Lajili and Zegal, 2005), and in 
prospectus (e. g., ICAEW, 1999b, Papa, 2007; Deumes, 2008) - the 
empirical literature that has investigated risk information under this 
broader perspective is still limited. For example, Lajili and Zegal (2005) 
and Woods and Reber (2003) examined risk disclosure in annual reports 
without exploring the possible determinants of risk disclosure. Linsley and 
Shrives (2005) examined risk disclosure in non-financial UK companies 
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and, apart from size and risk level, other determinants are not tested. 
Other studies that have examined the determinants of risk disclosure have 
produced mixed results (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Abraham et al., 2007; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Konishi and Ali, 2007; Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004). 
The main issues that have been tackled or are currently being tackled in 
accounting disclosure literature as a whole includes identifying what 
companies are reporting, the underlying factors that may affect the extent 
to which information is reported and what motivates companies to make 
particular information disclosure. While some previous studies have 
focused on what risk information is disclosed, more studies are needed to 
examine how risk information is disclosed, and to examine the potential 
benefits of risk information disclosure, for example, its impact on the 
company's cost of capital. 
Thus, with regard to risk reporting, the empirical literature provides only 
partial answers concerning risk disclosure practises, its characteristics 
and its determinants. In addition, there is limited research on the potential 
impact of risk information disclosure on the company's cost of equity 
capital. The scope of this research aims, therefore, to fill this gap in the 
literature. 
This research project has three key objectives. The first objective is to 
explore corporate risk disclosure practices in the annual report in three 
different time periods (1998; 2001, and 2004) to determine whether 
differences exist in the extent and variety of disclosure over time. This is a 
longitudinal study. The purpose is to provide a snapshot of the volume and 
nature of information disclosed and evaluate whether disclosure practices 
indicate any changing pattern in corporate reporting, hence to draw 
attention to the limitations inherent in risk reporting. Although there have 
been published studies on risk disclosure, no previous studies has 
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explored risk disclosure trends and examined whether companies have 
responded to the pressure from the burgeoning demand for risk 
information. It is interested to study how risk disclosure has developed 
over the years in response to the developments of new rules and codes of 
corporate governance (ICAEW, 1999b). The literature on other types of 
accounting disclosure (e. g., social and environmental disclosure) shows 
that corporate social reporting has increased over time in response to a 
number of factors. Some of the reasons may be attributed to increases in 
legislation, specific events, activities of pressure groups, societal 
awareness and politics (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Companies' risk 
reporting should reflect the developments in corporate governance and 
regulations made over the past years. 
The second objective is to explain the variation, if any, in risk disclosure 
and to examine what determines the extent of disclosure about risk. The 
association between disclosure and firm characteristics has long been of 
interest to accounting researchers. The extent of corporate disclosure 
may be influenced by different firm factors (e. g., financial factors, non- 
financial factors, social responsibility factors) including firm size (e. g., 
Aljifiri, 2008; Aljifiri and Hussainey, 2007; Huafang and Jianguo, 2006; 
Oliveira et al., 2006; Kent and Ung, 2003; Naser et al., 2002; Depoers, 
2000; Raffournier, 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Hossain et al., 1994; Wallace et 
al., 1994; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989a), industry type 
(Aljifiri, 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; 
Lymer, 1997; Wildstrom, 1997; AIMR, 1997; Cooke, 1992), listing status 
(Abraham and Cox, 2007; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Hossain et al., 1994; 
Singhvi and Desai, 1991), leverage (Aljifri, 2008; Huafang and Jianguo, 
2006; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Naser et al., 2002; Hossain et al., 1994; 
Bradbury, 1992; Meek et al., 1995, Hossain et al., 1994; Malone, 1993), 
performance (Oliveira et al., 2006; Land and Lundholm, 1993; Wallace et 
al., 1994), ownership structure (Huafang and Jianguo, 2006; Hossain et al., 
1994; Mckinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Craswell and Taylor, 1992), the 
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size of audit firm (Oliveira et al., 2006; Depoers, 2000; Hossain et al., 1994; 
Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Malone, 1993) and culture (Hanifa and Cooke, 
2005). However, some of these relationships are weak and not verified in 
the literature. The findings of previous research do provide a good starting 
point to further examine the relationship between risk disclosure and its 
underlying firm factors. The present research relates the level of risk 
disclosure to four firm factors including firm size, leverage, type of 
industry and US-dual listing. These factors are chosen because they are the 
most commonly used independent variables (factors) in accounting 
disclosure. 
The third objective of the present research is to examine the potential 
usefulness of risk disclosure made in the annual report. Previous 
accounting disclosure research offers insight into the potential usefulness 
and perceived benefits and costs of disclosure. For example, it has been 
asserted (e. g., Gray and Roberts, 1989; AICPA, 1994; Botosan, 1997; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2000; Lajili and Zegal, 2005; Hail, 2002; ICAEW, 1997) 
that improved disclosure enhances corporate transparency, develops 
corporate image, and provides useful information for decision making. 
Disclosure can also be seen as one of the mechanisms to mitigate adverse 
selection by reducing information asymmetry between preparers 
(managers) and users (e. g., investors). It is a mechanism to lower a 
company's cost of capital, increase liquidity of its shares, and lower 
transaction costs resulting from lower bid-ask spreads. In addition, 
disclosure can be seen as one of the mechanisms by which companies 
attempt to manage their stakeholders in order to gain their support and 
approval. Moreover, disclosure can also assist in staving off potential 
regulatory pressure and avoiding additional requirements. 
The question whether greater disclosure level reduces a company's cost of 
equity capital is a matter of considerable interest and importance to the 
corporate reporting community. However, there is debate on this issue 
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(e. g., Botosan, 1997; Armitage and Marston, 2007). Theoretical argument 
suggests that greater disclosure is associated with a reduction in the cost 
of equity capital through reduced transaction costs and/or reduced 
estimation risk. The ICAEW sees great merit in enhancing corporate risk 
disclosure, claiming that companies with greater disclosure of risk 
information will portray an image in the marketplace that they are riskier 
than prior to their disclosure. Risk reporting encourages risk management 
and reduces stock volatility, thereby, lowering the company's cost of 
capital. Information disclosure is important to outside investors. The more 
they know, the more accurately they will be able to determine a company's 
cost of capital and its value. However, empirical evidence does not seem to 
totally support the theory and produces mixed findings. By way of 
example, the Jenkins committee (AICPA, 1994) states that an important 
benefit of greater disclosure is a lower cost of capital. In rebuttal, the 
financial executive institute (Berton, 1994, cited in Botosan, 1997) argues 
that the improved disclosure promoted by the committee's report are 
targeted to stock traders which would add-to share price volatility thereby 
increasing risk and leading to a higher cost of equity capital. In the 
institute's report (ICAEW, 1999b) some sceptics point out that "a more 
accurate cost of capital is not necessarily a lower cost of capital and a more 
accurate value is not necessarily a higher value. In practice, more 
disclosure might well increase the cost of capital" (ICAEW, 1999b, p. 11). It 
could be argued that companies with a higher level of risk may 
demonstrate a reluctance to reveal such information in order to divert 
attention from their riskiness. Recent evidence (Armitage and Marston, 
2007) finds that finance directors do not believe in a clear link between 
disclosure level and the cost of equity capital perhaps because their 
companies already provide at least a good practice level of disclosure. It is 
also argued that only when investors perceive that the information is 
credible and relevant, can risk disclosure in annual reports serve as a 
mechanism to reduce the company's cost of capital. Whereas risk 
disclosure is increasingly required in annual reports, the current rules 
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allow firms a degree of discretion with regard to the type of information to 
be disclosed and the level of details to be provided, hence risk disclosure 
depends on manager's willingness to actively disclose the right 
information (Deumes, 2008). Indeed, the decision of the UK government to 
abolish the statutory requirements for preparing the OFR by listed UK 
companies is to avoid producing "boilerplates" information that do not 
help investors to make accurate decisions. 
Existing literature (ICAEW, 1997,1999b, 2002; 2004b; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2000; Woods and Reber, 2003; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004, Lajili 
and Zegal, 2005) suggests that there is still demand for empirical work 
examining the impact of risk disclosure on the company's cost of equity 
capital. Thus, based on the research aim and objectives, the research 
questions are formulated as follows: 
Research question 1: What are the current practices of corporate risk 
disclosure and to what extent did UK listed companies respond to recent 
developments that lead to the increased pressure on companies to 
enhance their information disclosure? This question is extended to include 
the following sub questions: 
  Do differences exist in the extent and variety of annual report risk 
disclosure of UK companies between 1998,2001, and 2004? 
  What information is being disclosed? 
  How is the information being disclosed? 
  Does reporting practice vary between industries? 
Research question 2: Does risk disclosure relate to the following firm 
attributes (factors): size, leverage, industry and US-dual listing variables? 
Research question 3: Does risk disclosure have an impact on the 
company's cost of equity capital? 
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Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the research plan and framework of the research. 
Theoretical Argument 
Disclosure theories 
Agency theory 
Signalling theory 
Capital need theory 
Benefits and costs theory 
Political cost theory 
Reason for disclosure 
- Proprietary cost (e. g., 
Verrecchia, 1983). 
Information asymmetry 
Foreign listing 
Impact on cost of equity 
Increased analysts following 
Reduced estimation risk 
Reduced information 
asymmetry 
Figure 1.1: Research Plan 
Research question 1 
The level of Risk 
disclosure 
Impact on cost of 
equity capital 
Figure 1.1. Framework for the Research 
Framework of the Literature 
- Increasing demand for information 
- Regulatory development 
- Codes of best practices on corporate 
governance 
- Other factors (globalisation, volatility, economic 
and political uncertainty, increased competition 
activity) 
1 Impact on: 
Risk disclosure 
(disclosure practices 
and trends) 
(Contribution) (1) 
1 
Impact on: 
A company cost of 
equity capital/ info. 
asymmetry 
(Contribution) (3) 
Relate 
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-Leverage 
Industry 
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(Contribution) 
(2) 
Research question 2 
Company factors: 
- Size 
-Leverage 
Industry 
US dual Listing 
Research question 3 
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1.4 Importance of the Research 
For the present research, I first reviewed the existing theory and 
contributed to the literature of corporate disclosure by developing a 
detailed analysis of risk disclosure in term of risk types and type 
attributes. This study compares risk disclosure over a six-year period. 
There is a need for longitudinal studies (ICAEW, 1999b) as the comparison 
between previous studies conducted by different researchers is not always 
appropriate. This longitudinal study of the extent of risk disclosure seeks 
to explain and understand risk disclosure evidence. The study sheds 
further light by examining how companies have responded to recent 
developments such as corporate governance and other regulatory 
pressures. Corporate reporting should reflect the recent development in 
corporate governance and other developments and pressures that have 
occurred over the past years. Previous studies (e. g., Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005; Patten, 1992; Deegan et al., 2000; Gray et al., 1995a; Trotman, 1979) 
provide examples of event studies where the volume of social and 
environmental disclosure was shown to respond to the increased 
exposure to criticism experience after a particular event. 
This gap in the literature needs to be filled especially when one is 
examining the response of companies towards improving the quantity and 
quality of information disclosed in annual reports; not only in terms of 
complying with regulations, but also in meeting the needs of various user 
groups. To this end, it is hoped that this research will answer the 
numerous calls made for improving risk disclosure. 
Any increase in risk disclosure would be seen as evidence and endorse 
recent efforts of corporate governance reforms (e. g., Solomon et al., 2000). 
It is important to keep abreast of how companies' attitudes towards risk 
disclosure have changed over time. Fast moving technology, intense 
competition pressure, globalization of financial markets, development of 
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new internal accounting standards, and regulatory development are 
among the many factors that significantly influence the way companies 
disclose their risk information. Studying risk disclosure practices can 
make clear to the financial reporting community whether risk reporting 
can be viewed as an area of best practices (Deumes, 2008). Various users 
may wish to extend their investigations and verify such reporting 
practices. The study also has its advantages as it offers investors an 
objective assessment of the current reporting practices. Investors need to 
be able to observe and form an opinion on the risks potentially affecting 
the company and the way in which these risks are managed. Risk 
disclosure would also help investors to form a view on the amount, timing 
and probability of the firm's future cash flows. Indeed, any increase in risk 
disclosure would attract the attention of users. The results have the 
potential to assist all users including standard setters when developing the 
framework and the requirements of corporate risk disclosure. 
The present research also contributes to the existing literature by 
identifying factors that determine risk reporting. The study will be useful 
both in assisting regulators and investors in identifying the type of risk 
information disclosed by different companies in different sectors and by 
identifying the characteristics of the companies that disclose such 
information. 
Finally, the present research contributes to the existing literature by 
examining the usefulness of this information by empirically testing the 
impact of risk disclosure on a company's cost of equity capital. Only when 
annual report risk disclosure is useful in some way to investors is it 
expected to find a significant relationship between the cost of equity and 
the level of annual report risk disclosure. Previous studies (e. g., Botosan, 
1997; Botosan and Blumlee, 2002; Hail, 2002, Chen et al., 2003) examined 
different disclosure types including financial and environmental, 
15 
corporate governance and investors' relation disclosure. This study 
focuses specifically on risk disclosure. 
1.5 Summary of Research Methods 
The present research is descriptive and empirical in scope. A detailed 
specification of the research methodology employed (including the 
rationale for the selection of the research methods, research models, 
sample selection, and statistical tests) is provided in Chapter 4. 
For data collection, the research approach adopted is content analysis 
(e. g., Neu et al., 1998; Milne and Adler, 1999; Campbell 2004; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006) to measure the level of risk disclosure in the annual report. 
Content analysis is a method of codifying the text (or content) of a piece of 
writing into various groups (or categories) depending on selected criteria 
(Weber, 1988). The extent and nature of risk disclosure in annual reports 
was measured according to the number of sentences disclosed and trends 
were analysed over a six-year period. Risk disclosure is classified 
according to four quality variables: risk disclosure categories 
(environmental risk, operational risk, strategic risk); the nature of 
evidence (i. e., qualitative versus quantitative); the type of news (good, bad, 
neutral); and time orientation (future, past, non-time). 
The present research attempts to measure directly the cost of equity 
through a four-stage dividend growth model. In addition, bid-ask spread 
was used to capture information asymmetry, a component of the cost of 
equity capital. Another proxy, stock volatility, was also used. The analysis is 
based on companies' annual reports based on a sample extracted from the 
FTSE 100-index. The selection procedures yield 52 UK non-financial 
companies. Three annual reports for each company (fiscal years 1998, 
2001, and 2004) are sought and analysed. A three-year interval was 
chosen to give greater time coverage for the analysis, hence allowing more 
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in-depth examination of trends. The time span 1998-2004 is recent 
enough to ensure reasonable access to firms' corporate reports and yet 
still ensures the availability of other post-sample data. 
The focus on FTSE-100 index makes sense given the focus of prior studies 
of risk disclosure practices (e. g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Dunne et al., 
2007; Abraham and Cox, 2007). The focus on FTSE-100 index firms will 
ensure that the sample includes some multiple listing companies and that 
all companies are subject to approximately equivalent levels of disclosure 
pressures arising from various regulatory and capital market regimes. 
More importantly, FTSE-100 firms are the UK's largest, audited by the 
biggest firms and tend to be well monitored; hence, the selection will 
ensure analysts' forecasts accuracy (Kou and Hussain, 2007). 
The reason for choosing annual report as a basis for analysis is because it 
is the most dominant, reliable, and significant source of information for 
users. Furthermore, most accounting rules and codes of corporate 
governance are aimed at disclosures in the annual report. 
1.6 Chapter Summaries 
Chapter one provides an introduction to this thesis together with an 
outline of the key aims of the research. 
Chapter two provides the context for the issue in corporate disclosure 
with special focus on recent changes in business environment, the debate 
on corporate reporting and related literature. The chapter begins with a 
review of various factors and business events that have occurred recently 
and affected businesses and raised questions on the corporate governance 
system and quality of business reporting. The chapter then discusses 
issues in corporate reporting including users needs and information 
problems. This is followed by a comprehensive review of the role of 
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regulators and accounting institutions in promoting corporate reporting in 
an attempt to restore user confidence. This covers regulatory 
development, the development in corporate governance and the role of 
accounting institutions. Following this, a section reviewing related 
literature on risk and risk disclosure where the notions of "risk" and risk 
classification are discussed. In addition, previous studies which examined 
risk disclosure will be reviewed and discussed in order to identify gaps in 
the literature. 
Chapter three begins by explaining the term 'disclosure' and differentiates 
between different types of disclosure. The chapter presents the theoretical 
framework of disclosure, which includes various disclosure theories. The 
aim is to understand what motivates managers to disclose additional 
information regarding their firms. This is followed by a section devoted to 
explaining disclosure benefits and costs. Following this, the determinant 
factors of disclosure are discussed. This chapter culminates with a review 
of the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital, and a summary of previous 
studies is presented. 
Chapter four describes the research methods and research design which 
has been utilized to achieve the research aims and objectives. The chapter 
outlines the research objectives, research questions and hypotheses. The 
chapter then presents the research models and, in addition, the sample 
selection procedures. This is followed by a section devoted to describing 
the research methods chosen to carry out this research. The measures of 
variables are discussed. Descriptive statistics are described followed by a 
discussion on the use of statistical tests and data sources. 
Chapter five reports the results of content analysis. It gives a broad 
explanation of the results of content analysis. Hypothesis 1 will be tested 
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in this chapter. A discussion of the results will be given and some 
comments are made. 
Chapter six reports on the results of statistical analysis which examines 
the relationship between disclosure and some firm-specific characteristics 
including firm size, leverage, industry type, and US-dual listing. Then the 
results of this chapter are explained and discussed. 
Chapter seven constitutes the final chapter on empirical analysis. The 
chapter reports on the results of empirical analysis which examine the 
impact of risk disclosure on the cost of equity. The results are discussed 
and explained. 
Chapter eight summarizes the research findings with discussions on the 
contributions of this research. Limitations of the study are also outlined in 
this chapter. In addition, potential extensions of the study and areas for 
future research are explored. 
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2.1 Introduction 
"Studying risk disclosure is important because corporate 
transparency about risk is vital for the well functioning of 
capital markets. " 
(Deumes, 2008: 122) 
Financial reporting or disclosure is defined by the Accounting Standards 
Steering Committee (ASSC) as the process of communicating information, 
both financial and non-financial, regarding the resources and performance 
of the reporting entity (ASSC, 1975). Disclosure is a complex function and 
is critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market. Disclosure in 
company reports is an area that has aroused the interest of the financial 
reporting community including regulators and accounting setters, stock 
markets, accounting and auditing bodies, academics, rating agencies, and 
other interested users of reported information including investors and the 
public. 
In particular, the last 15 years have seen dramatic changes in the business 
environment, which created concerns among users of financial reports as 
well as company directors. With this in mind, the aim of this chapter is to 
carry out a critique of the literature. More specifically, the chapter covers 
related literature on corporate reporting and corporate risk disclosure. 
Throughout the chapter, changes in the economic and business 
environments are discussed. Next, the recent debate on financial 
reporting, the information needs of users, and information problems is 
explained. Thereafter, the role of accounting regulatory and accounting 
institutions in promoting corporate reporting is discussed. Afterwards, the 
concept of risk and risk categories are examined followed by a section 
reviewing previous related risk disclosure studies culminating in a 
summary of the chapter. 
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2.2 General Background 
This section highlights the characteristics of the business environment and 
the economic forces which gave rise to a demand for disclosure and 
motivated both regulators and the accounting profession to act to enhance 
the quality of financial reporting and increase its credibility. 
., i.!!: (:, 'I: 
The business environment has changed dramatically over the past fifteen 
years driven by fundamental developments in technology, society and 
world politics. Additional factors influencing businesses and corporate 
financial reporting include the globalisation of capital markets, expansion 
of businesses as well as economic, political and regulatory conditions. 
Figure 2.1 highlights the factors that have most impacted the corporate 
reporting of companies. These changes create risks. 
Mo!, -i000 ! u' 
r fc, rnis 
Competitive Globali1ateon 
pressure 
Technological FINANCIAL Increasing 
change -º 
REPORTING 4- regulation 
Political and Financial 
eO Komi( -I- volatility 
in( i e. r,,,, d dorn, rnd for 
information by investors 
Figure 2.1: Pressure for Change: Factors Affecting Financial Reporting 
The evolution of new technology during the late 20th century - such as 
computers, communications, and the internet - has facilitated the 
expansion of businesses as well as the globalisation of capital markets, 
thereby creating many opportunities and challenges for companies. Such 
technological advances have made it progressively easier for companies to 
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communicate with investors and financial intermediaries through the 
internet and other communication tools. However, a key challenge lies in 
the fact that the economic impact of these innovations is not reflected in 
financial statements in a timely manner (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Capital and products markets are becoming increasingly global. However, 
globalisation causes complexity in business transactions and structures. 
Given the differences in legal, social and economic circumstances in 
different countries and also the differences in need for accounting 
information, among the users of financial reports, there have been calls for 
harmonising regulations, accounting standards and procedures related to 
the preparation and presentation of financial statements, otherwise 
referred to as the globalization of financial reporting. Notably, the 
international harmonisation of accounting practices was a central concern 
for companies operating in more than one country (Weetman, 1999). 
Many organisations have also adopted rapid and innovative forms of 
business expansion through either internal development or merger and 
acquisitions. While such development and expansion is necessary for the 
growth of businesses it has, however, created many challenges and 
concerns. Trading conditions have also become very tough and 
competitive, and remain so, with new businesses emerging all the time. 
Companies are being confronted with various laws and regulations. Many 
countries around the world have recently developed, or are in the process 
of developing new regulatory and legal structures. These laws and 
regulations are sometimes complex and change frequently and tend to 
become more stringent over time. Applying and complying with these laws 
and regulations is sometimes costly and may adversely impact companies' 
operating cost and performance. 
The ongoing political conflict in some significant parts of the world created 
concerns. The economic downturn of the late 1990s had a knock-on effect 
on the macro-economy and was also a real concern to politicians. Energy 
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prices dropped, volatility increased, consumer spending decreased, 
economic growth slowed, earnings sank, stock markets fell and investors' 
wealth declined (Andersen et al., 2001). The rise in stock return volatility 
together with an increase in economic, political and regulatory uncertainty 
around the globe was also cause for concern. 
Furthermore, the events of 9/11 coupled with the recent business 
scandals and failures of major companies such as Enron, WorldCom (and 
more recently Lehman Brothers and AIG) have worsened already 
deteriorating economic conditions. Investors' confidence has been shaken 
in the truthfulness and accuracy of information provided. The survey of 
UK investors conducted by Cavendish Asset Management (2002) found 
that 66% of UK investors no longer feel confident investing in the stock 
market as a result of fraud and accounting problems at Enron and 
WorldCom. This raises questions concerning the quality of financial 
reporting and the efficiency of corporate governance (CG). 
2.2.2 Business Reporting: Recent Developments 
In any economy, disclosure is essential for the optimal allocation of saving 
to investment opportunities in the economy (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Therefore, it is essential to provide investors and other users with useful 
information to enable them to make investment decisions, hence achieving 
stock market prosperity (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board stated that financial reporting 
is intended to provide information that is useful to different users in 
making business and economic decisions (FASB, 1978). In 1989, the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) - later 
reconstituted as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) - 
supported the FASB's view stating that financial statements should 
"provide information about the financial position, performance and 
changes in financial position of an enterprise that is useful to a wide range 
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of users in making economic decisions" (IASC, 1989: Para 12). However, 
"financial statements do not provide all the information that users may 
need to make economic decisions since they largely portray the financial 
effects of past events and do not necessarily provide non-financial 
information" (IASC, 1989: Para 13). 
The rapid pace of change meant that the present financial statements 
reporting model fell short in reflecting the economic consequences of 
many of these changes in a timely way. Adding to this is the growth of 
intangible assets including those constituting intellectual capital which are 
not recognised in financial statements (Beattie and Pratt, 2002; Beattie et 
al., 2002). Past performance in financial statements has become a less 
useful guide to future prospects (Beattie and Pratt, 2002) and fell short in 
satisfying investors' demands of understanding a company's future 
performance (e. g., ICAS, 1999). It is argued (e. g., Elliot, 1992; AICPA, 1994; 
ICAEW, 1997,1999b; ICAS, 1999; Lev and Zarowin, 1999) that the present 
financial reporting model is increasingly inadequate in meeting the 
information needs of users in the new rapid economy characterised with a 
highly advanced technology. Previous research (Francis and Schipper, 
1999; Brown et al., 1999; Chang, 1998) provides evidence of the declining 
value-relevance of financial statements. Also, financial reporting was 
perceived as being "unreliable", "irrelevant"; "inadequate"; "incomplete", 
and "unsatisfactory" (e. g., Aboody and Kasznik, 2000). Hence, there have 
been increased calls for studying the relevance of financial reporting. It 
was suggested that the present accounting model should be re-engineered 
to provide more relevant information to users of financial reporting. There 
was an acknowledgment that companies had to change their external 
reporting if it was to maintain its relevance (Elliot, 1992). Elaborating on 
this, it has been suggested (e. g., AICPA, 1994; ASB, 1999; IASC, 2000) that 
for financial information to be useful to users, it must have the following 
five characteristics: relevance, reliability, comparability, timelines and 
understandability. 
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Thus, along with this development, there was growing evidence regarding 
the need and importance of narrative disclosure/communication, as used 
by all information users. Previous research (e. g., Solomon et al., 2000) 
provides evidence that investors regard the forward-looking information 
(where risk information is considered a critical part of this type of 
information) as an important source for decision-making. There is also 
evidence (Rogers and Grant, 1997; Breton and Taffler, 2001) that analysts 
relied highly on narrative sections of annual report where forward looking 
information is disclosed. The evidence (Bartlett and Chandler, 1997; 
KPMG, 2005) concludes that private shareholders viewed narrative 
disclosure sections as highly important. Over the past years, 
recommendations have been made to encourage companies to provide 
additional information in narrative sections outside financial statements 
such as the chairman statement, chief executive review, the operating and 
financial review (OFR), directors' report and corporate governance report. 
Evidence (e. g., ASB, 2007) shows that some companies have responded to 
this demand and increased the content of qualitative information in their 
annual report. Improving disclosure would be beneficial from both the 
company's and investors' perspective. From the investors' perspective, 
disclosure is useful and improves their decision-making (ICAS, 1999). 
From the company's perspective, improved disclosure would increase 
transparency, thereby reducing the company's cost of capital (ICAEW, 
1997,1999b; Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002; Froidevaux, 2004; Petersen and 
Plenborg, 2006) and increasing its share price performance (Healy et al., 
1999). 
Forced by the regulators and accounting bodies, companies began to 
change the type of information used internally to manage their businesses, 
and, therefore, adopted new performance measures for internal reporting 
purposes, such as those developed in the framework of the Balanced 
Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). In addition, new measures and 
techniques have been developed and adopted by companies to control and 
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manage their risks, hence, reducing their internal reporting gap. However, 
although the internal reporting gap was narrowed, the external reporting 
gap remains high (Eccles et al., 2001). Recent evidence (e. g., Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006) concludes that the type of risk information disclosed in 
annual reports and the lack of coherence in the risk narratives entails that 
a risk information gap exists. 
Financial reporting was not perceived as useful or particularly 
comprehensive for investors in making their investment decisions partly 
because it focuses more on the past (backward focus). The problem in the 
UK is compounded by past court decisions. These maintain that accounting 
information in the UK is produced to tell the existing owners of the 
company what the directors had done with their money. In other words, 
accounting information was not produced for investment decisions (e. g., 
the case of Candler v. Crane in 1951; and the case of Caparo v. Dickman in 
1993) but for stewardship (explaining the past) purposes'. This is the 
purpose of accounts in Agency theory. However, there is now a strong 
perception that accounting information should also satisfy the needs of 
users for information that is useful for making investment decisions. 
However, some information such as risk is sensitive by nature and, 
therefore, cannot be disclosed; hence company annual report cannot 
always satisfy the information needs of users. 
The following section provides evidence on the increasing public demand 
for firms to disclose more useful information that managers would be able 
to draw on and utilise in assessing future business prospects. 
I However, this is different from the USA where the safe harbour protection is provided to 
companies releasing forward looking information. 
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2.2.3 The Information Needs of Users 
Several academic studies and professional reports worldwide (e. g., ICAS, 
1988; AICPA, 1994; ICAEW, 1997,1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2002; ICAS, 1999; 
IASB, 2005; CICA, 2002) highlighted the drawbacks of the present financial 
reporting model and called for a more comprehensive disclosure to satisfy 
the needs of corporate report users. 
For example, Baker and Haslam (1973) found that individual investors 
were keen to be able to access three key elements of information for the 
purpose of their investment analysis of a total of 34 identified factors. 
These include a company's future economic outlook, the quality of 
management, and the future economic outlook of the industry. 
Furthermore, Lee and Tweedie (1975) found that one-third of 
shareholders included in the survey conducted confirm the need for 
information related to the future prospects of companies and their 
income-generating potential. 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued a 
report entitled Report of the Task Force on Risk and Uncertainties 
recognising that the users of financial statements in uncertain 
environments are increasingly demanding more information to help them 
to evaluate risk and uncertainties related to company results and future 
cash flow (AICPA, 1987). In addition, Making Corporate Report Valuable 
(MCRV) published in 1988 by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland (ICAS) criticized the present corporate reporting model and 
described it as "unsatisfactory" because it seldom gives any indication of 
the overall objectives of the entity. The traditional financial statements 
model does not adequately reflect the economic reality of a company's 
progress and position, concentrating on past events rather than the future. 
Notably, the AICPA reported that business reports are losing their 
significance since they are not future-oriented and do not provide value- 
based information. Improving Business Reporting: A Customer Focus, 
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Meeting the Information Needs of Investors and Creditors, published by 
the AICPA (1994) (the Jenkins report) identified that users demand more 
information about strategy, strength and weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats, performance measures, management plans, trends, significant 
risks and uncertainties. Furthermore, a study by the Association for 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR, 1993) found that financial 
analysts are in need of additional information about company strategies, 
plans and expectations. 
Weetman et al. (1994,1996) examined the views of analysts and 
institutional investors on information reported by companies in Operating 
and Financial Review (OFR). The results indicated that analysts believed 
that the OFR would contain useful information though the assertion that 
companies would produce high-quality reports on a voluntary basis was 
deemed improbable. The ICAEW project revealed a very low level (only 
1%) of forward-looking information disclosure and quantified disclosure 
to support the need for a statutory requirement (Beattie et al., 2002). 
These findings support the findings of previous researchers (Zeff, 1995) 
on the need for a mandatory OFR statement. Analysts expressed their need 
for forward-looking information rather than historical events. Among 
forward-looking information, information related to risk and uncertainties 
was the most important information that respondents would like to 
welcome. 
Eccles and Mavrianc (1995) noted the incorrect communication system in 
the capital market and emphasised the need to improve information 
disclosure. Rankin's (1996) study on environmental reporting concluded 
that investors are demanding more information than they are receiving. 
Coleman and Eccles (1997) surveyed 200 UK financial analysts and found 
that the analysts viewed companies' disclosures on seven valuable 
measures as inadequate. Schrand and Elliott (1998) summarised and 
documented the debate held in the 1997 AAA/FASB conference on risk 
reporting by companies to their stakeholders. The authors suggested that 
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US companies were not providing sufficient information related to risk in 
their annual reports. 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) has 
also expressed its view on user needs suggesting that the traditional 
model did not provide users with information about the risk to which 
companies are exposed, and which may affect company future 
performance. The Institute issued a number of professional reports 
(ICAEW, 1997,1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2002,2004b) addressing specific 
issues relating to the future of corporate reporting. Most notably, the 
ICAEW has suggested a framework for the comprehensive reporting of 
risk (ICAEW, 1997) and encouraged the directors of UK listed companies 
to report upon risk in greater depth (ICAEW, 1997,1999b, 2002). Hence, 
stressing the importance of enhancing risk disclosure by encouraging 
companies to disclose their key risks, explaining how these risks are being 
managed and what measures are used in assessing risks. The aim is to 
provide investors with practical forward looking information that will 
assist them in making more accurate investment decisions. Disclosure of 
forward-looking financial and non-financial risk information is considered 
as key information by investors, as it aids them and improves their 
decision-making (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Solomon et al., 2000; 
Hermanson, 2000; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; ICAS, 1999). The absence of 
forward looking information may lead investors to make inaccurate 
investment decisions based on other inaccurate information sources. 
Epstein and Palepu (1999) found that financial analysts are not satisfied 
with the amount of information they receive on strategies and risks. 
Similarly, Solomon et al. (2000) concluded that institutional investors 
perceived the level of risk disclosure to be insufficient. Furthermore, 
institutional investors acknowledged the importance of risk disclosure as 
it aids them in assessing the risk profile of a company. Beattie and Pratt 
(2002) examined users' views in relation to a comprehensive set of 130 
disclosure items. The authors provided evidence on users' preferences for 
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disclosure of financial items, board objectives and strategy, together with 
some management discussion and analysis items, background items, risk 
items and innovation value driver items. Beattie et al. (2002) analysed 
over 6000 narrative texts units and found little disclosure on non-financial 
performance measure, analytical discussion and forward-looking 
information. Clarkson et al. (1999) provide evidence on the relation 
between forward-looking information disclosure and future corporate 
performance suggesting that forward-looking disclosure provide credible 
information. Walker and Tsalta (2001) documented a positive association 
between the quality of forward-looking information and analysts 
forecasts. Mak (1996) found a positive relationship between disclosure of 
future earnings and the extent of information asymmetry. Furthermore, 
the author concludes that this type of disclosure is affected by the level of 
agency cost. Deumes and Knechel (2008) found that the extent of 
voluntary internal control reporting is positively associated with 
indications of information and agency problems. Their results reveal 
strong evidence that managers provide relatively more disclosure on 
internal control if information problems and agency conflicts are high. 
Thus, if companies fail to meet user demand, the reporting gap between 
preparers and users will be high. As a result, companies may face a higher 
cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002). In addition, there is also the 
risk of adverse economic consequences that may arise. The following 
section examines these issues further. 
2.2.4 Information Problems 
Investors demand information from companies in which they are 
interested due to the fact that management has greater knowledge of both 
the firm's current and future performance, certainly more so than outside 
investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). There exist 
many positive reasons for additional disclosure. For example, disclosure 
enables investors to make more accurate investment decisions 
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(Hermanson, 2000; ICAS, 1999; Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Solomon et al., 
2000), and also reduces the level of information asymmetry between 
managers and investors, thereby reducing the firm's cost of capital. 
Disclosure is, however, influenced by a diverse range of supply and 
demand forces (Craswell and Taylor, 1992). These forces have created 
what is called "the information gap" between those who prepare financial 
reports (managers) and those who use the reports (investors), hence an 
increased demand for information by users in the face of information 
asymmetry and agency conflict between company managers and investors. 
Quintessentially, there is a concern among those who prepare reports that 
disclosure of confidential and sensitive information may be used by 
competitors, thereby potentially damaging their own business. In addition, 
litigation might reduce directors' incentives to disclose additional 
information. However, this should not outweigh the benefits of disclosure 
to users. Such an imbalance between demand and supply inevitably fuels 
the information problems. 
In modern corporations, the separation of ownership and control adds to 
the potential conflict of interest between the principals (investors) who 
invests their money in the business and managers (agents) who are 
charged with acting responsibly on behalf of the principal in managing the 
business (Brealey and Myers, 2000,2003). Since both management and 
investors are acting to maximise their own benefits and have conflicting 
incentives, agency problems most often occur when management are 
encouraged to act against the interest of investors by withholding some 
information. When agents (managers) hold relevant information about the 
current and future performance of the business, but withhold this 
information from owners (investors) (for various reasons including 
commercial sensitivity and uncertainty about measurements), this leads to 
an information problem between insiders and outsiders of the business, 
known as information asymmetry. This is a key issue in corporate 
disclosure and a serious problem that could potentially disturb the 
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operation of the capital markets leading to their partial or complete 
breakdown (Akerlof, 1970; Lev, 1988). 
Whilst it is not possible to resolve such information problems completely 
by means of private collection and analysis of data due to the costly nature 
of accessing such resources coupled with the knowledge required to 
effectively do so, and known only by a small number of investors. 
Information asymmetry between firms and investors may produce the 
problem of adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) leading to the removal of 
uninformed investors from the market, resulting in higher transaction 
costs, lower trading volume, and liquidity problem or even total market 
breakdown (Lev, 1988). Thus, voluntary disclosure has become an 
important issue to the extent that it has aroused the attention and interest 
of regulators, accounting institutions and other interested groups who 
have vested interests in corporate reporting. The next section provides an 
overview on the role of UK regulators, accounting setters, and accounting 
organisations in promoting corporate disclosure to improve the level of 
transparency and disclosure in companies' financial reporting. 
2.3 Theoretical Literature and Policy Developments: An Overview of the 
Role of Accounting Regulation, Accounting Bodies and Accounting 
Institutions in Promoting Corporate Disclosure 
It is evident from the above review that there appears to be a growing 
support for the view that the present financial reporting package with its 
backward focus is not enough to satisfy investors' demands for 
information. This has consequently roused interest among regulators, the 
accounting profession and academics worldwide in the quality of financial 
reporting. The accounting profession has witnessed significant criticism 
from various bodies including the accounting profession itself, academics, 
governments and regulatory bodies. There was a significant drive and 
urgency for developing an aggressive program designed to enhance the 
relevance, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of corporate reporting in 
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order to provide users (investors) with more rational information that 
may facilitate their investment decisions. UK Companies are bound by 
different regulations and norms, at national and international levels, 
which oblige them to report on risk. The following sections review the role 
of the regulators in corporate disclosure law. The sections review relevant 
regulations and accounting standards, and the growing literature of 
corporate governance. Further, the sections highlight the efforts of 
accounting institutions in enhancing corporate reporting. Throughout the 
discussion, the review focuses on the key issue of concern, namely risk 
reporting disclosure (which is considered as part of forward-looking 
information). 
2.3.1 The Regulatory Development 
The regulators have been actively considering how to promote better 
disclosure by listed companies in order to increase transparency of 
financial reporting, hence restoring investors' confidence. This is achieved 
by considering new general rules and formats, that is, mandatory 
disclosure, and also by encouraging companies to follow best practice in 
their reporting by way of voluntary disclosure in order to help users 
understand current and expected future conditions of the company. 
Of late, risk reporting required mainly from listed companies has been 
under a long chain of regulatory and professional debate. In the UK, the 
regulations that govern financial reporting prepared are drawn from an 
assembly of different regulatory bodies including the Financial Reporting 
Council, the Financial Services Authority and company law. 
The corporate report 1975 (ASSC, 1975) was published by the Accounting 
Standards Steering Committee (ASSC) to consider the usefulness of 
published financial statements and sought to satisfy the information needs 
of users. The report identified several users of information and stressed 
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that companies should provide information which is deemed to be 
relevant, reliable, comparable, understandable, complete and objective. 
In 1993, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB), the operating body of 
Financial Reporting Council, has recognised the need of users for quality 
information and introduced a non-mandatory statement Operating and 
Financial Review (OFR), the equivalent of the Management Discussion and 
Analysis (MD&A), to encourage the wider use of reviews within the annual 
report. The ASB suggests that an OFR should include the following: a 
discussion of the business as a whole, trends and factors that have affected 
the results, a separation between trend and factors that are not expected 
to continue and those that are expected to have an impact on future 
performance (para 3). The discussion should be objective and balanced, 
balancing good and bad news. The ASB also recommended UK listed 
companies to discuss principal risks and uncertainties. In addition, 
companies are encouraged to comment on the approach to managing 
these risks, and in qualitative terms, the nature of the potential impact of 
the results. The ASB encouraged disclosure of events, trends and 
uncertainties that are expected to have an impact on the business in the 
future, and recommended listed companies to disclose the dynamics of the 
operations related to the principal risks and uncertainties within the OFR. 
Thus, while the OFR statement encourages disclosure of forward-looking 
information, companies are not required to provide forecast disclosures or 
any other disclosure that may harm their business. The intention here is to 
assist users in making their decisions. 
Indeed, the introduction of the OFR was an important shift that 
emphasised the importance of narrative disclosure and represented a 
major innovation in UK financial reporting. It provided evidence of the 
regulators' recognition of the importance of qualitative, non-financial 
information disclosures. Since it was launched in 1993, the OFR has been a 
feature of the annual report of many listed companies and was subject to 
extensive discussion. Following a period of consultation with various 
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preparers and users (Weetman et al., 1996), the ASB had emphasised a 
desire for general voluntary consensus rather than regulation (ASB, 1992), 
thereby encouraging the development of best practice (Weetman, 1999). 
Notably, the statement is strongly user-oriented. 
The Final Report produced by the Company Law Review Steering 
Committee, released in July 2001 took the view that OFR should be 
mandatory (DTI, 2001). A revised version of the OFR statement was issued 
in January 2003 by the ASB (ASB, 2003), providing a broader framework 
for the discussion of business performance than its predecessor in 1993. 
The statement set out the principles that directors should follow when 
preparing an OFR. Reflecting the power of Company Law, the statement 
gives emphasis to the need for the provision of information about the 
business objectives and strategy, the expected effect of known trends, the 
potential effect of risks facing the businesses and the key performance 
indicators used by management. 
The UK regulation initially introduced a new requirement [S.! 2005/1011- 
("the March Regulations") the Companies Act (Operating and Financial 
Review and Director Report etc. ) Regulation, 2005] in the Companies Act 
1985 ("the 1985 Act") which came into force on 22 March 2005 for all 
listed companies to publish an OFR on or after 1st April 2005 which 
compiled with a standard to be issued by the ASB. The Regulations ("the 
March Regulations") also expanded into an enhanced business review the 
existing requirements for companies to include a fair review of their 
business in Directors' Report. These requirements were a specific 
implementation of the EU Accounts Modernisation Directive2. Following 
the requirements, a Reporting Standard (RS) 1 'the Operating and 
Financial Review' was issued by the ASB on May 2005 (Companies House, 
2006) which, in the main, following the requirements of the Final Report. 
The standard superseded the revised OFR that was issued in 2003. 
2 The Directive requires directors to provide, among other things, a description of the principal 
risks and uncertainties facing the company. 
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The intention was that directors of companies should focus on the 
information needs of users rather than follow a rigid list of items to be 
disclosed. The requirements for publishing an OFR extended the 
requirements of the Directive in order to provide greater disclosure for 
shareholders. The mandatory OFR intended to include disclosure relating 
to all areas has been seen as a focus for narrative reporting disclosure 
generally. However, on 28th November 2005, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (Gordon Brown) announced the Government's intention to 
remove the statutory requirements on listed companies for the new 
mandatory OFR which came into force in April 2005. Regulations to repeal 
the requirement [Statutory Instrument, SI, No. 205/3442] were laid in 
Parliament on 15th December 2005 and came into force on 12th January 
2006 (DTI, 2006; FRC, 2006). 
The government concluded that it was not practical to regulate the OFR by 
law, and decided to abolish the mandatory requirements. The chancellor's 
decision surprised and shocked the business community. Perhaps the 
government decided to diminish the corporate red tape burden (Grant, 
2006) and provide safe harbour protection for directors. It was left to the 
ASB to change the status of RS 1, and in 2006 the ASB issued a Reporting 
Statement, replacing the RS 1, providing best practice guidance rather 
than a statutory requirement. The ASB recommended, among other 
things, that "the OFR should include a description of the principal risks 
and uncertainties facing the entity together with a commentary on the 
directors' approach to them" (ASB, 2006: Para 52). Companies' directors 
should also provide a discussion of the issues that have affected the 
performance of the business during the period and those that are expected 
to affect its future performance and financial position. It was also 
recommended that forward-looking orientation should be included in the 
statement in order to help shareholders understand and assess the 
company's strategies. In general, the ASB emphasised on providing quality 
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information rather than a large quantity of information which may result 
in significant issues becoming vague. 
While the statutory requirements for publishing an OFR have been 
abolished the requirements to include "business review" in the Directors' 
Report remain. The business review, identified as part of the Directors' 
Report, requires "... a description of the principal risks and uncertainties 
facing the company... a balanced and comprehensive analysis of the 
development and performance of the business of the company during the 
financial year, and the position of the company at the end of the 
year-analysis using financial key performance indicators... and where 
appropriate analysis using other key performance indicators, including 
information relating to environmental matters and employees matters" 
(Companies ACT, 2006, Item 417). All UK companies, except those which 
qualify as small companies, have to include a business review in their 
Directors' Report (DTI, 2006). 
Ultimately, companies producing an OFR do not have to produce a 
separate business review as the mandatory OFR would have fulfilled the 
new business review requirements (DTI, 2006). Thus, after the statutory 
01711 has been abolished, it is now the decision of companies' directors 
whether to produce an OFR statement or a business review statement as 
required by the European Accounts Modernisation Directive. The two 
statements include similar requirements. Quoted companies preparing 
statuary OFR in line with the requirements in S. I. 2005/1011 would have 
also fulfilled the requirements for a business review (DTI, 2006). 
UK firms with a US listing are also facing additional risk reporting 
requirements under the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
regulations. The SEC regulations require foreign securities registered in 
the U. S. to reconcile financial statements from their domestic accounting 
standards to U. S. accounting standards and submit this via a form 20-F. 
For example, the instructions for form 20-F require that "the document 
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shall prominently disclose risk factors that are specific to the company or 
its industry" (SEC 2008, p. 11, Item 3D). UK firms are not required to 
disclose this additional information within their UK annual reports, 
however, the information made available to investors in other markets 
give rise to a stock market expectation that the same information must not 
be held back from investors in the UK (Abraham and Cox, 2007). 
In addition, UK companies (and other foreign companies) with a US listing, 
are required to comply with the reporting requirement of the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act (2002). For example, companies are required to report on 
internal controls under sections 302 and 404 of the Act. The Act also 
emphasised disclosure requirements of risks without referring to 
companies' management. For example, section 401 (under title "IV- 
Enhanced Financial Disclosure") requires enhanced disclosures on risks 
involved in off-balance sheet special purpose vehicles. 
The EU directives, modernisation directive and transparency directive, 
require the reporting of the main risks and uncertainties. The 
requirements are not limited to financial risks only, rather the disclosures 
should cover all different types of risks. 
2.3.2 Accounting Rules (Accounting Standards) Related to Risk Disclosure 
At the national levels of individual countries, risk disclosure has been 
underpinned by the development of national accounting standards in 
different countries. Examples include Financial Reporting Standards 
(FRSs) issued by the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in the UK, 
accounting rules issued by Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
in the US; German Accounting Standards (GASs) issued by German 
Accounting Standards Board (GASB). in Germany; Australian Accounting 
Standards (AASs) issued by Australian Accounting Standards Board 
(AAAB) in Australia, and so forth. 
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In the US, FASB, through a number of rules, tackled the reporting of risks 
associated to financial assets within the financial statements (e. g., FASB 
No. 133 (SFAS 133), Accounting for Derivatives Instruments and Hedging 
Activities aims to achieve the objectives of reporting all derivatives in 
balance sheet at fair market value and to increase the transparency of 
derivatives activities; SFAS 5 requires information on contingencies). 
Likewise, the SEC (through its FRR No. 48) established compulsory rules 
on listed companies obliging them to disclose the market risk arising from 
adverse changes in interest and foreign exchange rates, and in stock 
commodity prices. 
At the international level, risk disclosure is encountered in the 
international accounting standards/international financial reporting 
standards (IASs/IFRSs) adopted/issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB). For example, the International Accounting 
standards Board (IASB) adopted/issued a number of rules to establish the 
compulsory disclosure of market risks arise from the use of financial 
assets (e. g., IAS 32, IAS 39, and IFRS 7 deal with capital instruments; IAS 
24 deals with related party disclosures; IAS 37 is related to risk as it deals 
with "provisions, contingent assets and contingent liabilities"; derivatives 
are largely dealt with in IAS 39). 
The EU required all its listed companies to begin applying lASs/IFRSs from 
January 2005. Therefore, UK listed companies are required to prepare 
their consolidated financial statements in accordance with IAS/IFRS from 
2005 onward. Table 2.1 provides examples of the UK accounting standards 
and its IAS's/IFRS's equivalents that tackled risk disclosure. 
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SSAP 25 AS 14*** Segmental reporting 
FRS 5 
FRS 8 
FRS 12 
FR5 13* 
FRS 25" AS 32 
FRS 26 AS 39 
SSAP 25 requires major companies to disclose 
information regarding the different classes of 
business and the different geographical areas in 
which they operate. It is designed to aid users 
identifying the risk inherent in any segment of 
the business. 
No direct Reporting the FRS 5 has the effect of providing a better 
equivalent substance of 
indication of the riskiness' of an enterprise by 
transactions bringing certain assets and liabilities on to the 
balance sheet that might have been treated as 
off balance sheet. 
AS 24 Related party FRS 8 identifies transactions carried out on non- 
disclosures commercial terms. 
Provisions, contingent FRS 12 ensures that a provision is recognized AS 37 
liabilities and only when it is actually exists at the balance 
contingent assets sheet date. 
Derivatives and other FRS 13 helps in identifying risks arising from the 
financial instruments use of financial instruments. 
AS 32 
Financial instruments: FRS 25 helps to understand factors that affect 
Disclosure and the amount, timing and certainty of an entity's 
presentation future cash flows relating to financial 
instruments and the accounting policies applied 
to those instruments. Also, the nature and 
extent of an entity's use of financial instruments, 
the risks associated with them, and 
management's policies for controlling those 
risks, 
Financial instrument: FRS 26 set down principles for recognizing and 
Measurement measuring all types of financial instruments 
except some items. 
FRS 29 IFRS 7 Financial Instrument: FRS 29 helps to understand nature and extent of 
Disclosure risk arising from financial instruments by 
requiring disclosures specifically related to the 
way the entity manages and monitors risks. 
Table 2.1: Accounting Standards Relating to Risk Disclosure 
On January 2005. the reporting requirements of FRS 13 was replaced by FRS 25 IAS 32. 
" From 1 January 2007 the reporting requirements of FRS 25 was replaced by the requirement of FRS 
29/IFRS 7 
"' IAS 14 is replaced by IFRS 8 Operating Segment' effective for annual periods beginning 1 January 
2009 
The UK accounting standards presented in Table 2.1 above represent the 
UK risk-relevant reporting standards that UK companies should comply 
with given the period of analysis in this research study (i. e. 1998-2004). 
For UK listed companies, the requirement of the EU to comply with 
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IASs/IFRSs beginning January 2005 means that there are implications for 
risk disclosure published in their annual reports. 
Accounting rules have been developed in response to the increasing needs 
of users for relevant risk information. For example, Financial Reporting 
Standard (FRS) 13 "Derivatives and other Financial Instruments" issued by 
the ASB in 1998 to tackle the perceived high disclosure attached to 
derivatives and other financial instruments. FRS 13, which came into force 
in March 1999, obliges companies to disclose narrative and numerical 
details about the use of all financial instruments, held or issued, in order to 
provide information about their impact on the entity's risk profile. FRS 25 
was issued to tackle "Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation", 
and FRS 26 tackles "Financial Instrument: Measurement". 
The UK and IASs/IFRSs rules are roughly comparable and most of national 
accounting standards are based on the relevant IASs or IFRSs. For 
example, FRS 25 issued in the UK is equivalent to IAS 32; FRS 26 is 
equivalent to IAS 39. Likewise, Australian Accounting Standard Board 
(AASB) 132 "financial Instrument: Disclosure Presentation" is equivalent 
to IAS 32 "Financial Instruments: Presentation" issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). AASB 1033 is equivalent to IAS 39 
"Financial Instrument: Recognition and Measurement" issued by IASB. 
AASB 7 "Financial Instruments: Disclosure" is equivalent to IFRS 7 
"Financial Instruments: Disclosures". 
However, most regimes followed a piecemeal approach - accounting rules 
are aimed at specific risk categories as opposed to requiring 
comprehensive risk reporting. Accounting rules do not tackle any other 
risks related to non-financial risk and financial risk other than those stated 
in the standards (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Dobler, 2008). A notable 
exception to the above is Germany which has a separate standards GAS 5 
requiring a comprehensive and self-contained risk report (e. g., Beretta and 
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Bozzolan, 2004; Dobler, 2008) located in the management report 
(equivalent to MD&A report in the US annual report; and to the OFR 
statement in the UK annual report). Although there appears to be a 
movement towards a more comprehensive risk reporting there is, 
however, difficulty in how to incorporate information on risk in the 
present model of disclosure (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). 
2.3.3 The Development of Corporate Governance (CG) 
In modern corporations where shares are widely held, the management of 
company is delegated to directors who are not major shareholders of the 
corporation. The 'ultimate responsibility' of the directors is to mange and 
run the company in a way that maximises the long-term returns to 
shareholders (i. e., maximise the company's profit and cash flow). The 
separation of ownership and control in corporations leads to agency 
relationship between shareholders (principals) and management (agents). 
However, there is a potential conflict of interest, arising from both an 
information and power imbalance, between principals (investors) who 
invest their money in the business and management (agents) who are 
responsible in acting on behalf of principals in managing the business 
(Brealey and Myers, 2000,2003). This results in the principals 
(shareholders) being vulnerable to risk whereby management potentially 
act more in self interest than corporative interest. 
This emphasised the need for the system of corporate governance (defined 
as the system by which companies are controlled and managed) that aims 
at providing the means to ensure that companies are managed in the 
interests of their owners, that directors are managing the business at best 
and maximising returns to shareholders, and that business risk is 
minimised to a reasonable level. The system defines the distribution of 
responsibilities amongst the board and managers so a director or a board 
of directors do not become detriment of the shareholders. 
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The UK framework of corporate governance codes and guidelines (codes 
of best practices and related guidance) has been developed over the years 
in different countries. Internal control, risk management and risk 
reporting have been embedded in corporate governance and received a 
great deal of attention over the past decade. Worldwide, the attention took 
the form of improved guidance on developing and implementing internal 
control as evidenced by, for example, the COSO report (COSO, 1992,2004) 
and especially the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the US, Cadbury report 
(1992), Hampel report (1998) and Turnbull (1999) in the UK, Peters 
committee (1997) and Tabaksblat committee (2003) in the Netherlands. 
Many other countries such as Germany, Italy and Canada are also well 
advanced in this regard. 
In the UK, the issue of internal control and risk has been gaining more and 
more importance. The first reference to this is the publication of the 
Cadbury Report in 1992 by the Cadbury Committee which was taken 
forward by the publication of the Greenbury, Hampel and Turnbull 
reports. These codes provided, among other things, guidelines for 
companies' directors on establishing and monitoring the internal control 
systems, and reporting on the main risk that they face. Despite that, these 
guidelines are neither requirements nor accounting standards. Listed 
companies are expected to comply with them as non-compliance could 
have an adverse effect on the company's share price. Listed companies 
that do not comply with these requirements should include an explanation 
as to why they have not complied with these requirements in the 
statement required by the Listing Rules. Effective corporate governance 
structures are now considered important criteria for shareholders in 
selecting the company in which they wish to invest when making positive 
investment decisions (Müller, 2002). 
The Cadbury Committee was set up in 1991 by the Financial Reporting 
Council, the London Stock Exchange and accounting profession issued the 
Cadbury Code in 1992 which included a Code of Best Practice and its 
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recommendations were incorporated into the Listing Rules of the London 
Stock Exchange. The code made proposals covering four key areas: the 
board of directors; non-executive directors; executive directors; and 
control and reporting. Under the latter, the code proposed that directors of 
public companies should report on the effectiveness of the company's 
systems of internal control. 
Following Cadbury, a 'Working Group on Internal Control' was set up to 
assist companies complying with the Principle 4.5 of the Cadbury Code 
"reporting on the effectiveness of the company's system of internal 
control". This led to the publication of the Rutteman Report in 1994 on 
Internal Control and Financial Reporting. The Greenbury Report, 
published in 1995, adds additional requirements to those set by the 
Cadbury Report in regard to directors' remuneration. 
The Hampel Report, published in 1998, reviewed the progress on 
corporate governance since the publication of Cadbury in 1992. With 
regard to internal control, the Hampel Report widened the concept of 
internal control to address business risk assessment. financial 
management, and compliance with laws and regulation and the 
safeguarding of assets, including the minimising of fraud. The report 
proposed that companies should report on all controls rather than just 
financial controls, however, without requiring directors to give opinions 
on the effectiveness of these controls. 
The Combined Code, Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best 
Practice which was published in 1998 by the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) required directors of listed companies to "maintain a sound system 
of internal control to safeguard shareholders' investment and the 
company assets" (principle D. 2) and explain how this had been achieved. 
Under provision D. 2.1 "the directors, at least annually, should conduct a 
review of the effectiveness of the group's system of internal control and 
should report to shareholders that they have done so. The review should 
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cover all controls, including financial, operational, and compliance controls 
and risk management". Thus, directors should include a statement to 
confirm that they complied with the code by conducting annual review of 
all controls and risk management system. 
The Turnbull Guidance, Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the 
Combined Code (Turnbull Report), published in 1999, resulted from an 
agreement between the ICAEW and LSE in order to provide guidance on 
implementing the internal control requirements of the Combined Code on 
corporate governance. The guidance underlined the importance of internal 
control and risk management stating that "a company's system of internal 
control has a key role in the management of risks that are significant to the 
fulfilment of its business objectives... " (1999: Para 10). 
Before the publication of the Turnbull report, neither company directors 
nor auditors had been willing to express opinions on the effectiveness of 
internal controls (Solomon et al., 2000). The Turnbull Report, therefore, 
was a controversial proposal because it tackled this problem in an 
innovative way by requiring directors to identify, evaluate and manage 
their significant risks and to assess the effectiveness of the related internal 
control system (Para 18 and Para 31). Boards of directors are requested to 
review regularly reports on the effectiveness of the system of internal 
control in managing key risks. The board should state whether they have 
done so. In addition, the board should undertake an annual assessment for 
the purpose of making their statements on internal control in the annual 
report. Thus, the board are encouraged to express an opinion on the 
effectiveness on their systems. 
The Guidance encouraged companies' directors to provide meaningful 
high-level information and encouraged them to report externally on their 
key risks. The Guidance indicates that "... the board should, as a minimum, 
disclose that there is an ongoing process for identifying, evaluating and 
managing the significant risks faced by the company... " (Para 35). In 
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addition, "The board may wish to provide additional information in the 
annual report and accounts to assist understanding of the company's risk 
management processes and system of internal control" (Para 36). 
The Turnbull report requires the board of directors, among other things, 
to consider whether there are significant internal and external 
operational, financial and other risks identified and assessed on an 
ongoing basis. 
The Higgs Report on The Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive 
Directors was published in 2003 almost at the same time as the Smith 
Report, Guidance on Audit Committees was published by the Financial 
Reporting Council. The recommendations from both the Higgs and Smith 
reports have led to changes in the Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance resulting in the publication of a revised combined code in 
2003. The New Combined Code on Corporate Governance applies to all 
companies listed in the primary market of the LSE for reporting years 
commencing on or after 1st November 2003. 
In 2004, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) established the Turnbull 
Review Group to consider the impact of the Turnbull Guidance and to 
determine whether the Turnbull Guidance - Internal Control: Guidance for 
Directors on the Combined Code - which was first issued in 1999 needed 
to be updated. Accordingly, Internal Control: Revised Guidance for 
Directors on the Combined Code was published by the FRC in 2005. The 
Review Group decided to retain the flexible, principles-based approach of 
the original guidance and made only a small number of changes. As 
investors consider the board's attitude towards risk management and 
internal control to be an important factor when making investment 
decisions about a company, the Review Group took investors views into 
account and emphasised the importance of assessment of risks facing 
business and also reiterated the great importance of embedding risk 
management and internal control systems within the business process. 
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When communicating with investors the board should include in the 
annual report a meaningful information statement, as the board considers 
necessary, to help shareholders better understand the risk and control 
issues facing the company, the main features of the company's risk 
management processes and system of internal control, and should not give 
a misleading impression (Para 33). Table 2.2 provides a summary for the 
development of Corporate Governance codes and guidance in the UK. 
Cadbury Requires directors of public companies to maintain a system of internal control 
Report (1992) (Para 4.31). and also recommends directors to report on the effectiveness of their 
system of internal control and that the auditors should report thereon (Para 4.32) 
Hampel The board should maintains a sound system of all internal control include 
Report (1998) operational and compliance controls, and risk management (Para 2.19 and 2.20) but 
the board are not required to give opinions on those controls. 
Combined The board should maintain a sound system of internal control (Para D. 2) and for the 
Code (1998) audit committee to maintain and explain how this had been achieved (Para D. 3). 
The company directors should conduct a review of the effectiveness of their annual 
control systems and should report this information to shareholders (Para D. 2.1). 
Turnbull The board of directors is "responsible for the company's system of internal control 
Report (1999) ...... and must further ensure that the system of internal control is effective in 
managing risks in the manner which it has approved" (Para 16). The report 
encourages companies to report on their key risks without making it mandatory. 
Higgs Report Provided recommendation to the combined code. The report recommended that 
(2003) the board review the company's internal financial control system risk management 
systems. The recommendation made for the revised combined code e. g., the 
suggested code provisions D. 2.2 and D. 3.1 to D. 3.5. For example, the board should 
maintain a sound system of internal control and to review all controls, including 
financial, operational and compliance controls and risk management. 
Smith Report Also contains recommendations for the combined code. The directors should 
(2003) conduct annual review of the effectiveness of the group's system of internal control 
and should report to shareholders that they have done so. The review should cover 
all controls, including financial, operational and compliance controls and risk 
management. 
Combined The board of directors should, at least annually, "conduct a review of the 
Code (revised) effectiveness of the group's system of internal controls and should report to 
2003 shareholders that they have done so. The review should cover all material controls, 
including financial, operational and compliance controls and risk management 
systems" (Para C. 2.1). The audit committee should "review the company's internal 
financial controls and the company's internal control and risk management systems. 
The Turnbull Provide guidance for the board's responsibilities on maintaining a sound system of 
Guidance internal control and risk management. For example, in order to comply with the 
(2005) Code Principle C. 2, the board should disclose that "there is an ongoing process for 
identifying, evaluating and managing the significant risks faced by the company, 
that it has been in place for the year under review and up to the date of approval of 
the annual report and accounts, that it is regularly reviewed by the board and 
accords with the Turnbull guidance" (Para 34). 
Table 2.2: Corporate Governance Development in the UK 
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2.3.4 The Role of the Accounting Institutions in Promoting Risk Disclosure 
As a response to the increased calls for change, several reports, proposals 
and discussion papers (e. g., AICPA, 1994; ICAEW, 1997,1999b, 2002; 
CICA, 2002; ASB, 1993,2003,2006) have challenged the present model of 
business reporting. They have highlighted the failure of financial reports in 
meeting the information need of users and also stressed the narrowing of 
the reporting gap between preparers (managers) and users (e. g., 
investors). The wide-ranging review considered the demand for more 
information on intangibles, future prospects and stakeholder issues to be 
disclosed in the annual report. In general, it supported the need for 
narrative user-driven information disclosure and emphasised the 
importance of information (other than the information with backward 
focus) such as the company's strategy, plans and goals, risk and 
uncertainties, forward-looking information, and other information that 
may assist in understanding the current and future performance and 
prospects. 
In 1988, a report entitled Making Corporate Report Valuable (MCRV) 
published by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) 
encouraged companies to improve their corporate reporting in order to 
assist the users in gauging management performance and assessing an 
entity's prospects. The report made recommendations for companies to 
provide future-oriented information to shareholders. In the report, the 
view of ICAS was to meet the needs of management and investors. The 
report pointed to the shortening of historic cost accounting and supports 
the use of a current value system. Further recommendations were also 
made including investors be provided with future-oriented information as 
used by management in their planning of the business. 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) published 
a report with the aim of improving business reporting (AICPA, 1994). The 
report proposed a comprehensive model of business reporting that 
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included more forward-looking information and placed greater emphasis 
on value drivers and non-financial performance measures. 
The Institute of Chartered Accountant of England and Wales (ICAEW) 
(ICAEW, 1997) published a discussion paper entitled Financial Reporting 
of Risk - Proposals for a Statement of Business Risk. The ICAEW proposed 
that listed companies should be at the forefront of improved risk reporting 
in the financial statements. The Institute's view is that directors should 
include quality information that may assist users to assess the company's 
risk profile and make informed decisions. Recommendations were made 
for enhancing reporting of aspects related to future prospects. The paper 
emphasised that all type of risks should be considered since they have a 
potential bearing upon corporate performance. The ICAEW proposed that 
the preparation of a statement involves three stages as outlined in Table 
2.3. 
Identification and prioritization stage A company should identify and prioritize its key risks. 
Risk management stage 
Description of actions taken to mange each risk that is 
identified. 
Risk measurement stage Description of how each risk is measured. 
Table 2.3: Stages in Preparation of a Statement of Business Risk 
In Stage 1, ICAEW advises that when risks are identified, a company 
should prioritise them so that only risks deemed significant are reported. 
Different tools such as risk mapping or profiling were suggested. In the 
second stage, companies should inform on how they manage their risks 
and outline the methods used. The final stage involves using different 
measures of risks. 
In 1999, the ICAEW (ICAEW, 1999b) published a report entitled No 
Surprises: The Case for Better Risk Reporting which emphasised the need 
for management to disclose appropriate information on their strategies, 
risk and risk management. This report reaffirmed the earlier view that 
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enhanced disclosures about key business risks and how each risk is 
managed and measured would provide practical forward-looking 
information and help meet investors' needs. The ICAEW argues that 
companies who are not prepared to disclose appropriate information 
should reconsider their current listing. In the view of the ICAEW, there is 
no justification as to why listed companies are hiding some information 
when they are keen to maintain a good relationship with the providers of 
capital. However, the institute withdrew its original view (ICAEW, 1997) 
on the production of a statement of business risks and modified its 
suggestion that information should not be incorporated within a 
statement. 
The discussion paper entitled Inside Out: Reporting on Shareholder Value 
(ICAEW, 1999a) issued by the ICAEW and prepared by its financial 
reporting committee noted recognition that there is growing awareness of 
the limitations of the external corporate reporting. The paper stressed the 
importance of enhancing transparency and encourages disclosure of key 
information related to business strategy and information of a forward- 
looking nature, so investors could utilise this when making decisions 
about a given company. 
The following sections review related literature of risk and risk disclosure. 
The review covers the following subjects: risk definition, risk 
categorisations, and previous related risk disclosure studies. 
2.4 Risk and Risk Disclosure 
2.4.1 The Notion of Risk 
When conducting any risk disclosure study, a principle concern lies in the 
definition of risk. In the past, the word 'risk' has been used to reflect 
adverse events that have occurred. In pre-modern society, adverse events 
such as natural events were more likely to be viewed as an 'act of God' and 
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are beyond the influence of human intervention. However, followed by the 
industrial revolution, the ideas of risk have changed, influenced largely by 
the emergence of the insurance industry and the advance of probability 
calculations. 
The notion 'risk' relates to a distribution of future outcomes (Doherty, 
2000). The distribution of future outcomes is uncertain. Risk information, 
therefore, is defined as risk-related information on that distribution 
(Dobler, 2008). Businesses' activities entail a variety of risks driven by 
various external and internal factors or sources. These factors comprise, 
for example, political, economic, regulations, market, finance, business 
process and personnel. These factors have a potential affect on the entity's 
performance. From a portfolio perspective, some of the risks facing an 
entity such those arising from the external environment, are systematic, 
i. e., non-diversifiable, while others are non-systematic and diversifiable by 
measure of risk management. 
In modern businesses, the responsibility of risk managers lies in 
identifying different sources of risk related to their companies, and 
analysing and evaluating their impact on future outcomes. Risk 
management is increasingly recognised as being concerned with both 
negative and positive aspects of risk. Risk referred to as 'uncertainty' is no 
longer limited to uncertainty-based view (i. e., a one-side definition such as 
the exposure to financial loss). Uncertainty must also be seen clearly 
linked to opportunity, or upside risk (i. e., a target-based view). 
Consequently, different definitions have emerged in the literature. A well- 
cited definition of risk suggested by professional reports (ICAEW, 1997; 
CICA, 2002; IASB, 2005) and already used in previous risk disclosure 
literature (e. g., Solomon et al., 2000; Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2005) defines risk as: 
"... uncertainty as the amount of benefit The term includes 
both potential for gain and exposure to loss. " 
(FRS 5, Reporting the Substance of Transactions, ASB, 1994) 
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In this definition, the full range of uncertainties that may affect the 
company's future prospects is considered including both upside and 
downside risks, uncertainty risk, and volatility risk. Risk is referred to as 
uncertainty and uncertainty is associated with both a potential gain and 
loss. A company's performance has only two dimensions - risk and return - 
and there is nothing else. In this context, risk as uncertainty refers to the 
distribution of all possible outcomes, both positive and negative. The 
company's risk profile is related to the future and, therefore, is full of 
uncertainty about its future cash flows. Drawing a curve would show, 
companies' directors, the likelihood of different cash results over a future 
period and provide them with a useful insight about what might happen 
and how likely it is to be in the future. Figure 2.2 exhibits a normal 
distribution with different results becoming progressively less likely in the 
future. The curve may be related to any venture and differs from one 
company to another depending on directors' behaviours and their views 
on risks (ICAEW, 1999b). 
Hi: gh, -r lik" lih: cI 
Figure 2.2: Risk Profile 
Source: ICAEW 1999b 
Since a company risk profile is full of uncertainty about the future, the 
term 'opportunity for gain and potential for loss' can be referred to as 
volatility risk. A potential outcome is that the actual cash flows will turn 
out differently from period to period and so the result will be volatile. 
Risk as uncertainty may result on either upside or downside risk. Upside 
risk refers to potential for gain while downside risk refers to events when 
things go wrong. It depends, as shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, on where the 
cash breakeven line is. Figure 2.3 provides a useful explanation for an 
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extreme case where there is only upside risk. All the results that have any 
likelihood of happening give a positive net cash flow (ICAEW, 1999b). 
High-"r likelihood 
Z-ru net cnh flow 
Better cash result 
Figure 2.3: Upside Risk Profile 
Source: ICAEW 1999b 
Figure 2.4 shows the other extreme case where there is only downside risk 
so any likelihood of happening has a negative net cash flow. 
Hi. jh. "r likilihocd 
Zero net cash tIO 
Bette cash result 
Figure 2.4: Downside Risk Profile 
Source: ICAEW 1999b 
The upside element refers to opportunity which reflects the outlook of 
senior management and the planning staff when addressing such risk. 
Risk as opportunity is implicit in the concept that there is a relationship 
between risk and return. The greater the risk, the greater the potential 
return and, in the same way, the greater the potential for loss. The 
downside element is the common element and is what managers most 
often mean by the term. It refers to potential negative events such as 
financial loss, fraud, theft, damage to reputation, injury or death, system 
failure or lawsuit. 
Risk is also connected to business strategies, objectives and economic 
performance; and risk can, therefore, be understood within the broader 
context of a company strategy (IFAC, 1999). A business begins with the 
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setting up of a clear vision of the future and setting up its own strategies so 
as to decide on what opportunities that they are going to pursue. Then the 
corporate objectives to achieve this are identified. As such, risk is referred 
to as follows: 
"... uncertain future events which could influence the 
achievement of the organisation's strategic, operational 
and financial objectives. The dimensions of risk also include 
the impact on an organisation's reputation, even 'loss of 
legitimacy' from activities deemed unacceptable to the 
community. " 
(IFAC 1999: 6) 
The key challenge for companies is to identify and manage these risks so 
as to deliver successful change and innovation to create lasting value. 
Different approaches for managing risk have been developed and 
introduced in the literature to enable businesses to identify, assess and 
manage risks in a structured way. 
The sources of risk and the way to deal with it are closely connected with 
business strategy. Each company works out its strategies based on an 
assumption and, consequently, takes a risk. Taking risk is essential for 
companies in order for them to enhance performance and create value 
(IFAC, 1999). Shareholders who entrust their money to companies expect 
company directors to take risks and demonstrate that the board of 
directors understand, consider and manage risk well. Risk reporting 
would demonstrate the role of directors as being accountable toward 
shareholders and prospective stakeholders. Director's act to assure 
shareholders that risk and uncertainties are managed at best (De Loach, 
2000) so as to make accountability more transparent by implementing 
company-wide risk management systems, and by communicating risk 
profile and strategies to the external investors. Figure 2.5 illustrates the 
intertwined nature of this four-dimensional cycle. 
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Information 
Figure 2.5: Risk Reporting Cycle 
Source: ICAEW 1999b 
In the above section, risk was referred to as uncertainty associated with 
both a potential gain and potential loss. In other words, it is referred to the 
volatility of future earnings or cash flaws. Therefore, when examining risk 
disclosure, negative and positive outcomes (potential opportunities) are to 
be considered (Linsley and Shrives, 2005, Lajili and Zegal, 2005; Papa, 
2007). Having defined what is meant by risk, a clear identification of the 
different sources of uncertainty becomes necessary. In a business context, 
risks arise from various internal and external factors or sources. Under 
corporate governance codes, for example the Turnbull Report of 1999, 
there is little detail concerning the sort of information companies should 
explicitly report, where it should be reported and in what format the 
reporting should occur. Businesses in different industries are facing 
different risks; therefore, it is difficult to establish a set of risk types that is 
commonly faced by organisations. While it is left to the company to 
identify the sources of risks that are relevant to them, there is a detailed 
guidance on what should be discussed and reported (Turnbull report, para 
35 and 36). 
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Several professional reports and academics have split risk into a number 
of key categories in the literature. For example, the Turnbull Report (1999: 
p. 7) states that companies' directors should consider 'significant business, 
operational, financial, compliance and other risks'. A more detailed listing 
of the specific risks that an organisation may face is highlighted in the 
ICAEW (1997) proposal. The ICAEW reproduces the Arthur Anderson 
Model (Figure 2.6) which provides a comprehensive guideline for creating 
a list of risk categories. In the model, risk is grouped under three main 
components: environmental risk, process risk; and information for 
decision-making risk. Under each component, the model identifies a 
number of risk factors, for example operational, financial, empowerment, 
information processing and integrity risk. Another example is the Institute 
of Risk Management (IRM, 2002), which provides a diagram of risk 
categories showing that risks facing an organisation and its operation 
result from factors both external and internal to an organisation. The IRM 
further categorises risk into different types include strategic, financial, 
operational, hazard, etc. IFAC (1999) considered 3 different levels of risks: 
level 1 refers to systematic risk including political, economic and social 
risks over which an organisation has little control; level 2 risks arise from 
factors that organisations cannot control but can influence including 
competitive, reputation and regulatory risk; and, level 3 varies with each 
industry but an organisation can have a great deal of influence over it. 
Examples of the latter include financial and people risks. Jorion (1997) 
argues that companies are exposed to three types of risk: business, 
strategic, and financial. Table 2.4 displays different examples of risk 
categorization. 
57 
ICAEW (1997) Reproduced the Business Risk Model which was developed by one of the 
professional accountancy firms. Risk is classified as in Figure 2.6. 
Torion (1997) Differentiated between business risk; strategic risk; and financial risk. 
The Institute of Risk arises from external drivers and internal drivers. Risk classified into 
Risk Management financial; strategic; operational; and hazard. 
(IRM) (2002) 
ICAEW (October Risk grouped under the following components: strategic; operational, 
2002) financial; compliance (including health and safety); and environmental. 
ICAEW (November There were 12 suggested generic risk categories. These include: accounting; 
2002) economic and political environment; financial, human resources; legal / 
regulatory / corporate governance; management information; operations and 
markets; project and IT; reputation; strategic; and terrorist / criminal. 
Cabedo & Tirado Risk classified into the following groups: non-financial (business and strategic); 
(2004) and financial (market, credit, liquidity, operational, and legal). 
ICAEW (2004a) The suggested risk categories include: accounting; economic and political; 
financial; geographic; human resources; legal / regulatory /corporate 
governance; management information; operations and markets; project and 
IT; reputation; strategic; and terrorist / criminal. 
Lajili & Zegal (2005) Grouped risk into: financial, political, technology, environmental, weather, 
government regulations, seasonality risk, operational, cyclicality, suppliers, 
and natural resources. 
Papa (2007) Based on ICAEW (1997) model. Three risk components (environmental risk, 
process risk; information for decision making). Eight risk sub-components 
(operational, financial, empowerment risk, information processing risk, 
integrity risk, operational decision making risk, business reporting risk, 
strategic decision making risk). 75 risk categories and 114 risk items. 
Deumes (2008) Eight risk components: macro environmental sources, industry sources, 
internal sources, other sources, loss and probability of loss, variance, lack of 
information, and lack of control. 
Table 2.4. Examples of Ri sk Classifications 
lt should be noted that these categorizations are not uniform and that 
there is no well-accepted classification model of risk. Some classifications 
are convenient but are only informal wherein usage and definitions vary. 
Companies use different terminology when they refer to risk (Combes- 
Thuelin et al., 2006). Due to the fact that boundaries between categories 
are blurred, care needs to be taken. Some specific risks can have both 
external and internal drivers and therefore overlap the two areas. 
The model presented in Figure 2.6 was utilised by some of the previous 
studies (e. g., Woods and Reber, 2003; Linsley and Shrives, 2005,2006; 
Konishi and Ali, 2007). For example, Linsley and Shrives classified risk 
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disclosure categories into 6 categories and 37 sub-categories based on 
ICAEW (1997). However, for the purpose of this thesis, a new 
categrization was developed dividing risk disclosure into three categories: 
environmental risk, operational risk, and strategic risk. These categories 
and its contents are presented in the method chapter. The contents of 
these categories were pilot tested on a random sample to ensure that they 
are relevant and those are not relevant are omitted. Environmental risk 
relates to factors essentially beyond the organisation's control and 
comprises risks such as economic, political, social and demographic risk, 
legal and regulation risk, climate and catastrophic, and industry sources 
(e. g., competition, suppliers, customers). 
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Figure 2.6: Business Risk Model 
Source: ICAEW 1997 
Operational risk is the probability of losses arising from the essential 
operation side of the firm. Definitions of operational risk vary in 
accordance with the business under consideration; some definitions are 
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limited to process (e. g., risk associated with the process and internal 
control); while other definitions are broader. Operational risk should 
covers such issues as internal control, business disruption, infrastructure 
risk; liquidity and cash flow, project failure, operational problems, 
employment practices and workplace safety; clients, product and business 
practices, damage to physical assets, impact of operations on the natural 
environment, compliance and damage to reputation, and legal risk (arises 
from uncertainty due to legal actions or uncertainty in the applicability or 
interpretation of contract, laws and regulations. Legal dispute is an 
example). 
Strategic risk arises from operating in a particular industry and is 
associated with the company's future business plans and strategies. 
Strategic risk disclosures encompass disclosure related to research and 
development, intellectual property rights, acquisitions, alliances, and joint 
ventures, management of growth, investment risk, technology, and the use 
of derivatives, and other strategic risk related to planning and portfolio 
risks. 
2.4.3 Risk-Related Disclosure: Review of the Previous Literature 
The research on both corporate financial disclosure (Baker and Haslem, 
1973; Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979; McNally et al., 1982; Hossain et al., 1994; 
Meek et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Depoers, 2000; Hope, 2003; Oliveira 
et at., 2006; Aljifiri, 2008) and on corporate social and environmental 
disclosure (e. g., Davey, 1982; Burritt, 1997; Patten, 1991; Campbell, 2004; 
Xiao et al., 2005; Ahmad and Handley-Schachler, 2006) have ebbed and 
flowed for a number of decades. However, the evidence (Stanton and 
Stanton, 2002; Beattie, 2005) indicates that there is only scant research 
focusing on annual reports risk disclosure, which is considered as a part of 
the broader category of corporate financial disclosure as published in the 
1990s in comparison to other types of disclosure studies in a holistic sense 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Nevertheless, there have been several studies 
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on risk management and disclosure, notably on financial risk disclosure, 
directed mainly to the US setting. For example, following the issuance of 
Financial Reporting Release (FRR) No. 48 by SEC, which establishes 
compulsory requirements for disclosure on derivatives and market risks, a 
considerable strand of research (Linsmeier et al., 2002; Jorion, 2002; 
Rajgopal, 1999; Thornton and Walker, 2000; Roulstone, 1999; Linsmeier 
and Pearson, 1997) addressed compulsory market disclosures according 
to FRR 48 and examined the benefits of such disclosure to investors. For 
example, Linsmeier and Pearson's (1997) study of "quantitative 
disclosures of market risk in the SEC release" examined the effect of FRR 
No. 48 on derivatives and market risk disclosure. There are also studies 
focused on derivative-related information disclosure, which include Seow 
and Tam (2002), Li and Gao (2007) and Dunne et al. (2007). The studies 
reveal that these disclosures would be useful for investors to broaden 
their knowledge of the company derivative exposures and assets and risk 
situation. Studies reveal evidence consistent with an impact of risk 
disclosure on capital markets. However, the particular impact depends on 
the reporting format chosen (Dobler, 2008). Disclosure would be useful 
for investors when making informed decisions as it reduces uncertainty. 
The increased focus and attention applied by governments, regulators and 
accounting institutions around the globe have resulted in an upsurge in 
corporate risk disclosure in recent times. The growth in risk disclosure 
studies is shown by a number of academic articles that have emerged 
lately. Some of these articles provide an analysis of a comprehensive 
corporate risk disclosure and focus on developing a framework for risk 
disclosure (e. g., Solomon et al., 2000). Some studies examine risk 
information disclosed in a company's annual report more 
comprehensively (e. g., ICAEW, 1999b; Linsley and Shrives, 2005,2006; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007), while others examine risk disclosure in 
prospectuses (e. g., ICAEW, 1999b; Papa, 2007; Deumes, 2008). Table 2.5 
provides a synthesis of the contributions of a sample of articles. 
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Solomon et al. Survey the UK institutional investors 
(2000) to ascertain their attitudes towards 
risk disclosure. 
Linsley and Examine the merits and demerit of 
Shrives (2000) voluntary risk disclosure. 
Woods and Compare the UK and German 
Reber (2003) reporting practices in respect of risk 
disclosure post GAS 5. 
Beretta and Propose a framework for analysis of 
Bozzolan risk communication and a applied it 
(2004) on a sample of quoted Italian firms. 
Lajili and Examine risk disclosures in Canadian 
Zegal (2005) companies' annual reports. 
Linsley and Examine risk disclosure practices in 
Shrives (2005) UK companies annual reports. 
Combes- Ascertain an inventory of existing 
Thuelin et al. rules to identify the risk disclosure 
(2006) context faced by French firms. 
Linsley and 
Shrives (2006) 
Dunne et al. 
(2007) 
Li and Gao 
(2007) 
Konishi and 
Ali (2007) 
Examine corporate risk disclosure 
practice within a sample of UK 
quoted companies. 
Provide an empirical investigation 
into the disclosure of information on 
derivatives in annual financial 
statements of UK companies 
following the introduction of 
Financial Reporting Standard (FRS 
13). 
Examine the usefulness of derivative 
related disclosures in the Australian 
banking sector, by testing whether 
derivatives disclosures are associated 
with annual stock returns of the 
banks over the period of 1998-2004. 
Examine the relationship between 
the level of risk disclosure available in 
a sample of Japanese annual reports 
and firm-specific characteristics. 
There is a need to provide more detailed 
risk disclosures rather than generalized 
statement of business risk management 
policy. 
They conclude that few companies would 
disclose risk disclosure voluntarily and 
argued the need to mandatory 
requirements. 
Although GAS 5 served to increase risk 
disclosure amongst German companies, 
the study found higher and different 
reporting practices amongst UK 
companies. 
The index of disclosure quantity is not 
influenced either by size or industry. 
The high amount of risk disclosure found 
reflects both mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosure. The lack of uniformity, clarity 
and quantification in disclosure potentially 
limiting its usefulness. 
Companies provide an incomplete picture 
on the risk that they are facing. 
There is no consensus between the 
different pieces of regulations. The 
terminology used by companies when they 
refer to risk is different. 
The type of risk information disclosed and 
the lack of coherence in the risk narratives 
entails that a risk information gap exits. 
The results show that the implementation 
of FRS 13 was associated with a substantial 
increase in derivatives-related information 
published in companies annual reports. 
The preliminary results reveal that the 
disclosure of fair gains and losses for both 
trading and non-trading derivatives are 
significant to the stock returns, which may 
suggest that these disclosures contain 
useful information. However, the 
disclosure of principal amounts and credit 
disclosure is insignificant to stock returns. 
The results show that risk disclosure is 
related to company size. However, no 
relation was found between risk disclosure 
and the corporate characteristics examined 
in the study. 
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Abraham and Examine corporate disclosure 
Cox (2007) practices within a sample of UK 
quoted companies and relate 
disclosure level to some firms' 
factors. 
Papa (2007) Performs a quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of risk 
reporting available in IPO 
prospectus for a sample 
comprising of 12 listed Italian 
firms. 
Abraham et Analyse the quality of business 
al. (2007) risk disclosure statements based 
on four themes: formulaic, 
specificity, capability of 
measurement, and evidence of 
measurement. 
Deblor (2008) Focuses on reviewing 
discretionary disclosure and 
cheap talk models to analyze risk 
reporting incentives and their 
relation to regulation. 
Deumes 2008 Focuses on a sample of Dutch 
companies, the author examines 
risk information reported in the 
risk section of prospectuses. 
Table 2.5: Review of Academic Articles on Risk Disclosure 
Disclosure level found negatively related to 
share ownership by long-term institutions, and 
positively related to the number of 
independent directors. 
Much emphasis is given to external risks, 
whereas other sources of uncertainties are 
neglected. Qualitative risk disclosure 
dominates over quantitative risk. 
The findings reveal an overall low score for 
disclosure quality for the companies based on 
all of the four themes. 
The results suggest that the informativeness of 
risk reporting should not be overestimated 
even in a regulated environment. 
The results reveal that a measure of risk 
extracted from the risk sections in 
prospectuses successfully predict the volatility 
of companies' future stock prices, the 
sensitivity of future stock prices to market 
wide fluctuation, as well as severe declines in 
future stock prices. 
The studies selected for the review are limited to those relating to risk 
disclosure in the annual report. The review of other corporate accounting 
disclosure (e. g., financial disclosure and social and environmental 
disclosure) is beyond the scope of the present research and are, therefore, 
excluded in an attempt to keep the review of previous research studies 
within manageable proportions. Some of the academic articles displayed 
in Table 2.5 above are discussed in the following two sub-sections. 
An initial study was conducted in the UK by Solomon et al. (2000) using a 
questionnaire survey. The authors tried to canvas the attitude of UK 
institutional investors towards risk disclosure in relation to their portfolio 
investment decisions. Respondents of the survey did not generally favour 
a regulated environment for corporate risk disclosure and supported a 
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voluntary framework. It could be deduced that perhaps investors have 
learnt how to manage certain types of risk in a costless basis throughout, 
for example, diversification. Hence, the reduced desire for legislation. In 
addition, following a review of existing theory and practices, the authors 
developed a diagrammatic representation (see Solomon et al., 2000) of the 
conceptual framework for internal control, risk management and risk 
disclosure, which envisages a system for internal control involving several 
stages, where each stage would follow principal themes. These are 
presented in Table 2.6. 
Identification Involve the identification The board of director should consider "the 
stage and prioritisation of risks. nature and extent of the risks facing the 
company as well as "the extent and categories of 
risk which it regards as acceptable for the 
company to bear" (Para. 17). 
Estimation Depicts the assessment of Consideration of "the likelihood of the risks 
stage the potential impact of concerned materialising" (Para 17). 
identifiable sources of risk. 
Development The company develops its The board should consider the "company's 
stage specific risk management ability to reduce the incidence and impact on the 
strategy which should be business of risks that do materialise. Also, an 
tailored to match specific evaluation cost of operating particular controls 
risks. relative to the benefit (Para 17). 
Implementation The board puts their N/A 
stage chosen risk management 
strategy into operation. 
Evaluation Evaluating the effectiveness "Effective monitoring on a continuous basis" 
stage of implemented strategy. (Para 27). 
Internal feedback Flows of report between Companies who do not operate an internal audit 
stage managers and the board should review the need for one on a frequent 
and also an internal audit. basis (the combined code, D. 2.2). 
Disclosure Reporting, to stakeholders, 
stage information relating to the 
company's risk 
management strategy, its 
effects and succeeds as 
well as some predictive 
discussion of the company 
going concern. 
Companies should, as a minimum, disclose that 
there is an ongoing process for identifying, 
evaluating and managing the significant risks 
faced by the company (Para. 35). In addition, the 
company could choose to provide additional 
information in the annual report and accounts to 
assist understanding of the company's risk 
management processes and system of internal 
control (Para 36). 
Interpretation Interpretation of disclosed 
stage information to facilitate 
external feedback and 
control. 
Para 35 and 36. 
Table 2.6: Stages for the System of Internal Control, Risk Management and Risk Disclosure 
Source: Based on Solomon et al. (2000) 
(17, 
2.4.3.2 Risk Disclosure in the Company Annual Report 
Table 2.5 displays several studies examining corporate risk disclosure. 
Some studies focus on specific risk category while others examine risk 
more comprehensively. The studies have provided strong evidence that 
companies have not been adequately disclosing risk-related information 
(e. g. Lajili and Zegal, 2005; Papa, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2005,2006; 
Konishi and All, 2007; Woods and Reber, 2003, Abraham and Cox, 2007). 
To illustrate, Linsley and Shrives (2000) reviewed risk disclosure 
requirements and recommendations and examined the merits and non- 
merits of disclosing such information in annual reports. They suggest that 
the most important potential benefit for enhanced risk disclosure by 
companies is reduction in the cost of capital. The authors concluded that 
the level of disclosure disclosed voluntarily by companies is not adequate 
and argued that if such disclosure is considered desirable then there is a 
strong argument for regulation. In another article, Linsley and Shrives 
(2005) discussed similar issues but within the context of UK non-financial 
firms. Furthermore, Woods and Reber (2003) conducted a pilot study of 
twelve UK and German companies and compare risk disclosure practices 
in UK and German companies' annual reports. In particular; the authors 
examined whether the requirements of the German Accounting Standard 
(GAS 5), which require German companies to report on risk for the 
financial years commencing after 31st December 2000, serve to enhance 
risk disclosure within German annual reports. Thus, the authors compared 
risk disclosure practices over two years, those of 2000 and 2001. The 
results showed an increase in risk disclosure found in German companies' 
annual reports and supported the assertion that GAS 5 had a positive 
effect upon risk reporting despite the fact that the level of disclosure 
remains higher in the UK than in Germany. However, given the small size 
of the sample used in the research, it is difficult to extrapolate or 
generalise on a country-wide basis. 
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Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) proposed a framework for the analysis of 
risk disclosure and an index to measure the quality of risk disclosure. The 
index was based on a framework which integrates all dimensions of risk, 
the aim of which was to evaluate risk disclosure disclosed in the 
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section in a sample 
comprising 85 Italian firms' annual reports. The framework considered 
four different dimensions: content, economic sign, type of measure and the 
outlook orientation. The results showed that firms disclose more 
information relating to the past and present rather than future 
information. Where future information is disclosed, companies avoid 
disclosing its expected impact, both positive and negative. However, the 
framework and methodology employed by the study has been criticised. 
There is difficulty in quantifying risk disclosure. It was argued by Botosan 
(2004) that the measure is not related to or influenced by the firm 
characteristics, e. g., size and industry, found in the prior literature to 
explain disclosure behaviour. The design of the index with many 
dimensions has limited ability to operate in a large sample either across 
firms or across time (Shevlin, 2004) and confuses the reader as opposed to 
aiding understanding. Botosan (2004) also explained that disclosure 
quality is not measurable. The quality of information disclosed depends on 
user perception as stated by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) on whether or not information is useful in the decision-making 
process. 
Lajili and Zegal (2005) examined risk information disclosures practices in 
Canada. The authors describe and analyse the subject matter of risk 
information found in 300 Canadian companies' annual reports. A high 
degree of risk disclosure intensity was observed. However, there appears 
to be lack of uniformity, clarity and quantification in the information 
disclosed, hence, potentially limiting their usefulness. 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) examined risk disclosure practices in UK 
companies' annual reports and related these to firm characteristics. For 
67 
this purpose, 79 annual reports were analysed. Although the results 
showed a large amount of risk information disclosed by companies, there 
were limitations to their usefulness. The information disclosed was found 
to be incomplete, less specific and less detailed with limited disclosure 
found on risk related to intellectual capital and reputation risks. 
Qualitative disclosure was found to be more prevalent than quantitative 
disclosure. The results showed that companies' directors are willing to 
disclose forward-looking information disclosure. However, the study's 
results are not consistent with the results of previous studies (e. g., Beretta 
and Bozzolan, 2004; Woods and Reber, 2003). 
Abraham and Cox (2007) examined risk disclosure practices within UK 
annual reports and related it to institutional ownership, board of directors 
and US dual-listing characteristics. A sample of the largest UK companies 
was selected for this study based on the financial year ending in 2002. The 
results showed a negative relationship between corporate ownership by 
long-term institutions and risk reporting and a positive relationship 
between corporate ownership by short-term institutions and risk 
disclosure. 
Thus, the above review reveals that there is a growing body of published 
empirical academic articles aims at risk reporting. While some studies 
have investigated risk disclosure, the focus of these studies varies 
considerably. Some research aims exclusively at studying quantified risk 
disclosure in financial statements and at specific categories of risk, 
especially market risk (e. g., Jorion, 2002; Linsmeier et al., 2002; Rajgopal, 
1999) according to FRR 48, and derivative-related disclosure (e. g., Li and 
Gao, 2007; Dunne et al., 2007). The empirical literature that has examined 
risk under its comprehensive perspectives is still limited (Papa, 2007). 
Some studies have examined risk reporting and disclosure domestically 
(e. g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Lajili and Zegal, 2005) while others have 
done so in a comparative international context (e. g., Woods and Reber, 
2003; Shrives and Linsley, 2003). Most studies highlight the shortcomings 
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and lack of transparency in risk disclosure due mainly to the absence of 
standards and uniform measures for different risk components. Studies 
show that different countries have different risk reporting requirements. 
For example, Germany has, generally speaking, a more detailed domestic 
regulation of risk disclosure than the UK. However, the empirical analysis 
as shown by the previous studies, based on annual reports issued by 
German companies, indicates an overall poor disclosure practice (see for 
example, Woods and Reber, 2003). It has been argued (e. g., Lajili and 
Zegal, 2005) that more valuable information about a firm's total risk 
exposure could be inferred from the non-financial side of operations. 
Therefore, with the aim of contributing to the history of risk disclosure, 
this research examines different types of risk in the annual reports of UK 
companies. 
The timeline of the present study lends to its importance as it comes a few 
years after the publication of the Turnbull report (published in 1999). 
Previous literature (e. g., Patten, 1992; Deegan et al., 2000) provides 
examples of event studies where the volume of environmental disclosure 
was shown to respond to the increased exposure to criticism experienced 
after a particular event. It will be interested to consider how the risk 
disclosure enhanced over the past period in response to Turnbull and 
other pressures (ICAEW, 1999b). It is expected that this study will shed 
further light on the impact of Turnbull and other pressure on the extent of 
risk disclosure by companies. Any increase in risk disclosure would be 
seen as evidence and endorse recent efforts of corporate governance 
reforms (Solomon et al., 2000). It is important to keep abreast of how risk 
changes over time. Fast moving technology, intense competitive pressure 
and regulatory change can all impact the risks faced by an enterprise. The 
study also has its advantage as it offers investors an objective assessment 
of the current reporting practices. Indeed, any increase in risk disclosure 
will attract the attention of users (Solomon et al., 2000). This research is 
therefore expecting to find evidence that companies are responding to 
69 
Turnbull and other pressures by enhancing the amount of risk disclosure 
over the years. The theory and evidence reviewed so far suggest the 
following hypothesis: 
Hi: There is a significant difference in risk disclosure over the 
period under examination, from 1998-2004. 
2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
In closing, this chapter provides a review of key literature relevant to the 
research questions. 
After reviewing the literature, it can be surmised that there are several 
internal and external factors affecting a firm's activities and reporting. The 
rapid increase of internationalisation in economic activities and the 
growing globalisation of financial markets has inevitably exposed 
companies to a much wider audience, an audience with greater interest in 
any given company's activities. 
Moreover, there has been a growing demand for company information by 
users. The research highlighted in this chapter suggests that companies 
are not disclosing enough information to serve the needs of the various 
user groups. Since disclosure is critical for the success of capital markets, 
the gap in reporting between companies and users is a cause of real 
concern for politicians and economists. Companies were put under 
pressure to disclose reliable and relevant information in order to reduce 
investor uncertainties, hence, improving the efficiency of resource 
allocation in the economy. 
The debate and development within the accounting profession and 
accounting regulations, including corporate governance, was discussed 
alongside an examination of risk notion and risk categorization. In 
addition, research addressing the issue of corporate risk reporting from 
various angles were explored and discussed in the present chapter. 
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The literature review in the present chapter, in addition to the review in 
the following chapter, provides a framework for the current research and 
serves as a link between previously published literature to the general 
problem of the current study. It is considered that this will aid in 
developing the research hypotheses and methodology for this study. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In corporate reporting literature, the issue of corporate disclosure has been 
developed into a main area of studying and investigation. Research on the 
subject of corporate disclosure is extensive (Marston and Shrives, 1996). 
The majority of previous disclosure studies have examined three different 
areas. The first is about what motivates companies to disclose more 
information beyond the level required by the legislation. The second 
concerns the factors affecting the level and type of information disclosed, 
and the third concerns the empirical consequences of disclosure. 
Firms must have incentives to reveal information to the public for many 
reasons. A number of theoretical perspectives have been applied by 
researchers to explain the phenomena of disclosure and to explain what 
motivates companies' managers to reveal more information than is 
necessitated by legislation. However, there is no single theory available to 
explain disclosure phenomenon completely, and, to date, researchers tend to 
select whichever theory articulates best with their hypothesis (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2000). 
It has been argued that enhancing corporate disclosure (including risk 
disclosure) is of great benefit to both stakeholders and the companies. From 
the stakeholders' perspective, disclosure will enable them to better assess 
the financial performance of the company and to assure them that the 
managers are managing companies at best. From the companies' 
perspectives, disclosure conveys significant messages about business 
performance and puts companies in direct contact with investors, which 
increases their confidence, and hence reduces the cost of capital (e. g., 
Botosan, 1997). If disclosure affects the company's cost of capital, this should 
put the market in a better position by keeping it informed, and hence 
facilitating its functioning. 
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The present chapter provides a discussion on the theoretical literature of 
corporate disclosure. The chapter reviews the previous theory and evidence 
in order to form the remaining research hypotheses. The chapter 
commences by discussing the type and nature of corporate disclosure. This 
is followed by a section devoted to explaining the incentives for disclosure. 
Next, disclosure benefits and costs are explained and discussed. Then, four 
explanatory disclosure variables that represent the most common firm's 
characteristics tested in previous research are discussed. These factors (i. e., 
firm-specific characteristics) may determine the level of corporate risk 
disclosure. Afterward, the chapter discusses the prior literature on 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital. Previous studies are discussed, 
summarised, and presented in the chapter. Research hypotheses will be 
developed throughout the chapter. 
3.2 Information Disclosure: Nature and Type 
The term disclosure, in its broadest sense, encompasses the revelation of any 
piece of information about a particular company. It encompasses everything 
contained in the company's annual report, interim report, information 
announcements, general meeting, press releases, magazine stories, and 
newspapers. Recently, the internet has become an additional medium of 
communication. The 'level of disclosure' refers to the quantity of information 
disclosed by the firm to the public. Disclosure of information is publicly 
communicated by companies to various user groups who have an interest in 
the business. Companies must disclose financial information to satisfy the 
users' different needs (FASB, 1978,2001; IASC, 1989). There is no doubt that 
the information disclosed by an entity is for the interest of shareholders 
(investors) since they are regarded as the main providers of capital to the 
company. However, there are other groups for firms to consider including 
lenders, employees, customers, suppliers, government and the public. 
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Disclosures in corporate reports are often distinguished based on whether 
they are mandated (required by legislation) or suggested, or whether they 
are voluntary. Mandatory disclosure refers to information disclosure 
required by authorities. Some items will also be suggested often by the GAAP 
of a particular country (Gernon and Meek, 2001). Voluntary disclosure refers 
to the level of information disclosed beyond what is necessitated by 
accounting and legal legislations. There are also financial and non-financial 
disclosures, which are both very important. 
Previous disclosure literature examined different areas in disclosures 
including financial disclosure, segmental disclosures, financial forecasts 
disclosure, and social and environmental disclosure. 
Companies' managers have a superior understanding of the future prospects 
of the firm since they have access to private information. Shareholders 
(investors), the main providers of capital, and other users need information 
for different purposes. Companies must disclose information to satisfy the 
needs of users. Not everything needs to be disclosed otherwise a reader can 
easily get confused with all of the information. Disclosure is a substantive 
issue, since information disclosed may potentially affect people's decisions 
and actions. Undisclosed information does not have that potential (Gernon 
and Meek, 2001). Thus, mangers have discretion when deciding what to 
disclose since this is not an easy decision to make. The decision of not 
disclosing information means that managers have decided to keep some 
information secret from users. Some amount of voluntary disclosure is 
needed by users since the information revealed has the potential to 
influence their (i. e., users) decisions. Moreover, there are potential benefits 
of voluntary disclosure including improving a company's reputation and a 
lower cost of capital, and higher liquidity of the firm's stocks. However, 
disclosure could adversely harm the firm by damaging its competitive 
position. Thus, a firm has to trade off the positive and negative effects of 
voluntary disclosure (e. g., Tsakumis et al., 2006; FASB, 2001; Edwards and 
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Smith, 1996; AICPA, 1994; Oliveira et al., 2006). In the following sections, the 
incentives for disclosure and its benefits and costs will be discussed. 
3.3 Incentives for Disclosure 
In corporate disclosure research, the issue of understanding the motivations 
for disclosure has attracted considerable attention. Firms must have 
incentives to provide additional disclosure. Researchers on corporate 
disclosure have been applying a number of theoretical perspectives to their 
studies to explain why firms engage themselves in different levels of 
disclosure. However, there is no single theory available to explain the 
phenomenon of disclosure as a whole, and researchers, to date, tend to 
select whichever theory articulates best with their hypothesis (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2000). The most common theories employed in previous disclosure 
research to interpret and explain disclosure practices are agency theory, 
signalling theory, capital need theory, political cost theory, stakeholder 
theory, proprietary cost theory, and cost benefit theory. The explanations for 
these theories are as follows. 
3.3.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory, proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), may help to 
explain managers' incentives for voluntary disclosure. Agency theory 
conceives that the role of monitoring managers on behalf of the owners has 
been delegated to the board of directors. Agency theory conceives an 
inherent moral hazard between shareholders (principals) and managers 
(agents) that gives rise to agency cost. Agency cost is one element of 
contacting costs (other elements include transactions costs, information 
cost, renegotiation costs and bankruptcy costs). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
identify two classes of agency conflict, namely owner manager 
(compensation contracts) and owner debt-holder (debt contracts). Thus, 
agency theory (e. g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976: Kelly, 1983) posits 
disclosure as a mechanism which decreases these conflict costs, for example, 
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by producing accounting reports and increasing the amount of information 
contained in these reports (Morris, 1987; Marston and Shrives, 1996). 
Disclosure is a mechanism to persuade shareholders and other parties that 
the company is being properly managed and is accountable to them. It is 
also a mechanism to reduce agency cost and investors' uncertainty. In other 
words, disclosure increases the confidence of shareholders, and hence 
reduces information asymmetry. 
Several studies (e. g., Salamon and Dhaliwal, 1980; Leftwich et al., 1981; 
Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989a, 1989b, 1991,1993; Hossain et 
al., 1994; Craven and Marston, 1999; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; 
Oliveira et at., 2006) have analysed the existence of differential disclosure 
levels, and agency theory has been employed to explain some of these 
differences in disclosure. 
The research of identifying financial accounting and reporting are affected 
by a variety and a diverse of supply and demand forces (Craswell and Taylor, 
1992). Financial reporting is designed to meet the demand of various user 
groups, which is to provide useful information to different user groups in 
order to enable them to make useful decisions (economic decisions and 
decisions for other purposes). While different users have different needs and 
demands of different information, certain information may be beneficial to 
one group of users, and harmful to another one. On the contrary, supply is 
influenced by existing regulation and the cost associated with disclosure, 
such as information collection and processing costs. If different parties are 
self-interestedly, these separations of demand and supply create conflicts 
and agency cost falling on either equity holders or debt holders (Morris, 
1987), therefore, resulting in higher agency costs. These agency costs 
comprise residual loss, bonding expenditures by the agent (managers) and 
monitoring expenditures by the principals (shareholders) (Kelly, 1983). 
Agency theory envisages that some annual reports' disclosure may provide a 
mechanism of reducing shareholder monitoring costs and also ease the 
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moral hazard problem (Schipper, 1981). Disclosure plays a device in 
reducing the adverse effects to moral hazard and adverse selection 
implications. 
Agency theory predicts that agency costs will vary with different corporate 
attributes such as size, performance, gearing and listing status. For example, 
Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) contend that large organisations with 
diffused ownership resolve the agency cost problem by separating internal 
decision management and control. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found no 
difference in corporate performance as a function of ownership diffusion. 
3.3.2 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory was developed by Spence (1973) in the labour market to 
explain the behaviour of these markets (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). It 
has been a general phenomenon applicable in any market with information 
asymmetry (see Morris, 1987), and has been employed by many researchers 
(e. g., Hossain et al., 1994; Craven and Marston, 1999; Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman, 2003; Oliveira et al., 2006) to explain cross-sectional variation in 
voluntary disclosure levels and has also been linked to agency theory (see 
Morris, 1987). Akerlof (1970) states that voluntary disclosure is viewed as a 
form of signalling relating to information asymmetry in the market, and 
signalling theory can address these problems of information asymmetry and 
reduce this asymmetry by the party with more information signalling it to 
others (Morris, 1987). If information available to the market is non-specific, 
then share prices will reflect general perceptions of risk and, hence this may 
result in some mis-pricing together with the phenomenon of adverse 
selection (Akerlof, 1970). Beatty and Welch (1996) report a positive 
association between the number of risk warnings disclosed in the flotation 
prospectus and mis-pricing at the end of the first day of trading. Financial 
information may be used by firms to signify underlying reality, and to 
influence external users when making decisions of different purposes. 
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Large companies may also have the incentive to disclose information in 
order to send a signal to the market to avoid potential lawsuit. 
Since signalling is a reaction to information asymmetry in markets, in this 
case, companies have information (for example, about risks and the way the 
risks are managed) that investors do not. In such circumstance, companies 
with high quality risk management systems will have an incentive to provide 
specific risk information to the market as a signal as this can then be used to 
adjust the price upwards (see, for example, Lev and Penman, 1990). 
However, signalling is costly and the cost of signal is higher for the bad type 
than it is for the good type (Spence, 1973). The incentive to make disclosures 
in order to differentiate a company from its rivals will only continue for as 
long as the resulting increase in market capitalisation exceeds the signalling 
cost (Morris, 1987). It is argued that only good quality firms will use this 
instrument, because the quality of firms can be later observed without 
difficulty, and firms would be punished by the market if they send wrong 
signals (Morris, 1987). Eccles et al. (2001, p. 192) observe "a management 
team that has confidence in both its own abilities and its strategy will not 
shy away from telling the market its plans for the future and how well it is 
doing today". 
3.3.3 Stakeholder Theory 
The definition of stakeholder has been developed over the past years. The 
definition has been limited solely to principal stakeholders since the main 
objective of a corporation is to maximise the wealth of its owners. A broader 
definition of stakeholder would include any individual or group who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives (Freeman, 
1984). This broader definition of stakeholder encompasses adverse groups 
such as interest groups and regulators. 
Stakeholder theory has been extensively employed in accounting disclosure 
literature to explain the phenomenon of, for example, corporate social and 
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environmental disclosure (e. g., Gray et al., 1995a, 1997; Deegan, 2000). 
Stakeholders who exist in a society are generally concerned with the way 
that an organisation is managed. Therefore, this theory is based on the 
assumption that an organisation needs the support of its stakeholders for its 
activities and needs their approval for its activities to ensure its continuous 
operation (Gray et al., 1997). Corporations require resources for their 
operations. However, these resources are affected (directly or indirectly) by 
the control power of stakeholders. The more powerful the stakeholders, the 
more the company must adapt (Gray et al., 1995a). Thus, the power is 
determined by the level of control they have over the resources. The 
stakeholder-corporation power relationship is not generic across 
corporations. Moreover, there are different forms of power that 
stakeholders may exercise including the command of limited resources 
(finance, labour), access to influential media, ability to legislate against the 
company, or ability to influence the consumption of goods or services 
(Deegan, 2000). When stakeholders exercise their control power, the 
company is likely to react in a way that satisfies the demands of the 
stakeholders (Ullmann, 1985). 
However, this theory faces the criticism of being flawed because it focuses 
on the way a corporation manages its stakeholders. The theory also 
discriminates as attention is given to each group of stakeholders based on its 
potential benefits to the organisation. 
3.3.4 Political Cost Theory 
Voluntary disclosure may also be targeted to reduce political costs. This 
theory (hypothesis), used by positive accounting theory (e. g., Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Leftwick et al., 1981), suggests that political costs (such as taxes and 
regulation) may influence the managers on the selection of the adequate 
accounting policy. This hypothesis is based around the notion that 
companies may develop procedures that eliminate or minimise political 
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interference. Voluntary disclosure may be one of these procedures (Lim and 
McKinnon, 1993). 
Political cost theory may also contribute to the explanation for voluntary 
disclosure. According to political cost theory, larger companies are politically 
visible and subject to higher political cost (e. g., taxes and regulations 
imposed by politicians upon companies) than smaller companies. 
Companies' directors may, therefore, reveal information in order to reduce 
the chance of more detailed and, perhaps, more costly requirements being 
introduced by law, accounting standards, or stock exchange requirements. 
3.3.5 Capital Need Theory 
Capital need theory has also been employed in accounting literature (e. g., 
Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003) to explain variations in voluntary 
disclosure. The notion of 'capital needs' has been referred to by a number of 
previous studies (Meek and Gray, 1989). Companies in the capital market 
are competing with one other to raise capital through offering different 
types of shares (Meek et al., 1995). The theory posits that the need to raise 
capital is a principal motive for disclosure (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 
2003). Companies reveal information voluntarily with a desire to raise 
capital at the lowest possible cost (Craven and Marston, 1999). 
Better disclosure should lead to more efficient allocation of capital within 
the market and, therefore, help stock market to evaluate and price the shares 
more accurately. Consequently, it is expected that more disclosure will 
increase the number of capital providers and allow companies to attract new 
shareholders, thus enabling companies to enjoy a healthy demand for shares 
with liquidity market (Craven and Marston, 1999) and increase the ease by 
which new capital can be raised (Cooke, 1993; Marston and Shrives, 1996). 
It is also assumed (e. g., Choi, 1973; Firth 1980; Cooke, 1993) that more 
information disclosure will increase transparency and reduce information 
asymmetries between the companies' management and market participants; 
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therefore, reducing investors uncertainty about the timing and expected 
future cash flow and thereby enabling investors to make investment 
decisions, and by doing so capital may be raised cheaply. 
One of the principal factors affecting the cost of capital is the perceived risk 
attached to the enterprise and its future cash flows. Under market 
uncertainty and information asymmetry, enterprises that are regarded as 
more risky generally have to pay a higher rate of interest to borrow funds 
and have a lower price/earnings ratio for their shares. Also, the risk 
premium required by investors on their investments will be high, hence 
increasing the cost of capital. It is difficult for research to pinpoint the 
precise impact of risk disclosure on the cost of capital (ICAEW, 1997), 
nevertheless, the evidence (Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002) supports a lower cost 
of capital for companies with a high disclosure level. Sengupta (1998) found 
a correlation between increases in disclosure and reductions in the cost of 
debt. Selva (1995) shows a strong correlation between financial analysts' 
perceptions of risks and companies price/earnings ratio. 
3.3.6 Proprietary Cost Theory 
A firm's decision to make public disclosure can damage its competitive 
position in the product market (Verrecchia, 1983; Darrough and Stoughton, 
1990) because competitors may make strategic use of information disclosed 
to their advantage (Edwards and Smith, 1996; Linsley and Shrives, 2005; 
Tsakumis et al., 2006). This may lead to the imposition of a proprietary cost, 
hence putting a company at a competitive disadvantage and affecting the 
company negatively. Therefore, in the presence of proprietary costs, a firm 
has to trade off the positive and negative effects of voluntary disclosure. 
However, there are other factors determining the decision for disclosure. 
These include the type of market competition and threat of entry of new 
firms to the market (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990). 
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3.3.7 Costs and Benefits Theory 
Benefit-cost theory may explain cross-sectional variation in voluntary 
disclosure levels. The decision regarding whether to reveal information is 
evaluated by the costs and benefits involved, thus companies tend to provide 
disclosures when the benefits exceed the cost of disclosure (both direct and 
indirect costs). These costs include not only the costs of preparing and 
disseminating information but also "the cost associated with disclosing 
information which may be proprietary in nature, and therefore potentially 
damaging" (Verrecchia, 1983, p181). Verrecchia states that "firms in highly 
competitive industries may regard public disclosures of any kind as 
potentially costly in the assistance it renders competitors. Firms in less 
competitive industries may see no costs associated with making public 
disclosures" (p191). Disclosure benefits and costs are discussed further in 
Section 3.4. 
Thus, it could be argued that these theories are relevant for explaining risk 
disclosure (see, for example, Woods and Reber, 2003; Linsley and Shrives, 
2000). Agency theory might be relevant and powerful when considering 
disclosure of risk and uncertainty. Risk disclosure would enable investors to 
deal more effectively with risk diversification. The results of the study 
survey conducted by Solomon et al. (2000) indicate that almost a third of the 
surveyed institutional investors agreed that increased disclosure would help 
them in their portfolio investment decision-making. Most investors would 
surely demand to know what managers are doing about the company's 
biggest risk. "Investors would not expect professional managers to shrug 
their shoulders and say that such risks defy analysis and that mangers 
cannot be expected to take account of political consideration" (ICAEW, 
1999b, p41). Thus, disclosure may act to reduce shareholders interference 
by publishing additional information. In addition, it can be argued that by 
providing greater disclosure, companies attempt to reduce the cost of capital 
by reducing investors' uncertainty. 
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Signalling theory may explain the motivation behind the risk disclosure as 
companies would gain the benefits from making additional risk disclosure. 
In the current complex business environment, companies may choose to 
disclose additional information to send signals to the market that additional 
requirements are not needed. If signalling theory is applicable in this case, 
then it is expected that companies have already disclosed additional 
information about risk that go beyond current requirements (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2000). By disclosing information about risk and its management, 
companies can convey significant messages about their performance. 
Disclosure will put companies in direct contact with the capital market, and 
hence companies could achieve the best price for their shares. This will be 
reflected in the stock price and funding cost of the firm. Since prior research 
suggests a negative association between disclosure and the cost of capital 
(e. g., Copeland and Gali, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Gray and Roberts, 
1989; AICPA, 1994; ICAEW, 1997,1999b; see also Botosan (1997) and Hail 
(2002) for evidence), risk disclosure, as a signal to the market, may reduce 
risk and cost of capital appeared in the capital market. 
Political cost may also contribute to the explanation of risk disclosure; it 
could be argued that companies may wish to disclose extra risk-related 
information in addition to statutory disclosure in order to signal that the 
feared regulation is not needed. Rather, they disclose the information to 
stave off perceived threats of more burdensome regulation. 
Stakeholder theory may also offer some insights into the reasons for annual 
report risk disclosure. The attitudes of some of external stakeholders can 
exert an important pressure in views about risk (Hellier et al., 2001). 
Companies disclose risk information in order to meet the demand of 
shareholders. Research has also shown that disclosure provides a way of 
controlling and minimizing conflict of interest among stakeholders (Chow 
and Wong-Boren, 1987). 
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In addition to the disclosure theories discussed above, there are also other 
theories including legitimacy theory (e. g., Patten, 1992; Deegan and Gordon, 
1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Guthrie and Parker, 1989) and media 
agency setting theory (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Ader, 1995). Regulation 
also affects the amount and quality of disclosure (e. g., Fields et al., 2001; 
Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Legitimacy theory has come to stress how companies will react to 
community expectations (e. g., Tilt, 1994; Patten, 1992). Companies may offer 
to disclose more information to legitimise their past behaviour. 
Media Agency Setting theory argues that an increase in media attention to an 
issue will increase the community concern so that the media provide to 
shape rather than reflect public priorities. 
Regulation can also play as a mechanism to increase disclosure. There is a 
need for regulation in the imperfect and incomplete market. In the perfect 
and complete market there is no need for accounting regulation. Disclosure 
rules deal with information gaps in the market to ensure that investors can 
make informed decisions founded on quality information, and that market 
participants are able to access up-to-date information relating to current and 
potential investments (O'Shea et al., 2008). Disclosure regulations improve 
the efficiency of market (Healy and Palepu, 2001) and influence, although 
arguably, the credibility of financial disclosure and, hence, public confidence 
in the capital market increases. However, although regulations are efficient 
in increasing the level of disclosure, the evidence found no impact in the 
quality of information (see Konishi and Ali, 2007; O'Shea et at., 2008; 
Rajgobal, 1999). 
Thus, although some theories may explain the phenomenon of risk 
disclosure, the reasons for information disclosure are nevertheless a 
complex issue. 
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3.4 Corporate Disclosure: Benefits and Costs 
In spite of increasing regulations (created by company law, accounting 
standards, and stock exchange requirements) that require companies to 
disclose information, the current rules are ambiguous and depend on 
managers' willingness to actively disclose the right information. Companies 
may choose to disclose information exceeding the level mandated by 
regulation or in advance of compliance date (i. e., voluntarily). The above 
section discussed a number of theories offered in the literature to explain 
disclosure phenomenon. 
Voluntary disclosure represents a range of free choice on the part of a 
company management to provide accounting and other information deemed 
important to users of corporate financial reports (Meek et al., 1995). The 
benefits and costs have been considered regularly by accounting setters, 
accounting regulators, accounting institutions (e. g., AICPA; ICAEW) and 
academics. Corporate disclosure literature provides theoretical and practical 
evidence on the potential benefits that disclosing firms can reap from 
revealing more information to the users in the market (e. g., O'Shea et al., 
2008; Healy et al., 1999; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002; 
Gray and Roberts, 1989). Although stock market considerations often 
dominate the disclosure decision, it is likely that companies will also disclose 
information for a variety of reasons. For example, it has been argued that 
voluntary disclosures reduce agency costs (e. g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987), lower information asymmetry among 
informed and non-informed market participants (e. g., Petersen and 
Plenborg, 2006; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Healy et al., 1999; Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991), reduce a company's cost of capital (e. g., ICAEW, 1997, 
1999b; Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002) and improve the market price of 
securities (e. g., Gray and Roberts, 1989). In addition, disclosure may also be 
made with the aim to reassure public and government, hence reducing any 
potential political cost or altering their perceptions. Moreover, disclosure 
improves the company image and reputation, and facilitates investment 
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decisions by investors. While promoting corporate risk disclosure in the 
annual report, the ICAEW argues that "enhanced information about what 
companies do to assess and manage key business risks of all types will: 
provide practical forward looking information; reduce the cost of capital; 
encourage better risk management; help ensure the equal treatment of all 
investors; and improve accountability for stewardship, investor protection 
and the usefulness of financial reporting" (ICAEW, 1997, p 3). 
However, the extent to which increased disclosures benefit companies (e. g., 
reduces information asymmetry or company's cost of capital) depends on 
the degree of usefulness of this disclosure. Since managers have incentives 
to make self-serving voluntary disclosure, it is unclear whether additional 
disclosure is credible (Healy and Palepu, 2001). For example, although there 
is a common proposition that forecasts disclosures are exceptionally 
relevant and provide useful information for investors, the problems of 
credibility arising from the non-verifiable nature of forecasts cannot be 
ignored (Dobler, 2004). 
While there are many potential benefits for disclosure, disclosure is not 
without costs. Revealing information to the public bring costs on companies. 
There are three types of costs associated with disclosure: non-proprietary 
costs, proprietary costs, and litigation costs. There is also the cost of 
possibility of intervention by government agencies, taxation authority and 
others. 
Non-proprietary costs are the direct costs associated with creating and 
distributing timely and accurate information, and include the costs of 
collecting, preparing and processing, and auditing financial information. 
The second type of disclosure cost is litigation costs. Some disclosure (e. g., 
some forward-looking information) may create litigation or invite regulatory 
intervention (Richardson, 2001; Field et al., 2003). Litigation might deter 
companies to provide certain types of disclosure, for example, directors 
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would withhold negative information (particularly those related to the 
future) when they feel this is necessary to avoid excessive legal costs or 
reputation concerns (Skinner, 1994). Therefore, it is unlikely that directors 
would release forward-looking information without safe-harbour protection 
and when disclosures are deemed too commercially sensitive (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2005; Armitage and Marston, 2007). 
Proprietary costs are imposed when managers perceive that some 
information is private and may be regarded as potentially costly because it 
may assist a company's competitors (Verrecchia, 1983; Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Thus, managers will probably withhold some information 
deliberately if the competitive pressures and proprietary costs associated 
with such disclosure are significant. Proprietary information costs arise from 
the negative outcome of proprietary information disclosure. Proprietary 
costs (usually referred to as 'competitive disadvantage costs' because it 
cannot be observed directly (Foster, 1986)) arise when competitors observe 
the information available in the market and use it to detriment the disclosing 
company. Disclosure of favourable information (e. g., forward-looking 
information including those related to risks and uncertainties) could 
encourage competitors to enter the market while disclosing other 
information could be used by current competitors to increase their market 
share. Verrecchia (1983,1990) suggests that traders tend to act less 
negatively in response to undisclosed information within a more competitive 
industry because they are aware of higher associated proprietary costs. The 
Jenkins committee (AICPA, 1994, p 41) referred to the competitive 
disadvantage notion of proprietary costs as "disclosure that would weaken a 
company's ability to generate future cash flows by aiding its competition is 
not in the interests of the company". The committee identified the 
competitive disadvantage arising from additional disclosure as an important 
constraint on expanding the scope of financial reports. The committee stated 
that "disclosing competitively sensitive information is a major concern for 
companies; for many, it is the single largest concern about the Committee's 
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recommendations. Companies are concerned that competitors would gain 
new insight from business reporting under the Committee's model and use 
that insight to a company's competitive disadvantage. To a lesser extent, 
companies are concerned that suppliers and customers also would gain new 
insights from improved reporting, thereby enhancing their relative 
bargaining position in price negotiations" (AICPA, 1994, chapter 5). 
Similarly, directors of UK companies have also expressed their concerns on 
this issue as presented in the ICAEW discussion reports (ICAEW, 1997, 
1999b). The institute, while encouraging companies' directors to improve 
their disclosure on risks and uncertainties, has acknowledged the concerns 
expressed by directors. Companies' directors are concerned that such 
disclosure on risks and how they are managed may place them at a 
competitive disadvantage against companies based in countries with less 
stringent disclosure requirements (ICAEW, 1999b). 
Thus, the indirect cost (i. e., litigation costs) and the cost of competitive 
disadvantage are the two primary costs and concerns for businesses' 
managers when considering information disclosure. Managers will have a 
high concern of indirect costs when they consider the decision of disclosing 
private information or commercially sensitive information. 
The Jenkins committee agreed that management should not be required to 
report information that would harm a company's competitive position 
significantly. Thus, a firm has to trade off the positive and negative effects of 
voluntary disclosure. Costs and benefits decisions must be made. However, 
the restriction limiting disclosure of competitively sensitive information 
should not be used as a reason to avoid producing meaningful disclosure 
(AICPA, 1994). Business reporting must be enhanced to make it relevant. 
The market should be kept well informed. The ICAEW are aware that 
commercial sensitivity should not be a major objective barrier to enhance 
risk disclosure. Directors need to be satisfied that disclosure would 
adversely impact shareholder value before they claim a commercial 
sensitivity exemption (ICAEW, 1999b). Difficult cost-benefit decisions 
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should be made when a company concludes that the risk of competitive 
harm outweighs the expected benefit from making voluntary disclosure 
(FASB, 2001). 
3.5 Companies' Characteristics and Disclosure Level 
Prior research suggests that several firm-specific attributes (factors) 
(including financial factors, non-financial factors, and social responsibility 
factors) may determine a firm's disclosure policy. Previous studies have 
tried to model the voluntary disclosure decision by relating disclosure to 
theses various factors. These factors include size of firm, leverage, 
ownership structure, the need for capital, size of auditing firm, listing status, 
type of industry and others. Some relations are, however, weak. The most 
important and commonly used factors include firm size, leverage, industry 
type and foreign listing. In this research, these four factors are investigated. 
3.5.1 Firm Size 
Size is an important determinant of disclosure level and has been used in 
many disclosure studies (e. g., Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Firth, 1979; Chow 
and Wong-Boren, 1987; Hossain et al., 1994; Meek et al., 1995; Raffournier, 
1995; Botosan, 1997; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Depoers, 2000; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007; Ratanajongkol et al., 2006; Aljifri and Hussainey, 
2007; Aljifri, 2008) that tested the association between disclosure and 
company size. Although most previous studies support a positive 
relationship, there is an unclear theoretical basis for such a relationship. The 
direction of association may be either positive or negative. Some previous 
studies found a negative association between size and the level of corporate 
disclosure (e. g., Aljifri, 2008; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007; Kou and Hussain, 
2007; Deloitte, 2006; Mak, 1996; Gray et al., 1995a; Roberts, 1992; Davey, 
1982; Ng, 1985; Stanga, 1976). These studies, therefore, did not support a 
positive relationship between size and disclosure. 
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Size is supported by agency theory and capital need theory. Disclosure costs, 
such as the cost of accumulation and dissemination of information, are 
higher for smaller firms (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Smaller firms may not 
possess the required resources for gathering and presenting the extensive 
array of information (Buzby, 1975). However, this argument may not hold 
true in all cases especially when considering the fast growth in information 
technology systems. The proportion of outside capital tends to be higher for 
larger companies and agency theory suggests agency costs (monitoring 
costs) increase with the amount of outside capital (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Thus, larger firms may have greater incentives to disclose more 
information in order to reduce agency cost (Firth, 1979; Chow and Wong- 
Boren, 1987), and hence reduce information asymmetries between 
managers and shareholders (Firth, 1979; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; 
lnchausti, 1997) and create a strong demand for their securities (Buzby, 
1975). The demand for information by analysts could be greater on larger 
firms (Firth, 1979; Schipper, 1991; Hossain et al., 1994). 
Larger listed firms have stronger incentives to disclose more information to 
improve their corporate reputation and public image since non-disclosure 
may be interpreted as bad news that could affect firm value (McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe, 1993; Schipper, 1991; Barry and Brown, 1986). 
Size is also a reflection of political cost theory because larger companies 
attract the interest of public and governmental bodies. Disclosure could be a 
mechanism by which to alleviate public criticism or governmental 
intervention (Firth, 1979; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Raffournier, 1995). 
The discussion so far suggests the following hypothesis: 
H2o: The level of risk disclosure is positively related to 
company size. 
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3.5.2 Industry Variable 
Industry can also be an important factor in explaining corporate disclosure 
(Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). The very industry a company operates in may 
have the potential to influence the amount and nature of information 
disclosed. The influence of industry has been proposed by political cost and 
signalling theory (e. g., Inchausti, 1997). Companies in sensitive industries 
will attract the attention of public and governmental bodies concerns (e. g., 
Adams et al., 1998). Disclosure will, therefore, play a key role in ensuring 
public concerns are answered. From signalling theory perspective, if a firm 
within an industry does not keep up with the others, this may be interpreted 
as a bad market signal, which may indicate that the firm is hiding bad news 
(Craven and Marston, 1999). Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) suggest that 
company risk profile is deeply influenced by the technological and market 
constraints exerted by the competitive industrial environment on the 
business models. Although many studies support a positive association 
between industry and disclosure (Abraham and Cox, 2006; Roberts, 1992; 
Paten, 1991; Cooke, 1989), some studies do not find an association between 
the two variables (e. g., Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007; Inchausti, 1997; McNally 
et al., 1982; Wallace et al., 1994). Based on the above argument, the 
following hypothesis is stated: 
H2b: Companies in certain industries (more industrial) are 
disclosing more risk information than others. 
3.5.3 US Dual Listing Factor 
Listing factors have been proposed by many studies in accounting disclosure 
as an important factor in explaining disclosure practices. It is a major 
determinant of disclosure. Evidence (e. g., Ball, 1995; Nobes, 1998) show that 
'equity' financed countries have a rich disclosure environment compared to 
'debt' financed countries. Ball et al. (2000) argued that equity-financed 
countries (e. g., common law countries) have more extensive accounting 
standards and better financial disclosure than debt financed countries (e. g. 
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code law countries). Listing in foreign stock exchanges gives firms an 
opportunity to raise capital (perhaps at a lower cost) in the foreign capital 
markets. Larger firms will be motivated to provide more disclosure to create 
demand for their securities (Buzby, 1975). Another reason that has been put 
forward for additional disclosure is that the foreign stock markets may 
require extra disclosure. For example, companies listed in the US had to 
follow US reporting rules (e. g., SEC regulations that require additional risk 
disclosure); the annual reports prepared under the UK rules are not the 
same ones for US listing. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
H2c: Firms with a US-dual listing disclose more information 
than firms without a US-dual listing. 
3.5.4 Leverage 
It has been proposed that the capital structure of a firm is related to agency 
cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency costs (e. g., incurred by monitoring 
costs) are higher in highly leveraged firms (i. e., more debt in the capital 
structures) because a large proportion of debt allows greater potential 
wealth transfers from debtholders to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Thus, agency theory predicts that corporate disclosure is expected to 
increase with leverage. Also, highly geared firms have a wider obligation to 
satisfy the needs of their long-term creditors for information compared to 
lower geared firms. However, the empirical evidence on this hypothesis is 
contradictory and produced inconsistent results. For example, Konishi and 
Ali (2007), Abraham et al. (2007), Oliveira et al. (2006), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005), Linsley and Shrives (2005), Wallace and Naser (1995), Inchausti 
(1997), Craswell and Taylor (1992), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Ahmad 
and Nicholls (1994), Hossain et al. (1994), Meek et al. (1995), and 
Raffournier (1995) found no significant relationship with disclosure, whilst 
others (e. g., Malone et al., 1993; Huafang and Jianguo, 2006; Naser et al., 
2002; Hossain et al., 1994; Bradbury, 1992) found a positive association. 
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Belkaaoui and Kahl (1978) found a negative relationship. The above 
argument suggests the following hypothesis: 
H2d: There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure 
level and leverage. 
3.6 Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Capital: Review of Previous Research 
The association between disclosure and the cost of equity capital is an 
important topic and a matter of considerable interest in today's economic 
environment (Hail, 2002) especially to the financial reporting community. 
Since economic theory and anecdotal evidence suggest a negative 
relationship between the two variables, the empirical evidence on this 
relationship is confronted with major methodological drawbacks - neither 
disclosure level nor cost of equity can be observed directly and has 
documented somewhat confronting results so far (Botosan, 1997; Hail, 
2002; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). More importantly, prior research fails to 
directly estimate the cost of capital. The cost of capital is a very technical 
issue and its estimate for an investigation of the impact of disclosure on cost 
of equity capital has never been easy to measure. The testing requires long- 
term testing periods. 
Prior theoretical research supporting a hypothesis of a negative association 
between disclosure level and the cost of equity has followed two distinct 
lines of research: stock market liquidity and an estimation risk perspective 
(Botosan, 1997). The first stream of research suggests that companies tend 
to increase disclosure to overcome the reluctance of potential investors for 
holding their shares, thereby enhancing stock market liquidity and reducing 
cost of equity capital either through reduced transaction costs or increased 
demand for a firm's securities (Botosan, 1997). This stream of research 
includes Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), and Bloomfield and 
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Wilks (2000). For example, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) construct a 
model in which they show that revealing information can increase demand 
for securities by investors, thereby improving liquidity and reducing 
information asymmetry, hence reducing the cost of equity capital. 
Bloomfield and Wilks (2000) also show that greater disclosure attracts 
increase demand for shares at a higher price from investors, thereby 
implicitly reducing the cost of capital and increasing liquidity. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) argue that the cost of equity is higher for securities with 
larger bid-ask spreads because investors require compensations for 
additional transaction costs. 
The second stream of research suggests that firm enhancing disclosure is an 
attempt to reduce the cost of equity capital by reducing non-diversifiable 
estimation risk (Botosan, 1997). This second stream of research is 
represented by Klein and Bawa (1976), Barry and Brown (1985), and 
Clarkson et al. (1996). Handa and Linn (1993) in their Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory model show A Bayesian investor attributes more systematic risk to 
an asset with poor information disclosure than to an asset with high 
information, resulting in lower demands and prices than under complete 
information. Klein and Bawa (1976) prove that estimation risk has an effect 
on the optimal portfolio choice. Barry and Brown (1985) suggest that higher 
information about a security could lower estimation risk. 
It is difficult, therefore, for the research to pinpoint the precise impact of 
disclosure on the cost of capital (Hail, 2002). This is why prior research has 
adopted an indirect approach when examining the relationship between the 
impact of disclosure and variables that are expected to be related to the cost 
of capital but not on the cost of equity capital itself. For example, Welker 
(1995) examines the association between the information asymmetry (using 
bid-ask spreads as the observable measure of market liquidity to identify the 
perceived level of information asymmetry) and the average disclosure score 
for an eight-year period. He finds that a useful disclosure policy reduces 
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information asymmetry, and, consequently, increases liquidity in equity 
markets. Lang and Lundholm (1996) provide evidence that the potential 
benefits of increased disclosure include reduced estimation risk and reduced 
information asymmetry. Selva (1995) documents a strong association 
between financial analysts' perceptions of risk and a company's 
price/earning ratio. Healy et al. (1999) find that greater analysts' disclosure 
ratings are negatively related to information asymmetry, as measured by the 
bid-ask spreads. For a sample of German firms, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
examine the association between disclosure policy of firms that adopt either 
IAS or US GAAP in contrast to firms that employ German domestic standards 
and cost of capital (using proxies of bid-ask spread, trading volume, and 
share price volatility). The mixed US evidence found in a rich disclosure 
environment such as US has motivated the authors to examine German 
environment. They found, as hypothesised, that firms with an international 
reporting strategy enjoy a lower bid-ask spread and a higher share turnover. 
However, contrary to expectations, German firms with an international 
reporting strategy have a higher share price volatility. Schrand and 
Verrecchia (2004) find that disclosure is negatively associated with proxies 
for a firm's information asymmetry, including the bid-ask spread, 
subsequent to the IPO. Petersen and Plenborg (2006) examine the impact of 
voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry. The sample includes 36 
industrial firms and is limited to one industry and covers the span of a three- 
year period between 1997 and 2000. The findings show that voluntary 
disclosure is negatively associated with both proxies for information 
asymmetry (e. g., bid-ask spread and share turnover). 
However, Botosan's (1997) was probably the first attempt to establish a 
direct empirical connection between disclosure level measured by her own 
index (self-constructed index) and cost of equity capital based on 
accounting-based equity valuation technique. For her sample, which 
comprises 122 US manufacturing firms, she finds that the disclosure level is 
negatively and significantly related to the cost of equity capital. However, 
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her results hold only for firms with low analysts' following, whereas for 
firms with high analysts following she finds no such relationship. 
Botosan and Blumlee (2002) extend Botosan's (1997) research by 
investigating further the relationship between the expected cost of equity 
capital and three different types of disclosure provided by AIMR (annual 
report, quarterly and other published reports, and investors relation 
disclosure) for a larger sample over several years, and representing 43 
different industries. They employed four alternative methods to measure the 
cost of equity capital. However, the results of the study are mixed. They find 
that greater annual report disclosure is associated with a lower cost of 
equity capital after controlling for firm size and market beta. Contrary to 
expectation, they find a positive relationship between the level of more 
timely disclosure in other publications such as quarterly report and the cost 
of equity capital. They explain these surprising results with the opinion of 
managers' claiming that more timely disclosure could attract transient 
investors who trade aggressively on short-term earnings, therefore 
increasing stock price volatility and consequently causing an increase in the 
cost of capital. Finally, they find no association between the cost of equity 
capital and the level of investors' relations activities. They conclude that the 
relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity depends on the type 
of disclosure. 
Richardson and Welker (2001) study the relationship between financial and 
social disclosure and the cost of equity capital for a sample of Canadian 
firms. They find a negative relationship between financial disclosure and the 
cost of equity capital for firms with low analysts following, which is similar 
to Botosan's (1997) findings. Contrary to expectation, they find a significant 
positive relationship between social disclosures and the cost of equity 
capital. They speculate that this conflicting result may be due to the poor 
economic conditions that characterize their sample period. 
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Hail (2002) examines the relationship between disclosure level (using an 
disclosure index developed by the Swiss Banking Institute) and the cost of 
equity capital (estimated by residual income model) in a lower disclosure 
environment compared for example to US and UK disclosure environments. 
The studies use a cross-sectional sample which comprises 73 non-financial 
Swiss companies. The findings show a negative and significant association 
between the cost of equity capital and annual report disclosure after 
controlling for firm size and market beta. 
Kothari and Short (2003) examine the impact of disclosure made by 
different sources (corporate management, analyst and business press) on 
the cost of equity capital estimated with the Fama and French three-factor 
model (an ex post proxy for the cost of equity capital). They use a very large 
content database of disclosure contents published in print medium and 
apply content analysis. In addition to segregating the sources of disclosure, 
the authors separate favourable and unfavourable disclosure. Overall, they 
find evidence that favourable disclosure reduces the cost of equity while 
unfavourable disclosure increases the cost of equity capital. The impact 
varies depending on who is making the disclosure. They find that positive 
news made by corporate management and business press do not materially 
affect cost of capital while negative news does. In contrast, they find that 
disclosure of both negative and positive news made by analysts does not 
have any significant impact on the cost of equity capital. The research 
suggests that analysts suffer from lack of objectivity and have a credibility 
problem or their responses to market changes are not on time (after market 
changes have taken place). 
Chen et al. (2003) studies the effects of disclosure level and other corporate 
governance mechanisms on the cost of equity capital in a relatively lower 
disclosure environment compared to the US. They find that the disclosure 
score provided by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) significantly 
reduces the cost of equity while the score provided by Standard and Poor's 
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does not. They find the scores on the non-disclosure corporate governance 
mechanisms (provided by CLSA) have a more pronounced effect in reducing 
the cost of equity capital. Finally, country-level investor protection also 
impacts the cost of equity negatively. 
Gietzman and Ireland (2005) find a negative association between timely 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital. The study results contradict the 
findings of Botosan and Blumlee (2002). 
Armitage and Marston (2007) examine the views of senior executives 
(primarily finance directors) on the cost and benefits of corporate 
communications, with the aim of ascertaining their views about the link 
between disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. Based on semi- 
structured confidential interviews, the main findings indicate that directors 
do not believe there is a clear link between disclosure and the cost of equity, 
perhaps because their companies already provide at least a good practice 
level of disclosure. 
A summary of academic articles on the relationship between disclosure level 
and the cost of equity capital is presented in Table 3.1. 
Welker (1995) To examines the impact of 
disclosure on the information 
asymmetry. A sample consisting of 
427 firms in 28 industries was 
selected. 1639 firm-year 
observations were analysed. 
Botosan To investigate the relationship 
(1997) between self-constructed 
disclosure score and the cost of 
equity capital. A sample of 122 
firms from the machinery industry 
in 1990 was selected. 
Healy et al. To examine the stock performance 
(1999) and intermediation reaction to 
sustained increase in disclosure. 
The sample covers 97 firms in 23 
industries. 
Finds that a useful disclosure policy reduces 
information asymmetry, and, consequently, 
increases liquidity in equity markets (the 
coefficient on disclosure is negative (-2.024) and 
significant a 1% level). 
Finds a significant negative association between 
the cost of equity and disclosure level for firms 
with a low analyst following. However, such a 
relationship was not found for firms with a high 
analyst following. 
Find that greater disclosure is positively related to 
higher stock returns, high in institutional share 
ownership and high analyst coverage. Find that 
disclosure is negatively (marginally significant) 
related to information asymmetry as measured by 
the bid-ask spread. 
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Botosan & To extend the study of Botosan 
Blumlee (1997) by including a larger sample 
(2002) over several years. The sample 
includes 3618 firm-year 
observations from 1985 to 1996. 
The results are mixed. Annual report disclosure 
reduces the cost of equity. However, more timely 
disclosure (such as disclosure made in quarterly 
reports) increases the cost of equity capital. No 
association was found between the level of 
investor relations activities and the cost of equity 
capital. 
Leuz & To examine whether German firms Find that firms with an international reporting 
Verrecchia can reduce their cost of equity by strategy enjoy a reduction in bid-ask spread and an 
(2000) switching to IAS or US GAAP. The increase in share turnover. However, German 
sample comprises 102 firms in the firms with an international reporting strategy have 
DAX 100 index during 1998. a higher share return volatility, which is contrary to 
expectations, 
Richardson & To examine the relationship Financial disclosure is significantly and negatively 
Welker (2001) between financial and social related to the cost of capital. However, 
disclosures and the cost of equity environmental disclosure is positively and 
capital. A sample of Canadian firms significantly related to the cost of equity, which is 
was examined. contrary to expectation. 
Hail (2002) To examine the relationship Finds a strong negative and significant relationship 
between disclosure quality and the between disclosure quality and the cost of equity 
cost of equity capital. The sample capital. He concludes that the lower overall 
includes 73 non- financial Swiss disclosure level in Switzerland compared to US 
firms. may provide an explanation for such a strong 
relationship. 
Kothari & To examine the impact of disclosure 
Short (2003) made by corporate management, 
analysts and print medium on the 
cost of equity capital. 887 firms 
from 1996-2001 from four sectors. 
The findings, overall, show that favourable 
(unfavourable) disclosure reduces (increase) the 
cost of equity capital. Specifically, negative news 
made by corporate and print medium reduces the 
cost of equity while positive news does not. The 
results show that the impact of disclosure made by 
analysts was less significant suggesting that 
analysts have a credibility problem. 
Chen et al. To examine the effects of disclosure 
(2003) level and other corporate 
governance mechanisms on the 
cost of equity capital. 
Petersen & To examine the impact of voluntary 
Plenborg disclosure on information 
(2006) asymmetry measured by bid-ask 
spread and share turnover in the 
context of Denmark. This study 
includes 36 industrial firms from 
one industry during 1997-2000. 
Greater disclosure is associated with a reduction in 
a company's cost of equity capital. 
The results indicate that the disclosure index is 
negatively associated with the bid-ask spread and 
the turnover ratio, both proxies for the 
information asymmetry. 
Froidevaux To examine the disclosure level of The findings show, for a cross-sectional sample of 
(2004) information in the investor relation 141 US non-financial firms, a negative and 
section of corporate websites and significant association between the level of 
its effect on the company cost of internet investor relation disclosure and the cost 
equity. of equity capital. 
Armitage & To examine the views of finance The main finding indicates that finance 
directors 
Marston directors on the cost and benefits do not support a negative relationship between 
(2007) of corporate communications, with disclosure level and the company cost of equity 
the aim of ascertaining their views capital, perhaps because their companies already 
about the link between disclosure provide at least a good practice level of disclosure. 
level and the cost of equity capital. 
O'Shea et al. To examine the effect of firm 
(2008) specific disclosure on stock price 
The results indicate that the amount of 
disclosure has significant influences on stock 
volatility and that these are relatively greater for 
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volatility of 340 metal and mining small and mid-sized firms than large firms. 
industry entities listed on the 
Australian stock exchange over the 
period 2005-2007. 
Table 3.1: Review of Academic Articles on the Relation between Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Equity Capital. 
Based on discussion so far, it is acknowledged that the anecdotal evidence, 
economic theory, and empirical research suggest that a greater disclosure 
level should improve investors' capabilities in forecasting the company's 
future developments and thereby reduce the estimation risk and an 
information asymmetry component of a firm cost of capital. While the 
relationship between financial and environmental disclosure and the cost of 
capital has been examined in prior literature, evidence on the direction of 
the relationship between the variables is mixed. The conflicting results may 
be due to the fact that the research studies dealt with differing experimental 
units - in terms of countries selected, sample selection, time and year of 
study, and different measures for variables including disclosure quality and 
cost of equity variables. 
The focus of this research is to examine specific types of disclosure (i. e., 
information on risks and uncertainties). Evidence on the link between risk 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital is quite limited if non-exist. It is 
suspected that risk disclosure can play a similar role to other types of 
information disclosure examined in the previous literature, and reduces the 
cost of equity capital by reducing transaction costs and/or reducing 
estimation error. If information about risk is relevant to and useful in 
assessing the firm's prospects, then enhanced disclosure of risk has the same 
effect, and then improving risk disclosure will have the same effect as 
improved disclosure of other types of information. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
113: There is u negative association between risk disclosure 
and the company's cost of equity capital. 
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3.7 Summary and Conclusion 
In closing, this chapter provides a comprehensive review of the literature. 
Examination of the relevant literature provides background and 
understanding into the dynamics of the present study. The present chapter 
has covered different areas including the nature and type of disclosure, the 
incentives for making information disclosure, disclosure costs and benefits, 
firm-characteristics affecting the level of information disclosed, and the 
impact of disclosure on the company's cost of equity capital. 
Disclosure theories which have been developed in the literature to explain 
disclosure practices were discussed in the present chapter. These theories 
include agency theory, political cost theory, signalling theory, capital need 
theory, benefit cost, and other theories. These theories in some senses 
emphasise different standpoints and assumptions of the phenomena to be 
explained and to this extent are not mutually exclusive (Morris, 1987). The 
theories are blurred in the sense that all of them seem logical and acceptable 
and none could be articulated to explain the research phenomena 
sufficiently. The theories overlap and there are no clear boundaries between 
them. To date, researchers tend to select whichever theory articulates best 
with their hypothesis. The relevance of these theories to risk disclosure and 
the cost of equity has been discussed throughout the present chapter. 
The present chapter examines various aspects of disclosure practice, such as 
its association with firm-specific characteristics. The underlying firm factors 
(e. g., size, leverage, industry, and listing) that may determine risk disclosure 
level were discussed and hypotheses were developed. 
The relevant previous studies that examined the relationship between 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital have been discussed and presented 
in the present chapter. The literature provides mixed results. It was noted 
that previous research that examines the relationship between disclosure 
and the cost of equity capital suffers from the well-known limitation of the 
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validity of disclosure measure, and cost of equity capital measure. The 
testing requires long-term testing periods. 
To achieve the research objectives (which have been presented in the first 
chapter), the next chapter will be devoted to explaining the research 
methods employed to conduct such a study. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters explored the corpus of literature related to 
corporate risk disclosure. The literature review shows that pressure from 
a variety of sources has come to bear on companies to report openly on 
the risks and uncertainties that they face, hence, increasing their financial 
reporting transparency. The present research is a contribution to the 
burgeoning literature that attempts to investigate corporate risk 
disclosure practices in companies' annual reports. Specifically, the 
research has three main objectives (see Chapter 1). Firstly, to investigate 
corporate risk disclosure practices in three different time periods (1998, 
2001 and 2004) to determine whether differences exist in the extent and 
variety of risk disclosure among companies. The second objective is to 
explain variation in risk disclosure, more specifically, to empirically 
explore the underlying factors that may affect the extent to which risk 
information is disclosed. Finally, the research examines the extent to 
which risk disclosure in the company's annual report is associated with a 
reduction in the company's cost of equity capital. The research sample is 
extracted from the UK FTSE-100 index and covers three different time 
periods (1998,2001 and 2004) and encompasses different industry 
sectors. 
In this chapter, the research methods used in the study and the sample 
selection procedures are discussed. The empirical models are stated. The 
measurement methods for the main research variables (i. e., risk disclosure 
level and the cost of equity capital) are explained alongside other 
explanatory variables. The remainder of this chapter is organised as 
follows: in section 4.2, a comparison is made between primary and 
secondary research. Next, the research questions and research hypotheses 
are briefly highlighted in section 4.3. This is followed by section 4.4 which 
presents the empirical models. The sample selection procedures which 
cover descriptions of the sample selection process, selection of the sample 
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period and justifications for the selection of the sampled firms and sample 
period are explained in section 4.5. The research assumption of using the 
annual report as a disclosure medium is explained in section 4.6. The 
methods for measuring risk disclosure level (e. g. using the content 
analysis approach) in the annual reports are discussed and explained in 
section 4.7. Section 4.8 is devoted to reviewing the measurement methods 
for the cost of equity capital. Descriptive statistics for the sample are 
displayed in section 4.9. Finally, the chapter concludes with section 4.10 
which provides a summary and conclusion. 
4.2 Primary and Secondary Research 
Once the research objectives have been set out, the following stage is to 
decide whether to collect new information or whether existing data are 
suitable to answer the research questions. Thus, one of the two paths (or 
both paths) can be undertaken as it is appropriate to the research 
objectives of a given study, primary and secondary research. Secondary 
research involves collecting information and data which are already 
available with reference to the research objectives at hand. In contrast, 
primary research is the purposeful collection of new information and data 
as part of the research project to fulfil its objectives for which there is 
insufficient information within the secondary research. 
In the present research, primary research was followed. The subject of this 
research is the affect of the content of company reports on stock market 
behaviour and this research directly employs the materials from company 
reports and stock market data from reliable sources. Companies' annual 
reports were sought, collected, and analysed to measure corporate risk 
disclosure. More specifically, unaudited narrative sections (mainly the 
chairman statement, CEO report, OFR, directors' report and corporate 
governance section were analysed). The analysis is confined to these 
sections because these sections are suitable and convenient medium for 
making voluntary disclosure (Oliveira et al., 2006). 
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4.3 Research Questions 
Three main research questions have been presented in the first chapter of 
this thesis. These questions are investigated on the basis of three 
hypotheses developed in previous chapters. Hypothesis 1 was developed 
in Chapter 2 while both hypotheses 2 (covering the following sub- 
hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d) and 3 were developed in Chapter 3. 
4.4 Empirical Models 
The statistical analyses performed in the present research includes the use 
of multiple linear regression models to examine the relationship between 
annual report risk disclosure level and the influencing factors referred to 
in Chapter 3. Prior research suggests that several factors (e. g., financial 
factors, non-financial factors, and social responsibility factors) may 
determine a firm's disclosure policy. In the present research, four 
variables were selected for investigation. These include firm size, leverage, 
industry type, and US-dual listing. These factors are the most commonly 
used independent variables in the accounting disclosure literature (Aljifri, 
2008; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007; Linsley 
and Shrives, 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2006; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2005; Raffournier, 1995; Hossain et al., 1994) and will be used 
here for testing with risk disclosure. The following model (1) will be 
tested: 
Risk Disclosure = ßo + ßi size+ ßZ listing + 03 leverage + 04 industry+ e 
Next, this research tests the relationship between annual report risk 
disclosure and the company's cost of equity capital. Following previous 
research on disclosure and the cost of equity capital (e. g., Botosan and 
Slumlee, 2002; Hail, 2002; Froidevaux, 2004; Chen et al., 2003; Petersen 
and Plenborg, 2006; Botosan, 1997) the cost of equity capital (IRR) is 
regressed on market beta (Beta), firm size and the risk disclosure score 
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(risk disclosure). I control for firm size and beta in line with prior 
research. This leads to the following regression model 2: 
IRR = ßo + ßi Risk disclosure + ß2 Size + (33 Beta +E 
Content analysis is used to measure the firm's risk disclosure level (risk 
disclosure level is a dependent variable in model 1; and an independent 
variables in model 2) disclosed in the annual reports. Since companies 
communicate their information throughout different channels, the annual 
report may not provide a powerful proxy for overall disclosure level 
especially when analysts play a significant role in the communication 
process. 
A company's cost of equity capital was directly measured using a four- 
stage dividend growth model. In addition, bid-ask spread, is used as proxy 
for information asymmetry (a component of the cost of capital) (e. g., 
Petersen and Plenborg, 2006; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Stock volatility 
is also another proxy used (O'Shea et al, 2008; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
In model (2), the control variables (e. g., size and beta) were selected based 
on previous literature (e. g., Petersen and Plenborg, 2006; Chen et al., 2003; 
Froidevaux, 2004; Botosan and Slumlee, 2002; Hail, 2002; Botosan, 1997). 
Beta and size were included in the analysis because prior research 
controlled for them when testing the relationship between disclosure level 
and the cost of equity capital. Total turnover at the year end (logged) has 
been calculated to proxy for company size and included in the model to 
control for the richness of the firm's information environment, whereas 
Beta is included in analysis to control for systematic risk because systemic 
risk is one of the major factors, which influences the cost of equity capital. 
Beta is the most accepted systematic risk measure used in the literature 
(Froidevaux, 2004) even though there is doubt about its validity as a 
measure of systematic risk (Fama and French, 1992; Gebhardt et al., 
2001). 
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4.5 Sample Design 
This study is based on a sample extracted from UK listed companies and 
drawn from FTSE-100 index. Taking into consideration research question 
number 1, the sample comprises the annual reports of 52 companies and 
covers three different time periods (1998,2001, and 2004). Thus, in total 
156 annual reports were sought, obtained and analysed. 
The decision to choose this time span was taken for the following reasons. 
First, with recent accounting regulatory development and other pressures 
in mind (highlighted in Chapter 2), there would be a research interest to 
assess whether these developments have influenced risk reporting. More 
importantly, the publication of Turnbull report in 1999 is considered to be 
a significant event that would have an influence on companies risk 
disclosure practices. At the late 20th and early 21st century, there has been 
an episode of significant stock market decline and volatility which caused 
a high risky business environment. Companies have been urged to place 
greater attention on risk reporting, and the topic 'risk reporting' has 
attracted the interest of regulators, accounting institutions, academics and 
other interested parties. Therefore, examining disclosure trends would be 
interesting so as to demonstrate ebbs and flows in interest at a time when 
discussion of this topic is still emerging. Thus, investigating corporate risk 
disclosure practices in UK annual reports over a six-year period, with the 
other research objectives in mind, makes a contribution to the literature. 
Finally, the years are recent enough to ensure reasonable access to firm 
corporate reports yet still ensure other post-sample data would be 
available. 
Three years intervals were selected because firms' disclosure is unlikely to 
change rapidly from one year to another (Ratanajongkol et al., 2006; 
Botosan, 1997). This would also allow for more companies to be examined 
in each period than a lesser number of companies over the full six-year 
109 
period. In addition, the time span of six years would give greater time 
coverage for the analysis, hence allowing more in-depth examination of 
trends. It is likely that the changes in disclosure over the six-year period 
would reveal interesting insights. 
Large companies are chosen because the theory suggests that they are 
more likely to disclose information. The largest companies have also a 
significant impact in the economy. The choice is also consistent with 
previous literature (e. g., Abraham and Cox, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Hall, 2002; Dunne et al., 2007). However, the sample choice may 
suggest a positive bias in disclosure level since disclosure is size-specific. 
Disclosure costs are decreasing in large firms and the information 
environment is assumed to be richer for large firms attracting high analyst 
followings and high media coverage (Hail, 2002). A positive association 
between disclosure level and firm size has been observed in prior 
literature (e. g., Oliveira et al., 2006; Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002; Meek et al., 
1995; Raffournier, 1995). Disclosure is also industry-specific (e. g., Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2005; AIMR, 1997). Manufacturing companies disclose more 
information than non-manufacturing firms (e. g., Cooke, 1992; Raffournier, 
1995). However, as long as cross-sectional variation in the disclosure 
remains, the empirical analysis should not suffer from the deficit. The 
sample covers different industries, so this will reduce the negative effect of 
the size on the sample choice. Different industries are likely to display 
different pattern of disclosure, therefore this would allow for comparison 
between industries (Botosan, 1997). 
A UK-based sample was chosen because this would reflect the extensive 
accounting development, and specially the work promulgated by the 
ICAEW on risk management and disclosure. There are also advantages of 
searching companies in a developed, active, and well regulated stock 
market. 
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In view of the fact that many initiatives for encouraging risk disclosure 
have taken place in different countries, the selection of the sample from 
the FTSE-100 index will ensure that the sample encompasses companies 
with multiple listings, and that all companies are subject to approximately 
equivalent levels of disclosure pressures arising from various regulatory 
and capital market regimes. 
Several data sources have been explored to obtain the FTSE-100 index list. 
Examples of sources include the Stock Exchange Year Book, Financial 
Times, Yahoo website, Guardian, etc. The FTSE-100 index selection was 
based on Yahoo finance website because it represented the most recent 
list at the time of selection. 
The collection of the sample reports proceeded as follows. Out of 100 
firms, 23 financial firms were excluded from the sample primarily because 
of the different regulatory requirements that apply and because their 
businesses differ heavily from other industries. This is in line with 
previous research (e. g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 
2005,2006; Dunne et al., 2007; Konishi and Ali, 2007). Following the date 
(post the fiscal year of 2004) at which the FTSE-100 list was obtained, 
some companies were found to be formed as a result of mergers during 
the past years (i. e., companies were not in existence either in 2001 or 
1998), others were merged together (e. g., Boots and Alliance Unichem), or 
taken over by other companies (e. g., Exel) at a later date, and some other 
were demerged (e. g., GUS). Some companies could not provide copies of 
earlier reports (i. e., for the year 1998 or 2001) since they came to exist at a 
later date. Taking all of the abovementioned reasons together, an 
additional 25 companies were dropped from the sample. The sample 
selection yields a final sample of 52 non-financial firms. The sampled 
companies are summarised in Table 4.1 and listed in Appendix 1. In detail, 
156 annual reports (related to 1998,2001, and 2004) prepared by 52 non- 
financial firms were sought and collected. Each company website was 
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checked first, and if annual reports were not available, a request was sent 
to each company requesting copies of their annual reports. 
Total firms at the beginning 100 
Financial firms dropped 23 
Other firm excluded (merger, demerger, take over, access denied) 25 
Total firms researched 
Table 4.1: Companies included in the Sample 
52 
The sample is not restricted to companies from one industry although 
some companies were excluded. Companies span a wide range of 
businesses. The 52 companies were broken-down into eight industry 
categories, based on London Stock Exchange (LSE) classification: namely, 
resources (RE), basic industries (BI), general industries (GI), non-cyclical 
consumer goods (NCCG), cyclical services (CS), non-cyclical services (NCS), 
utilities, (UT), and information technology (IT). To make comparison 
easier, information technology is consolidated with CS because it has only 
one constituent company, Sage. Thus, this reduces industry categories to 
seven categories. Table 4.2 displays the sampled companies classified 
according to industry sectors. 
Resources (RE) 4 
Basic Industries (BI) 5 
General industries (GI) 2 
Non-cyclical consumer goods (NCCG) 9 
Cyclical services and information technology (CS&IT) 22 
Non-cyclical service (NCS) 4 
Utilities (UT) 6 
Total 52 
Table 4.2; The Companies Sample Classified by Industry Groups 
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4.6 Research Assumption: Annual Report as a Disclosure Medium 
Organisations use a number of mediums to communicate to their 
stakeholders. The annual report is one medium. Other mediums include 
quarterly reports, press releases, conference calls, internet sites, and 
corporate news letters. The annual report has been the basis for the 
majority of previous accounting disclosure studies (e. g., Guthrie and 
Mathews, 1985; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; 
Patten, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Hossain et al., 1994; Gray et al., 
1995a; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and 
Rankin, 1996; Botosan, 1997; Depoers, 2000; Abu-Baker and Naser, 2000; 
Hail, 2002; Deegan et al., 2002; Unerman, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; 
Oliveira et al., 2006; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; 
Dunne et al., 2007; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Aljifri and Hussainey, 
2007; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Aljifri, 2008). In recent times, 
corporate reporting on the internet has gained importance (IASC, 1999) 
and has become an important medium of choice for companies and 
investors alike. Reporting on the internet has also received researchers' 
attention (Froideveaux, 2004; Ettredge et al., 2002; FASB, 2000, Williams 
and Pei, 1999) lately due to its recent rapid development. There also exist 
some studies that examined corporate disclosure in press releases (e. g., 
Ramaswami, 2001), interim reports (e. g., Mangena, 2004; Schadewitz, 
1994), and conference calls disclosure (e. g., Frankel et al., 1999). 
The present study focuses on the annual report because companies' 
managers regard it as a significant form containing focused information 
covering a view of a company's performance and operation to the public 
(Hines, 1988; Neimark, 1992). The company annual report has a 
substantial editorial input into it and is widely read (Deegan and Rankin, 
1996). The annual report is considered the most comprehensive document 
available to the public and is therefore the main disclosure vehicle 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991), is presented in an easy-to-read format, and is 
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automatically sent to all stakeholders (Adams et al., 1998). The annual 
report is deemed as an important source of information and is regarded as 
the most preferable source of certain information for a number of 
stakeholders (Tilt, 1994; Deegan and Rankin, 1997; RSA, 1998; Epstein 
and Palepu, 1999); and contains more desirable information for individual 
investors (Epstein and Freedman, 1994). The annual report is also one of 
the least costly, but most effective, means of communication for most 
companies (e. g., Holland and Foo, 2003). It possesses a degree of 
credibility not associated with any other forms of communication (Neu et 
al., 1998) and is, therefore, regarded by both preparers and users as an 
important medium of communication. 
There are numerous other reasons for choosing the annual report as a 
medium of communication. Most proposals that required companies to 
enhance their risk reporting have recommended the annual report as the 
vehicle for improved risk disclosure (e. g., ICAEW, 1997,1999b, 2002; ASB, 
1993,2003,2006). For example, the ICAEW writes "... we remain 
committed to the idea that listed companies annual reports should contain 
information about risks in the broader sense, about actions to manage 
them and relevant measures" (ICAEW, 1999b, p. 3). In view of the fact that 
the annual report is a statutory report produced on a regular basis by all 
enterprises (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Tilt, 1998), using it as a basis for 
analysis will make comparisons between the years relatively easy. It will 
also enable comparison to other studies that examined the same issue 
(Brown and Deegan, 1998; Guthrie and Parker, 1989). While the analysis 
excludes other communication avenues, it is assumed (e. g., Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993) that disclosure levels found in the annual reports are 
correlated positively with the amount of disclosure provided by other 
media. However, it should be noted that the focus on annual report alone 
may result in an incomplete picture of reporting. Nonetheless, the length 
of the sample period, from 1998-2004 could be a relevant point here. 
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The present study focuses on the analysis of risk disclosures made in the 
OFR, Chairman Statement, CEO Report, Directors' Report, and Corporate 
Governance Report. These are the parts in which companies are 
encouraged to enhance their reporting voluntarily. The contents of these 
parts are not required to conform totally to accounting conventions. The 
current rules indeed depend on the willingness of managers to actively 
disclose the right information. For example, although companies are 
required to give a description of the principal risks and uncertainties that 
they face in a 'Business Review' section identified as part of Directors' 
Report (Companies Act, 1985), the regulations provide no further 
guidance on preparing a statutory 'Business Review'. This lack of guidance 
allows company directors a large degree of freedom to discuss what is 
significant to their businesses and encourages them to follow modern 
best-practice communication. Company directors are also permitted to 
express their judgment when applying the requirements of corporate 
governance. The debate on the OFR reflects an important recognition for 
the need of narrative disclosure, even where this was not capable of audit 
verification. Many organisations (e. g., ICAEW, 1997,1999b, 2002; CICA, 
2002; IASB, 2005; and AICPA, 1994) around the world have issued 
recommendations encouraging companies to discuss and report risks and 
uncertainties in the sections outside the financial statements. For example, 
the UK recommendations encouraged the publication of an OFR where 
risks and uncertainties could be reported, while other countries (e. g., 
Germany, Italy, Canada, US) required companies to report risks in the 
management report (in the case of German companies) and in the 
'Management Discussion and Analysis' (MD&A) report for other countries. 
Both the 'Management Report' and 'MD&A' are the counterparts of an 
'OFR' in the UK. 
There are also several reasons why the focus is on these sections. There is 
evidence (e. g., Eccles and Mavrinac, 1995; Bartlett and Chandler, 1997; 
ProShare, 1999) that these narrative sections are deemed to be very 
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important for investors when they make their own investment decisions. 
For example, Eccles and Mavrinac (1995) provide support that investors 
and analysts value non-financial information (reported in the narrative 
sections) and that they do not favour mandating disclosure. Other 
evidence includes Solomon et al. (2000). The needs for information by 
users was also recognised by accounting regulators and other 
organisations (e. g., AICPA, 1994; ICAEW, 1997,1999b, 2002; DTI, 2001; 
ASB, 2002,2003,2006) to promote better disclosure by listed companies. 
Woods and Reber (2003) compare risk disclosure found in 'Management 
Report' of German companies' annual reports and in 'the OFR statement' 
of the UK companies' annual reports. Beretta and Bozolan (2004) focused 
on the MD&A report of Italian companies' annual reports. 
4.7 Measuring Risk Disclosure Level 
The level of annual report risk disclosure is one of the two main variables 
(the second main variable is the company's cost of equity capital) that 
needed to be measured in this research. 
Empirical research chooses between two alternatives paths through which 
content analysis has been used to date, namely disclosure indices and 
frequency of risk items' occurrence. Previous studies (e. g., Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2008; Botosan, 1997; Kent and Ung, 2003; Botosan, 1997; 
Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Meek et al., 1995) have used disclosure indices to 
measure the extent and quality of information that is disclosed by firms. 
The construction of a disclosure index involves the selection of a number 
of information items. Once an index has been developed, the next step is to 
choose between different approaches available in the literature. A 
commonly used method is to score items in a disclosure index according to 
whether or not they are disclosed in a weighted or an un-weighted 
approach. The un-weighted approach (e. g., Cooke, 1989a, 1992; Rubin and 
Austin, 1992; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Hossain et al., 1994; Branco and 
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Rodrigues, 2008) uses a dichotomous procedure in which an item scores 1 
if it is disclosed and 0 if it is not, while the weighted one (e. g., Singhvi and 
Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; Malone et al., 1993) applies a weighted 
disclosure index where qualitative items are rated according to their 
degree of importance. However, both approaches have limitations (Rubin 
and Austin, 1986; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Marston and Shrives, 
1991). The un-weighted approach, for instance, assumes that every 
information item is equally important for all users of annual reports. 
However, information relevance is harder to define since potential users of 
annual reports may have extremely different interests. The weighted 
approach, on the other hand, entails subjective judgment in its 
construction which cannot be completely removed (Marston and Shrives, 
1991). An additional drawback occurs in replicating the analysis and/or 
making comparisons (Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
Instead of detecting the presence or absence of information items, the 
alternative approach taken in the present study is a multi-dimensional 
coding, to quantify the level of risk disclosure (the approach known as 
content analysis). This is justified in order to classify and analyse the 
different aspects of risk disclosure, and investigate its characteristics. This 
approach will also ensure that all relevant risk topics are checked and 
analysed, and that a valuable insight into the way the information is 
disclosed can be provided. It is also an appropriate approach for 
examining differences and analysing trends. This is what is not achieved 
by disclosure index. 
The approach of content analysis has been widely used in accounting 
disclosure literature (e. g., Guthrie and Mathew, 1985; Zegal and Ahmad, 
1990; Mathews, 1993; Adams et al., 1995; Neu et al., 1998; Milne and 
Alder, 1999; Hall, 2002; Woods and Reber, 2003; Campbell, 2004; Beretta 
and Bozolan, 2004; Lajili and Zegal, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2005,2006; 
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Abraham and Cox, 2007; Dunne et al., 2007; Deumes and Knechel, 2007; 
Papa, 2007; Deumes, 2008; Williams, 1999; Tsang, 1998). 
Content analysis is an approach to the analysis of documents and texts 
(printed or visual) that seeks to identify content in terms of 
predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable manner 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003). Probably a well-known definition is the one 
provided by Holsti (1969) as "a research technique for making inferences 
by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of 
message". Weber (1985,1988) described it as a method of codifying and 
categorising the text (or content) of a piece of writing into various groups 
or categories depending on selected criteria. Content analysis code the 
texts (which is measured by word or sentences or any other units of 
measurement) against a particular schema of interest (Wolfe, 1991). 
Having reviewed the above definitions, it is striking that the above 
definitions contain some qualities including objectivity and being 
systematic. Objectivity is attained when certain rules are clearly specified 
before assigning the content (text) to categories (or groups). This allows 
the procedures being followed to be transparent, hence reducing the 
analyst's personal biases to as minimum level as possible. The quality of 
being systematic means that the application of the rules is undertaken in a 
consistent manner so that bias is repressed (Bryman and Bell, 2003). As a 
result of these two qualities, anyone else repeating the analysis would 
categorize the unit in the same way (i. e., reliability). 
Content analysis involves different stages. An essential element is the 
selection and development of categories into which content units can be 
coded and classified. Beresford and Cowen (1979) indicate that the 
themes (categories) defined are a description of what has happened in the 
past years (and how), as well as a benchmark to evaluate the changes and 
progress in reporting. A review of mainstream literature was carried out 
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in order to draw up a list of these categories and items. Several empirical 
studies in the area were of great utility (e. g., ICAEW, 1997; ICAS, 1999; 
IFAC, 1999; CICA, 2002; IASB, 2005; Woods and Reber, 2003; Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Lajili 
and Zegal, 2005; Papa, 2007; Deumes and Knechel, 2007; Deumes, 2008). 
In the mainstream literature, risk has been defined as "uncertain future 
events which could influence the achievement of the organisation's 
strategic, operational and financial objectives" (IFAC, 1999). Uncertainty 
refers to either potential gain or potential loss as in the following 
definition "the uncertainty associated with both potential for gain or 
exposure to loss" (ASB, 1994). In other words, risk referred to the 
volatility of future expected earnings or cash flows which is dependent 
upon both diversifiable and non-diversifiable risk. Furthermore, the 
definition encompasses both negative and positive outcomes. Therefore, 
the potential opportunities disclosed will be taken into consideration 
when examining risk information (Lajili and Zegal, 2005; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2005; Papa, 2007). Having defined what is meant by risk, the next 
step is to recognise what causes different type of uncertainties. In other 
words, what are the different sources of risk? The report by ICAEW (1997) 
reproduced the Arthur Anderson risk disclosure model TM (presented in 
Chapter 2). In this model, a distinction is made between three main 
components (e. g., environment risk, information for decision-making, and 
process risk). Each component referred to general classes (for example, 
process risk refers to operational, financial, empowerment, information 
processing and integrity risk). Finally, within each class, there are a 
number of categories and items. Although the model was considered very 
complicated, it has been of great utility for previous studies (e. g., Woods 
and Reber, 2003; Linsley and Shrives, 2005,2006). For example, Linsley 
and Shrives (2005,2006) use a framework comprising 6 categories and 37 
sub-categories. For the purpose of this thesis, a new classification was 
developed, dividing risk disclosures into the following three categories: 
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1. Environmental risks; 
2. Operational risks; and, 
3. Strategic risks. 
These categories and its contents (items) (risk sources and types) were 
drawn from previous literature in the area. These categories and items 
were pilot tested on a random sample of twenty annual reports (the 
sample was part of the final sample) to ensure that they are relevant and 
those that are not relevant are omitted. 
Environmental risk arises from factors essentially beyond the 
organisation's control and comprises disclosures relating to economic risk 
(e. g., interest rate, currency risk, price and commodity risk, inflation, 
taxation, credit risk), political risk, social risk, legal and regulation risk, 
climate and catastrophic risk, and industry sources (competition, 
suppliers, customers). 
Operational risk is the probability of losses arising from the essential 
operation side of the firm. Some definitions are limited to the process (e. g., 
risk associated with the process and internal control) while others are 
broader. Operational risk covers such issues as internal control, business 
disruption, infrastructure risk; liquidity and cash flow, project failure, 
operational problems, employment practices and workplace safety; 
clients, product and business practices, damage to physical assets, risks 
arising from the impact of companies' operations on the natural 
environment, compliance and damage to reputation, and legal risk (arising 
from uncertainty due to legal actions or uncertainty in the applicability or 
interpretation of contract, laws and regulations - legal dispute is an 
example). 
Strategic risks arise from operating in a particular industry and are 
associated with the company's future business plans and strategies. 
Strategic risk disclosures encompass disclosure related to research and 
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development, intellectual property rights, acquisitions, alliances, and joint 
ventures, management of growth, investment risk, technology, and the use 
of derivatives, and other strategic risk related to planning and portfolio 
risks. A full list of categories including sub-categories and items are 
included in Table 4.3. 
Economic risk 
General economic condition 
Currency risk 
Interest rate 
Price and Commodity 
Inflation 
Taxation 
Credit risk 
Political risk 
Social risk 
Regulation and legislation 
Industry sources 
Competition 
Potential entrants 
Suppliers 
Substitutes 
Strategic partners 
Customers 
Dependent on clients 
Market acceptance 
Changing client requirements 
Change in demand 
Level of activity 
Changes in customer 
preference 
Internal control 
And information system 
Risk management policies 
Liquidity and cash flow 
Capital availability 
Funding and refinancing 
Infrastructure 
Millennium 
Euro 
Project failure 
Product failure 
Product liability 
Product deficit 
Operational problem 
Operational disruption 
Supply chain 
Manufacturing 
Service delay 
Health and safety 
Impact of operations on the 
natural environment 
Compliance and reputation 
Legal dispute 
Product market 
Research and development 
(R&D project choice) 
Intellectual property rights 
Acquisitions 
Alliances 
Joint ventures 
Management of growth 
Investment 
Use of derivative 
Technology 
Other strategic planning 
Table 4.3 Risk Disclosure Categories and Items 
Another essential element of content analysis is the selection of the 'unit of 
analysis'. This requires an important consideration (Bryman and Bell, 
2003; Unerman, 2000; Gray et al., 1995b; Krippendorf, 1980) as it will 
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determine 'how' to capture the data (e. g., risk disclosure) in the annual 
report. One of two approaches can be followed: namely the number (or 
incidence) and the amount of disclosure (Gray et al., 1995b). The former 
deals with the absence or presence of disclosure, whilst the latter captures 
the volume of disclosure (using, for example, words, sentences, pages, 
number of lines etc. ). Although both approaches have intrinsic value, the 
latter approach, although involving more work, offers the richer data set 
and will, in many cases, cover automatically the former (Gray et al., 1995b; 
Cowen et al., 1987; Guthrie and Mathews, 1985). 
There is a debate about the "unit of analysis" one should use in content 
analysis. A number of "units of analysis" are employed in the written 
communication literature including: words (e. g., Deegan and Gordon, 
1996; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Xiao et al., 2005); sentences (Milne and 
Adler, 1999; Deegan et al., 2000; Woods and Reber, 2003; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006; Konishi and All, 2007); pages and proportions of a page 
(Guthrie and Mathews, 1985; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Campbell, 2000; 
Dunne et al., 2007); "frequency" (e. g., Cowan et al., 1987; Ness and Mizra, 
1991); "number of lines" as a percentage of total lines (Trotman and 
Bradley, 1981; Papa, 2007); and "high/low" disclosure (Patten, 1991). The 
most common and preferred units of analysis tend to be "word", 
"sentence", and "page" (Gray et al., 1995b). These measures are capable of 
generating volumetric measure of disclosure volume. However, there is 
no single accepted unit of capturing data in content analysis; each has 
their pros and cons. Although counting 'words' may provide a precise 
measure, individual words have no meaning to provide a sound basis for 
coding disclosures without a sentence or sentences for context. Thus, the 
extra precision that might be gained is unlikely to add to understanding 
(Milne and Adler, 1999). In addition, NG (1985) concludes that the results 
were not reliable when "word" was used as a measurement unit. Words 
are smaller and more numerous as a unit of measurement compared to 
sentences, thus using "word" is time consuming and costly, especially 
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when contemplating a large sample. Page or "proportion of page", on the 
other hand, does not consider different print and page size (Hackston and 
Milne, 1996). Coding "words" or "areas of a page" (e. g. tenths or one 
hundredths), as a basis to obtain a disclosure measure, adds unnecessary 
unreliability (Milne and Adler, 1999). Moreover, "laying a plastic grid 
sheet over a body of text and trying to code the contents of each grid 
square would result in meaningless measures" (Milne and Alder, 1999, p 
243). 'Sentence' as unit of analysis provides a high degree of accuracy and 
is likely to provide data which are complete, reliable and meaningful 
(Milne and Adler, 1999). 
Thus, 'sentence' as a unit of analysis is used here in the present research to 
count the number of risk information sentences disclosed. This is in line 
with previous related risk disclosure studies (Woods and Reber, 2003; 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005,2006; Abraham 
and Cox, 2007). Hackston and Milne (1996) concluded that the 
measurements of average "pages" amount and number of "sentences" are 
correlated with a number of important variables indicating that the choice 
between the two methods has little impact on the results. 
Furthermore, the analysis was taken one step further and three more 
dimensions (sometimes referred to as variables or characteristics) were 
considered: the nature of evidence2 (qualitative and quantitative 
disclosure), the type of news3 (bad, good, and neutral disclosure), and time 
2 Disclosure classified to qualitative disclosure if it includes information that is not numerical in 
nature, and to quantitative disclosure if it contains and primarily relates to actual numbers of 
financial and non-financial nature. 
3 Sentence is regarded as good news if it contains statement beyond the minimum which include 
(for example) specific details where these details have a creditable reflection on the company; or 
any statement which reflects credit on company, upbeat analysis/discussion/statements (e. g., 
reducing the number of incidents). Statement is counted as bad news statement if it contains any 
statement which reflects discredit on the company (e. g., increase number of accidents; negative 
impact of volatility). Sentence is counted as neutral news statement if it refers to a general policy 
statement or intent within statutory minimum with no details of 'what' or 'how', statement of facts 
whose credit/discredit to company is not obviously unaccompanied by editorializing (Gray et al., 
1995b). 
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orientation4 (future, past, and non-time). Figure 4.1 summarises the final 
coding scheme including four stages. Each stage represents a quality 
dimension (variable). These dimensions are considered in order to 
improve the content analysis process and achieve some sense of quality of 
the information disclosed. These dimensions were drawn from the 
previous literature in the area (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Papa, 2007; 
Woods and Reber, 2003; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Milne and Adler, 
1999; Hackson and Milne, 1996; Gray et al., 1995b; Hall, 2002). 
Based on the coding scheme, each company's annual reports for 1998, 
2001, and 2004 were analysed and risk disclosure was classified on an 
individual recording sheet as in Table 4.4. Essentially, narrative sections of 
the annual report were examined and risk disclosure texts (containing risk 
relevant information that facilitates the reader to be better informed about 
past and potential threats or opportunities arising from external or 
internal variables (Linsley and Shrives, 2005) were detected manually)5. 
Then, the texts were measured by the number of sentences and matched 
to categories of risk disclosure which appeared in Table 4.4. If the 
sentence contains two categories of disclosure, it was prorated 
accordingly (coding rules are presented in Appendix 2). The contents of 
the recording sheets were then transferred to an Excel spreadsheet in 
order to permit subsequent analysis and to facilitate statistical 
manipulation. 
Typical examples of risk disclosure per category are provided in the 
results chapter (see Chapter 5). Examples on quality variables appear on 
the coding scheme (Figure 4.1) and Table 4.4 and are also provided in 
chapter S. 
" Disclosures are classified to past disclosure' if disclosure relates to the past; future disclosure if 
relates to the future; and non-time disclosure otherwise. 
5 The method does not employ a computer-aid to extract risk sentences from the report but rather 
uses a manual method of actually reading through the risk sections as a user of the report would do. 
Although computer-aid is labour-saving in terms of time and effort, human coders are better at 
judging the meaning of a sentence in a context. 
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Coding Stage 1 
Annual Matching the 
report risk content of 
disclosure the annual 
(Narrative report to 
sections) categories' 
content 
Figure 4.1: Coding Scheme 
Environmental 
risk 
Operational 
risk 
Strategic 
risk 
TOTAL 
Table 4.4: Disclosure Checklist 
Key: G= good B= bad N= neutral 
Stage 2 Qualitative 
The nature of ------ 
evidence Quantitative 
Stage 3 Good 
Type of news Baý 
--1 Neutral 
Stage 4 Future 
News time 
frame Past 
Non-time 
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Category Qualitative Quantitative Qualitative Quantit; t; v, ý t2ualit ative Quantitative 
Past Past Non-time Non-time Future Future 
GBNGBNGBNGBNGBNG6N 
A potential area of concern is the reliability of coding. Coding must be 
done in a consistent manner; coding must be consistent between coders 
(inter-coder reliability) and each coder must be consistent over time 
(intra-coder reliability). Since the coder may become expert in the coding, 
this may lead to inconsistent coding over time. If after training the coder 
demonstrates an acceptable level of accomplishment by coding a pilot 
sample, the coder might be acceptable (Milne and Alder, 1999; 
Krippendorf, 1980). Disagreement in coding arises from inter-observer 
inconsistencies, which is the weakest form of reliability. However, Milne 
and Adler (1999) consider it as being of least concern. Stability can be 
improved by designing a decision rules for the coding to ensure 
consistency (Krippendorf, 1980; Milne and Adler, 1999). If the reliability is 
low, the coding rules must be revised and then tested on a pilot sample 
and if required revised and tested again until reliability is achieved. 
The researcher discussed the coding scheme with two independent 
academics, and after extensive discussion, the researcher spent a sufficient 
amount of time practicing coding in order to become familiar with the 
research instrument, coding instruction and its application on the chosen 
sampling unit prior to commencing coding. 
A preliminary coding of twenty annual reports, which were also included 
in the final sample, was undertaken in order to assess and refine the 
coding process. Some issues arose concerning some risk items (e. g. some 
items did not always represent fully mutually exclusive categories) and 
coding was refined as a result. Quality variables were then examined with 
an experienced academic familiar with both risk disclosure literature and 
content analysis. Reliability can be improved by producing a set of 
decision rules that the coder can refer to (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). The 
results of coding an initial sample were used to construct a set of decision 
rules (see Appendix 2). Throughout the pilot work, difficulties (if any) 
concerning, inter alia, the interpretation of the decisions rules can be 
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noted, clarified and discussed. All the conflicts were resolved following the 
construction of clear coding principles and decision rules. The inter-rater 
or inter-observer method was tested when a further sample of annual 
reports was coded independently by the coder and a further two 
independent persons, who hold permanent full-time positions and have 
academic experience, working under written instructions from the 
researcher to test that consistency of the coding was occurring. The results 
showed there were no significant differences between the scores. 
After extensive discussion, and once agreement had been achieved, the 
researcher coded all annual reports by himself to ensure consistency, and 
by followed a set of coding rules to ensure reliability and validity of 
coding. 
However, as with all research methods, content analysis suffers from 
certain limitations. Content analysis measures quantity but not quality of 
disclosure (Unerman, 2000) as information disclosed is counted 
volumetrically. Problems arise when there are repetitions of certain 
numbers and words in annual reports. Numbers need to be accompanied 
by explanatory words to provide meaning. However, a coding scheme 
(such as the one which was developed above) can be developed to 
minimise subjectivity in coding (e. g., Tilt, 1998; Campbell, 2000) and to 
permit further analysis (Milne and Adler, 1999), therefore suppressing the 
limitation and improving the quality of analysis (Hall, 2002). 
4.8 Measuring the Cost of Equity Capital 
Previous evidence (e. g., Botasan, 1997; Botosan and Blumlee, 2002; Hail, 
2002) pertaining to disclosure quality and the cost of equity seeks to 
provide a further contribution to the accuracy of the cost of equity 
estimation. However, the major drawback of cost of equity calculation is 
its difficulty. 
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The literature includes different approaches for estimating the cost of 
equity capital. However, these approaches, as acknowledged by Botosan 
(1997), suffer quite severely in their accuracy of estimations. One of the 
approaches is to use past returns to derive an ex post cost of capital 
estimates. For example, using average realized return. However, average 
realized returns provide an extremely noisy measure of cost of equity 
capital as it has had difficulty in establishing a significant association 
between returns and market beta, the most widely accepted measure of 
risk (Fama and French, 1992). Lakonishok (1993) concludes that at least 
70 years of data would be required to show that even market beta is a 
statistically significant risk factor if average realized returns are used to 
proxy for the cost of equity capital. It is unlikely, therefore, that this 
approach would provide a powerful test of the disclosure hypothesis, 
especially given the limited sample employed in this study. Another 
example is to use a method based on the asset-pricing model, such as the 
CAPM and Arbitrage Pricing theory (APT), or an empirically motivated 
factor model such as the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. 
Although the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is considered less noisy 
than realised return, Botosan (1997) concludes that CAPM does not 
provides a role for information and demonstrates little or no relation to 
market beta6. Prior research (e. g., Barry and Brown, 1985; Handa and 
Linn, 1993; and Coles et al., 1995) concludes that estimation risk7 is not 
reflected in the traditional CAPM formula for market beta (which is 
derived under the assumption that the parameters of the distribution are 
known). Fama and French (1997) conclude that there are three difficulties 
inherent with the use of this approach (using past return to derive an ex 
post of cost of capital estimates) including the difficulties in the choice of 
an asset-pricing model; the imprecise estimates of risk loading; and factor 
6 As it is assumed that cross-sectional variation in market beta alone derives variation in the cost of 
capital. Hail (2002, ppl5-16) states "The CAPM provides no role for risk factors than market beta, 
e. g. estimation risk, to derive variation of capital unless one assumes these factors are directly 
linked to market beta itself". 
7 Since the prior research suggests that greater disclosure can reduce cost of equity capital by 
reducing non-diversifiable estimation risk. 
128 
risk premia. The earning-to-price ratio adjusted for growth and dividend 
payout is another measure that has been used by academics and 
practitioners to estimate cost of equity capital. However, it has been 
argued (i. e., Penman, 1993) that the E/P ratio may be used to estimate the 
cost of equity capital only in the rare situation where expected future 
earnings are current earnings adjusted for growth at a rate equal to the 
cost of capital. Penman concludes that prior research fails to find an 
association between the E/P ratio and measures of risk because E/P ratios 
reflect cross-sectional variation in the ability of firms' current earnings to 
predict their future earnings more than they reflect cross-sectional 
variation in cost of equity capital. In the line with this, using earning-to- 
price ratio, Botosan found no statistically significant association between 
the cost of equity capital estimates and market beta for her firms' sample. 
Average return on equity is another approach used to compute the cost of 
equity capital. 
An alternative approach to estimate the cost of equity capital is by using 
the residual income model (RIM) of Ohlson (1995) or its different versions 
(e. g., Accounting valuation model) based on the same principles. RIM 
model specifies a relationship between equity values and current book 
values and future abnormal earnings. Residual income is net income less a 
charge for common shareholder's opportunity cost in generating this net 
income (the cost of capital). In practice, this approach encounters 
problems. The first problem is the assumption of risk neutrality is 
unrealistic in the current business environment (Feltham and Ohlson, 
1999). Second, the use of dividend discount formula within the 
accounting-based valuation requires a quite arbitrary measure of the 
terminal value. Several studies (e. g., Botosan, 1997; Gebhardet et al., 1999) 
use different time horizons to estimate the terminal value. Thirdly, the 
assumption of this model is that growth rate equals to zero which is 
unrealistic in the current business environment. 
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RIM is also of limited validity (e. g., Myers, 1999; Callen and Morel, 2001). 
Most studies show that RIM produces too low estimates for the cost of 
capital. Fama and French (2001), for example, find values close to zero. 
Gebhardt et al. (2001) failed to document the validity of this model in 
estimating the implied cost of equity capital, and raise doubts about its 
ability to provide a valid ex ante estimate for the cost of equity capital. The 
authors found a positive (and not negative) relationship between the cost 
of capital and size. The dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts, a 
measure of business risk, is significant but also with the intuitively wrong 
sign. There is also difficulty in applying this model due to the lack of data 
in the UK environment on book value of equity. The UK accounting 
methods mean that measure of book value are less meaningful than in the 
US; for example, the two factor Fama and French model which uses HML 
and SMB measures is not necessarily applicable therefore. 
Previous studies also used 'Risk measure' as an example to proxy for the 
cost of equity capital estimates. They provide theoretical (e. g., Klein and 
Bawa 1976; Ramchand and Sethapakdi, 2000) and empirical (e. g., Prodhan 
and Harris, 1989; Botosan, 1997) link between risk, as measured by 
market beta, and the cost of equity capital. 
The present research attempts to measure directly the cost of equity 
although there are problems in the accuracy of the estimations, as 
acknowledged by Botsoan (1997). A four-stage dividend growth model to 
directly measure the cost of equity capital is used. This uses the basic 
discounting methodology of Gordon (1962) but divides the future into 
four stages of growth. This is more realistic than using a simple, constant 
growth model. 
Simplifying assumptions are made about the patterns of growth in 
dividends. Firms tend to go through different phases of growth. Dividends 
are expected to grow from one year to next but because of competitive 
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pressure, dividend growth rates tend to the norm over time. Therefore, for 
companies which grow very quickly or above average, the assumption is 
that the above average growth cannot continue indefinitely. Eventually, 
firms fail to keep pace with the changes in the market environment in 
which they operate and growth falls to below that for the average 
company in its sector. Thus, for corporations taken as a whole, the 
assumption is that, over the long term, earnings and dividends growth will 
decay toward normal economics growth level (real GNP plus inflation) 
(i. e., maturity growth). 
The four stages of growth are: specific growth projections for each of the 
next two years, the growth trend (assumed to be continued for a further 
five years); a ten-year period during which the rate gradually converges to 
a very long maturity rate. The model was designed to mirror short, 
medium, and long-term expectations. The short and medium forcasts were 
available. It then seemed sensible to use another 10 years to assume that 
long-term maturity is reached. The model is as follows: 
P=D(1+g, 
)+D(l+g1)(1+g2)+D(l+g1)(1+g2)(1+G*) 
1+K (1+K)2 (1+K)3 
.D 
(1+g1)(1+g2)(1+G*)S+D (1+gß)(1+g2)(1+G*)5(1+G1* ).... 
(1+K)7 (1+K)8 
+D 
(l+g, )(1+g2)(1+G*)(1+G,.. ).......... (1+G, o**) +P (1+K)17 17 
=D 
(1+G. ) 
Pi' " (r-G, 
ß)(1+K)i' 
Where: 
D is the historic dividends 
gl + 92 are the dividend growth rate in year 1 and year 2 
G* is the annual dividend growth trend during years 3 to 7. 
G** is the average annual dividend growth during years 8 to 17. 
K is the implied discount rate (cost of equity capital) 
P17 is the value of discounted dividends from year 18 onward. 
G,,, maturity growth (real growth plus inflation) 
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ra common maturity discount rate (long-dated UK bond yield + risk 
premium) 
To implement the model, stock prices and dividends are needed. These are 
provided by Datastream while consensus forecast data are retrieved from 
Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (IBES) International database. Data 
were entered into an Excel worksheet and the cost of equity capital for 
each company was computed making use of the Excel IRR function (an 
example of which is shown in Appendix 3). 
In addition, this research uses bid-ask spread as proxy for information 
asymmetry (a component of the cost of capital). The bid-ask spread is 
commonly thought to measure information asymmetry explicitly because 
it addresses the adverse selection problem that arises from transacting in 
firm shares in the presence of asymmetrically informed investors. Less 
information asymmetry means less adverse selection, which in turn means 
a smaller bid-ask spread (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
Stock price volatility has also been used by prior research as proxy for 
information asymmetry (e. g., Leuz and Verrechia, 2000). It has been 
claimed that increased disclosure reduces information asymmetry as it 
reduces the magnitude of unforeseen activities and makes a firm's stock 
less volatile (Land and Lundholm, 1993). However, volatility is influenced 
by many factors unrelated to information asymmetry, and considered the 
least reliable among the other proxies (e. g., bid-ask spread, trading 
volume) of information asymmetry (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Other 
studies (e. g., O'Shea et al., 2008) examined the effect of disclosure on 
volatility. Leuz and Verrechia (2000) found no effect on share price 
volatility for German firms that have switched from the German to an 
international reporting regime. 
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4.9. Descriptive Statistics for the Sample, Statistical Tests and Measurements 
of the Variables 
The sample of 52 firms included in the present study is sufficient to 
increase the powerfulness of empirical analysis. It approximately equals to 
the number of samples used by numerous other studies (Oliveira et al., 
2006; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Hail, 2002; 
Hughes et at., 2001; Botosan, 1997 (subset sample), Hossain et al., 1994). 
Descriptive statistics for the full sample of 52 firms are displayed in Table 
4.5. Based on the literature, various measures for "size" including market 
value of outstanding equity (logged), total sales or turnover (logged), book 
value of total assets (logged), and number of employees can be used. 
Market capitalisation is an objective and commonly accepted criterion for 
size as it is based on the market value of the company. However, 'turnover' 
and 'total assets' can be stronger measures since market capitalization is a 
function of both corporate earnings and the multiple at which these 
earnings are valued. In some instances, fast growing companies, for 
example may be highly capitalized but are relatively small in physical asset 
terms. 
The figures shown in Table 4.5 are related to the most recent year, year 
2004. The missing data made it impossible to calculate cost of equity 
capital for 1998 and 2001 using the four stage dividend growth model. 
The Nat log of assets ranges from a minimum of 6.24 to a maximum of 
11.89 with mean and SD values of 8.65 and 1.14 respectively. The market 
value of outstanding equity (logged) ranges from a minimum of 7.56 to a 
maximum of 11.86. Other measures for the size including log of turnover 
and the number of employees indicate variation in size. The results 
presented in Table 4.6 indicate that there are significant relationships 
between the size variables. 
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Risk is another important firm characteristic. Beta as a risk measure was 
used. Market beta of the stock (beta) refers to as a measure of systematic 
risk, and has been used in many previous studies that investigated the 
relationship between disclosure level and the cost of equity capital (e. g., 
Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002; Botosan and Slumlee, 2002; Chen et al., 2003; 
Petersen and Plenborg, 2006). Beta8 data are collected from the Risk 
Measure Service (RMS) published by the London Business School (RMS, 
July 2005). There is another commonly used measure of risk, leverage. 
Leverage is used in the literature to proxy for a firm's riskiness. The higher 
a company's relative debt position, the most likely it will face financial 
distress from defaulting on interest and principal payments and therefore 
the riskier the stock is. 
To assess a firm's disclosure environment, two variables are applied 
including the number of analysts following a specific firm (analysts) and 
my measure of risk disclosure (risk disclosure was measured by using 
content analysis (the results of which are presented in Chapter 5). Table 
4.5 shows that the average sample firm is followed by approximately 17 
analysts. The table also shows that the highest disclosure score disclosed 
by firms is 275 sentences and the lowest disclosure is 28 sentences (the 
mean and SD are 93.5 and 54.12 respectively). 
Finally, the cost of equity capital estimate (IRR) ranges from 4.50 to 17.20 
with a mean of 9.99. The second proxy, bid-ask spread, ranges from 0.0009 
to 0.0056 with an average of 0.002. Stock volatility ranges from 15.02 to 
51.31. 
8 Beta was also estimated based on a five-year market model regression on the UK performance 
index and compared with RMS estimates. 
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Size: 
Nat log of market value (MV) 7.56 11.86 8.69 0.91 
Nat log of turnover 6.57 11.98 8.46 1.23 
Nat log of assets 6.24 11.89 8.65 1.14 
Number of employees 539 402375 50957 69474 
Risk: 
Leverage 1.50 527 131 106 
Beta 0.15 1.67 0.92 0.33 
Disclosure: 
Analyst following 7 42 16.53 6.98 
Disclosure score (number of sentences) 28 275 93.50 54.12 
IRR, bid-ask spread, volatility: 
IRR 4.50 17.20 9.99 2.69 
Bid-ask spread 0.0009 0.0056 0.002 0.001 
Volatility 15.02 51.31 26.01 7.10 
Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics for Sampled Firms 
Log of MV 1.000 
Log of Turnover 0.794** 1.000 
Log of Assets 0.840** 0.796** 1.000 
Employees 0.333* 0.551** 0.435** 1.000 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Market value is the market value of outstanding equity. Turnover is the Nat log of turnover at the 
year end. 'Assets' is the Nat log of total assets at the year end. Employees are the total number of 
employees. The figures are based on 2004 annual reports. 
Table 4.6: Pearson Correlations between the Size Variables 
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Hypothesis 1 (which investigates question 1) is tested using both 
parametric and non-parametric tests. A non-parametric test (e. g., 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test) has been applied on the data to determine 
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whether there are significant differences in risk disclosure between the 
years. This is a more powerful test than the sign test and involves 
comparisons of differences between two populations. The test is used 
when the experimental design is matched pairs and does not require a 
normal distribution of differences. 
In view of the fact that parametric tests are more powerful than non- 
parametric tests, a parametric test (e. g., Paired-Sample T Test) has also 
been used to test if there is any significant difference between the mean 
over the three periods, 1998-2001; 1998-2004; 2001-2004. This test was 
performed to support the results of the non-parametric test. 
A one-way ANOVA was also performed to determine whether there are 
significant differences in the mean risk disclosure between the seven 
industries groups. 
4.9.1.2 Testing Hypotheses 2 and 3 
Hypothesis 2 was formulated to test question 2. For the two categorical 
independent variables (industry and US-dual listing variables), the effects 
of possible individual company attributes on risk disclosure score were 
computed by using the Mann-Whitney U test and independent sample t 
test on each of the two variables in turn. 
For the two continuous independent variables (e. g., leverage and size), the 
effects of possible individual company characteristics on risk disclosure 
score were tested by calculating the Person product-moment correlation 
coefficients. In addition, the following ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression model was fitted to the data in order to assess the effect of each 
variable on risk disclosure level. 
For hypothesis 3, which was formulated to examine research question 3, 
both Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients and multivariate 
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analysis were performed on the data to test the effect of each variable on 
the model on the cost of equity capital (and bid-ask spread and stock 
volatility). 
4.9.2 Measurements of Other Related Variables 
The variables which were chosen to be used in the different tests are listed 
below. The measurement of each variable is as follows: 
Risk disclosure score is the average number of risk 
information sentences disclosed (the results of which are 
presented in Chapter 5). 
Size is the log of total turnover. 
Leverage is the ratio of total assets to total equity. 
Type of industry is represented by a dummy dichotomous 
variable takes the value of 1 if a firm belong to recourses, 
basic industries, non-cyclical consumer goods, utilities, 
general industries groups, and zero otherwise. 
US-dual listing variable is represented by a dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 if a firm with either a US primary dual 
listing or a level 11 or level Ili ADR, and zero otherwise. 
Beta was obtained from the Risk Measure Service published 
by the London Business School. 
IRR is measured using a four-stage dividend growth model. 
Consensus forecast data for dividend growth expectations 
and stock price data were retrieved from the financial 
database "Datastream". 
Bid-ask spread is the average bid-ask spread, that is, the 
absolute spread divided by the average of bid and ask. Data 
are collected from Datastream. 
Volatility is the annual stock volatility. 
Any other variables used in the analysis are defined throughout the thesis. 
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4.10 Summary and Conclusion 
The present chapter has described the research methods and sample 
selection employed in the present research. The measurement methods 
utilised to measure the research variables including the main two 
variables (e. g., risk disclosure level; and the cost of equity capital) have 
been explained and discussed. Selection and collection of the sample have 
been explained in depth, and descriptive statistics for the sample have 
been presented. 
The present chapter provided an in-depth description of the content 
analysis method employed, a method that will be utilised to measure the 
company's level of risk disclosure in three different periods, 1998,2001, 
2004. The measurement methods that are used to estimate the cost of 
equity were stated. A four-stage dividend growth model will be used to 
measure the cost of equity capital. There are other proxies used including 
bid-ask spread and volatility. The research assumption of using annual 
report as information source was discussed. Furthermore, statistical tests 
that are used to test the research hypotheses are discussed in the present 
chapter. Different data sources were of great utility for obtaining 
background information and other relevant information. The sources 
include annual reports, companies' websites, stock market data and 
Datastream. The research methods and statistical tests described in the 
present chapter will be utilised in the following two chapters to present 
the results of this research. 
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on the results of risk disclosure content analysis made 
in the annual reports of UK largest non-financial companies. In the present 
chapter, the results of the content analysis are revealed, summarised and 
analysed. The sample examined in the present research comprises 52 
companies and is extracted from the FTSE-100 index listed in London stock 
exchange (LSE). The purpose is to examine the extent and nature of 
corporate risk disclosure in the fiscal years 1998,2001 and 2004, in order to 
facilitate the analysis of trends over this six-year period. Thus, 156 annual 
reports prepared by 52 companies for the fiscal years 1998,2001, and 2004 
were sought and analysed. The sample choice and companies selection are 
explained in the previous methodology chapter (see Chapter 4). 
The present chapter provides the results that show the way companies 
report on different types of risk. The present chapter presents the results of 
risk disclosure current practices and establishes its trends. 
The results are displayed in accordance with the coding scheme (comprising 
four quality variables) developed and presented in the research method 
chapter. Therefore, risk disclosure sentences were classified according to 
four quality variables: the type of risk reported (environmental risk, 
operational risk, and strategic risk); the type of statement made (qualitative 
versus quantitative); the type of news conveyed in the statement (good, bad, 
neutral); and news time-frame (future, past, non-time). This will examine 
what risk information is disclosed and how the information is disclosed. 
The disclosure score obtained from the content analysis will be used to build 
a disclosure measure for the level of annual report risk disclosure. This 
measure will be used in the following chapters, namely Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7, to empirically test the relationship between disclosure level and 
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its underlying factors, and between disclosure level and the cost of equity 
capital. 
The present chapter is structured as follows. First, the chapter presents the 
results of risk disclosures practices and establishes the overall trends over 
the six-year period. Then, the results of categories disclosure are presented. 
Next, risk disclosures evidence (nature of evidence) and disclosure 
according to other variables (news time-frame, type of news) are presented 
and explained. Furthermore, the differences in disclosure between the years 
are statistically tested. Thereafter, a section is devoted to examine 
disclosure's differences among different industries (to test for industry 
effect). Afterward, the results are discussed and commented upon. A 
summary for the chapter is given in the final section. 
5.2 Trends in Total Corporate Risk Disclosure 
The results of the content analysis are displayed in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Table 
5.1 displays the descriptive statistics for the results of risk disclosure 
content analysis. Each company's annual report for 1998,2001, and 2004 
was analysed. The number of risk disclosure sentences was matched to its 
relevant category and was classified and calculated. As shown in Table 5.1 
(see columns three, eight, and thirteen), all companies in the sample have 
disclosed risk-relevant information in their annual reports. The figures 
shown in columns four, nine, and fourteen represent the mean (average) 
number of risk disclosure sentences. The third row of Table 5.1 represents 
the average overall disclosure score (all categories) and the following rows 
represent the average disclosure for each category. The rows in the middle 
of the table display disclosure classified according to the "news time-frame" 
(past, future, non-time); followed by the rows describing the "form/type of 
evidence" (i. e., qualitative versus quantitative disclosures). The last three 
rows classify risk disclosure according to the "type of news" (bad, good, 
neutral). 
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For each company's annual report, risk disclosure was analysed and 
classified on an individual recording sheet (comprising the four quality 
variables). The recording sheet is presented in the methodology chapter. 
Table 5.2 displays the results. 
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Figure 5.1 (based on Table 5.1, third row) displays the trends in total risk 
disclosure. The figure shows, in aggregate, the mean (average) number of 
risk disclosure sentences steadily increased across the period, rising from 
50.23 in 1998, to 64.94 in 2001 and 93.5 in 2004. This provides evidence 
that there is an upward trend in the average number of risk disclosure 
sentences being published by the sample of companies over the six-year 
period, 1998-2004, supporting its growing importance. 
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Figure 5.1: Trends in Risk Disclosure 
As predicted, the results may provide clear evidence on the impact of 
recent regulatory and other developments (e. g., the debate on the OFR 
statement, accounting rules, requirements of corporate governance, and 
risk disclosure debate) that led to an increase in the amount of risk 
information disclosed by companies in their annual reports. 
Of especial note is that companies disclosed information on the 
infrastructure risk and business interruption risk arises as a result of the 
millennium bug (i. e., Y2K problem) and the introduction of Euro. The Y2K 
disclosure refers to the year 2000 Readiness Disclosure. The Y2K issue 
occurs from the possibility that computer-based systems will fail correctly 
to process dates at the change of the millennium. Because annual reports 
of the fiscal year 1998 were included in the sample, there is disclosure 
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found on this item disclosed in the annual reports published by companies 
before the year 2000. This information (Y2K) is not applicable on 2001 
and 2004 annual reports. 
Companies have disclosed information on process risks relating to system 
availability risks relating to year 2000 and, in addition to that, companies 
disclosed risk information regarding the effect of the introduction of Euro. 
The following quotations are examples for these risks: 
The activities of YZK programmes focus on achieving a 
significant reduction of the Y2K risk (B(;, annual report 
1998) 
However, there can be no guarantee that all components 
have been identified and fixed, or that the programmes oJ' 
critical suppliers have'successtirl(y campletcti..... (1), (;, Annual 
Report 1998) 
..... Nor can any Siuarantee 
he given that the wider 
infrastructure within which BG operates will not be 
disrupted causing BG's operations to be adver'sehv affected 
(BG, Annual Report 1998). 
The demands and risks arisiiu) Crum the intruduetion u/ the 
single currency on 1 January 1999 did riot h(rvc (r m/tter-ial 
effect on BG (B(;, Annual Report 1998) 
Table 5.3 presents the results after excluding disclosure on these two 
items from the year 1998 disclosure score. Based on the results displayed 
in Table 5.3, Figure 5.2 demonstrates that the mean disclosure shows even 
more clear increase and trends, rising from 34.6 average sentences in 
1998, to 64.94 in 2001 and 93.5 average sentences in 2004. 
1998 52 34.6 
2001 52 64.94 
2004 52 93.5 
Table 5.3: Average Risk Disclosure after Adjusting for 1998 Results 
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Figure 5.2: Trends in Average Risk Disclosure after Adjusting for the Year 1998 Results 
Thus, the graphical interpretation reveals that risk disclosure increased 
from 50.23 to 93.5 over the six-year period. Table 5.1 demonstrates that 
the variation between the minimum and maximum disclosure is large and 
ranging from 140 sentences in 1998 to 247 sentences in 2004. Standard 
deviation is also increasing from 29.5 in 1998 to 54.1 in 2004. In the year 
2004, the mean disclosure was 93.5, with a maximum disclosure of 275 
sentences and minimum disclosure of 28 sentences and standard 
deviation of 54.1. Standard deviation is increasing from 29.5 in 1998 to 
37.4 in 2001 and 54.1 in 2004 (see Table 5.1 for descriptive statistics). 
These results may suggest that some companies are regarding the risk 
disclosures issue as being more important, hence, increasingly disclosing 
more than others each year. However, risk disclosure is industry and 
company specific. Higher disclosure could be the result of a size effect 
and/or an industry effect, but this has yet to be tested. The standard 
deviations for each category, as shown in Table 5.1, indicate that they all 
increased. 
Figure 5.3 (based on Table 5.2, bottom row) illustrates the proportion of 
risk disclosure attributed to each category for the most recent year, year 
2004. The figure shows that operational risk dominates over the other two 
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categories. The explanation for the variation between categories remains 
until categories are explained in the following section. 
Strategic Environmental 
disclosure disclosure 
14.52°0 20 R2% 
Figure 5.3: Proportion of Risk Disclosure for the Most Recent Year (Year 2004) 
5.3 Risk Disclosures by Categories 
As mentioned above, a multidimensional content analysis was used to 
enrich the content analysis data and gain some sense of quality of the 
information disclosed. According to the first quality variable, risk 
disclosure sentences were classified under three main categories: namely, 
environmental risks; operational risks; and strategic risks. 
Figure 5.4 (based on Table 5.1) shows the differences in risk disclosure (in 
terms of the average number of sentences disclosed), demonstrating that 
there is an upward trend in disclosure which contributes to the total 
average of risk disclosure trends shown in Figure 5.1. This figure shows 
that the average disclosure differs between categories, and that there is 
more risk disclosure made by companies on operational risk category in 
comparison to the other two categories. 
148 
Opererational 
disclosure 
64.86% 
H 
4.1 100 
C 90 
80 
70 
v' 60 
ö 50 
40 - 
30 
E 20 
10 
0 
1998 2001 2004 
Year 
-t- Environmental disclosure Opererational disclosure 
Strategic disclosure Total average 
Figure 5.4: Trends in the Average Number of Sentences Disclosed According to Categories 
Figure 5.4 also demonstrates that operational risk disclosure dominates; 
reflecting its growing importance. Environmental risk disclosure category 
increased over the six-year period, and reflects the trend shown by the 
overall average of risk disclosure sentences reflecting its significance. Both 
operational and strategic categories have also increased and showed an 
upward trend in terms of average number of sentences disclosed. 
A breakdown of what disclosures were made under each category is 
described below. 
5.3.1 1 Irannýcratr, l Risk lliýclcý urc 
Environmental risk arises from the macroeconomic, from factors 
essentially beyond the organisation's control and comprises disclosures 
relating to economic risk (e. g., interest rate, currency exchange, price and 
commodity, inflation, taxation), political risk, social and demographic risk, 
legal and regulation risk, climate and catastrophic risk, and industry 
sources (competition, suppliers, customers). Under this category, 
companies disclose that they are subject to/ or exposed to or/facing 
different types of risk. Figure 5.4 shows an increase trend over the years 
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from 1998 to 2004. The average disclosure under this category is 7.64 
sentences in 1998,12.43 sentences in 2001, and 19.28 sentences in 2004, 
an increase of 152 per cent. 
The most popular items under this category include economic (including 
foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, and commodity risk, credit risk) 
political, and legal and regulatory. Typical examples of environmental risk 
are as follows. 
In summaºy, the outlook for commodity prices will continue 
to dominate the landscape and we will do our utmost to 
minimise the impact on our customers and shareholders 
(Centrica plc, Annual Report 2004) 
Following another record year in 2001, the outlook for 2002 
remains uncertain with many different views on US 
economic prospects... (Hanson plc, Annual Report 2001) 
... In the light of this, our approach is one of continuing 
caution and recognises that we maybe faced with 
weakening demand in some of our markets (Hanson plc, 
Annual Report 2001). 
Economic risks include credit risk, the effect of commodity 
price expectations on investment plans, price indexation of 
gas contracts to oil-based indices, the levy of royalties and 
taxes on hydrocarbon production, exchange rates, inflation 
rates and UK corporation tax rates (PG Group, Annual 
Report 2001) 
The most significant economic risks are large fluctuations in 
the following: 
" Commodity prices, being the risk of a significant 
fluctuation in oil and/or gas prices; 
" Exchange rates, in particular, the US$: UK£ rate; 
" US/UK inflation rates; 
" UK corporation tax rate; 
" UK uncontracted gas prices (PG Group, Annual Report 
2001). 
Changes in business conditions, rate structures, taxes, 
governmental regulation and other factors may have a 
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material impact on the Group's ability to gain new market 
positions (PG Group, Annual Report 2001). 
5.3.2 Operational Risk 
A broad category of operational risk encompasses the failure of 
communication, internal control deficiencies, policies and procedures, 
liquidity and cash flow risk (including capitals availability and the ability 
to fund operations); infrastructure and business interruption; operational 
problems; project failure; product and service failure; product liability; 
health and safety ; environment risk (impact of operation on the natural 
environment), compliance risk, legal dispute. 
Operational risk category showed a clear increasing trend from 1998 to 
2004 (as shown in Figure 5.4). In 1998, the average number of sentences 
was 34.12 sentences, the number increased to 41.50 sentences in 2001 
and dramatically increased to 60.64 in 2004, an increase of 78 percent. 
The most popular items disclosed under this category include internal 
control and accountability and risk management policies. Management 
must affirm its responsibility for maintaining an adequate system of 
internal control and assess the effectiveness of the system. Control 
disclosures describe the existing system or process that companies have in 
place to identify, evaluate and manage the significant risks they face. These 
disclosures are mandated under Turnbull committee which requires a 
description of such a system. Such items contributed to the general 
increase in operational risk category, and hence to the increase in overall 
risk disclosure trends. The other popular and significant items are those 
related to disclosure of corporate social responsibility risks which cover 
disclosure of health and safety risk and disclosure of environment risk. 
Such disclosure reflects the greater concerns and awareness of the public 
and institutions about social and environmental issues. Perhaps firms 
recognised the importance of such disclosure to the long-term health and 
value of their companies. Evidence shows that the majority of European 
isi 
fund managers and financial analysts share the same view that the 
management of social and environmental risks has a positive impact on a 
company's market value over the long-term (CSR Europe et al., 2003). The 
disclosure on health and safety clearly contributes to the increase on 
operational risk disclosure category. The increased regulations on health 
and safety may explain this increase. Perhaps firms recognised that by 
disclosing information on health and safety risk they are not only 
improving their social accountability and enhancing their performance, 
but they are also attracting future employees. Examples illustrating 
operational risks are as follows: 
The health and safety of the group employees is a matter of 
paramount importance. Accordingly, it is the group's policy 
to manage its activities so as to avoid causing any 
unnecessary or unacceptable risk to the health and safety of 
its personnel, while also reducing all other risks to the 
minimal level achievable through good management 
practice and thorough application of relevant control 
measures (British Sky Broadcasting plc, Annual Report 
2004). 
This approach involves a rigorous health assessment, during 
which hazards are identified, risks assessed, control 
measures applied and improvement actions agreed to 
manage residual risks to an acceptable level (PG Group plc, 
Annual Report 2001). 
5.3.3 Strategic Risk 
Strategic risk refers to risk arising from operating in a particular industry, 
and risks associated with the company's future business plans and 
strategies. Under strategic risk category, items identified are: intellectual 
property rights; research and development; acquisitions, alliances, and 
joint ventures; technology, investment risk, capital expenditure; the use of 
derivatives, pension funds, and others. 
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As shown in Table 5.1 and in Figure 5.4, there is a small gradual increase 
in overall disclosure identified under this category, demonstrating that 
there is an increase in strategic risks category contributing to the total 
average risk disclosure trend showed in Figure 5.1. The following 
quotations provide an example of strategic risks. 
Wolseley has its principal operations in North America and 
Europe and therefore subject to specific risks of conducting 
business in these regions (Wolseley plc, Annual Report 2004). 
The Group's operations are also subject to the risks and 
uncertainties attendant to doing business in numerous 
countries (Cadbury plc, Annual Report 2001). 
The board sets the strategic objectives of the group, 
determine its investment policy, and agree on performance 
criteria and delegates to management the detailed planning 
and implementation of that policy, in accordance with 
appropriate risk parameters (SABMi11er plc, Annual Report 
2004). 
5.4 Disclosure Classified By the Evidence Type 
This section classifies risk disclosure sentences according to the 
evidence/form of disclosure (qualitative disclosure versus quantitative 
disclosure). Table 5.1 displays the results, showing that companies reveal 
both quantitative and qualitative risk disclosures. Figure 5.5 shows the 
trends in risk disclosures evidence. This figure demonstrates that 
qualitative risk disclosure follows a clear increasing trend from 1998 to 
2004, and dominates over quantitative disclosure. In 1998, the average 
number of qualitative sentences disclosed was 43.40, the number 
increased to 58.36 in 2001, and 84.10 in 2004. Qualitative disclosure, 
therefore, contributes significantly to the trend in total disclosures. In 
contrast, quantitative disclosures do not appear to follow a clear trend as 
it showed a decreasing trend from 1998 to 2004: the average number of 
sentences was 6.83 in 1998, decreased slightly to 6.58 in 2001, and then 
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increased to 9.40 in 2004. Therefore, quantitative disclosures do not 
reflect the overall trend of average risk disclosure shown in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.5: Disclosure Evidence in Terms of the Average Number of Sentences Disclosed 
5.5 Disclosure Classified According to the Time-Frame 
Considering another characteristic (quality variable) of information 
disclosed i. e., disclosure according to its time frame, Figure 5.6 shows that 
future, past, and non-time risk disclosures all follow clear trends of 
disclosure, therefore, reflecting the overall trend in the total average of 
risk disclosure shown in Figure 5.1. The results show that non-time risk 
disclosure dominates: the average number of sentences was 26.43 in 
1998,38.26 sentences in 2001, and 52.21 sentences in 2004. It was 
followed by future disclosures and past disclosures respectively. 
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Figure 5.6: Average Disclosure Classified According to Time Frame 
5.6 Disclosure Classified by Type of News 
Classifying disclosure according to news type (e. g., in terms of good news, 
bad news and neutral news), the results displayed in Figure 5.7 show that 
the average number of risk disclosure sentences for each type of news 
increased and followed the trends of the overall average of risk disclosure 
shown in Figure 5.1; thus, contributing to the upward trends of overall 
average risk disclosure. However, there was a small decrease in bad news 
disclosure between 2001 and 2004. Figure 5.7 shows that neutral news 
disclosure dominates followed by good and bad news respectively. 
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Figure 5.7: Average Risk Disclosure Classified by News Type 
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5.7 Overall Trends in Disclosure Variables 
Figure 5.8 (based on Table 5.2) shows overall trends evidence over the 
period under examination (i. e., 1998-2004). The results indicate an 
increase in the following categories: 
  Qualitative/future/neutral (i. e., the sentence is qualitative, future- 
related, and contains neutral news) 
  Qualitative/non-time/good, 
  Qualitative/non-time/neutral, 
  Qualitative/past/good, 
  Qualitative/past/neutral, 
  Quantitative/non-time/neutral (sentence will be classified as 
"quantitative disclosure" if it contains and primarily relates to 
actual numbers of financial and non-financial nature), 
  Quantitative/past/neutral, and 
  Quantitative/past/good. 
However, there is no clear trend for other categories. Examples of 
disclosure on the above categories are given throughout the present 
chapter. 
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Quantitative/neutral/non-time 
Quantitative/bad/non-time 
0u an ti tati ve/good/non-time 
Quantitative/neutral/future 
Quantitative/bad/future 
Quantitative/good/future 
Q uan titative/neutral/past 
Quantitative/bad/past 
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Qual itative/bad/future 
Qualitative/good/future 
Qual itative/neutraVpast 
Qualitative/bad/past 
Qual itative/good. 'past 
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Figure 5.8: Overall Disclosure Evidence for Years 1998-2004 (figures refer to average number of sentences) 
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5.8 Overall Risk Disclosure Pattern for the Most Recent Year (Year 2004) 
Figure 5.9 (based on 'f'able 5.2, last column) shows disclosure pattern for 
the most recent year, year 2004. This figure, again, reveals that qualitative 
disclosures dominate, and represent 89.95% (see Table 5.2, last column) 
of total disclosure made. 
Of the 89.95% qualitative disclosures, Figure 5.10 reveals that 6.66% are 
qualitative/past; 60.12% are qualitative/non-time; and 33.23% are 
qualitative/future disclosures (see Table 5.2, last column). 
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Figure 5.9: Overall Disclosure Pattern for the Most Recent Year (Year 2004) 
Figure 5.9 shows that the most popular category of disclosures relates to 
"qualitative/good news/non-time", which represents 38.92% (see Table 
5.2 last column) of total disclosure made in year 2004. The disclosure 
made under this category is mainly on operational risks, for example, 
internal control and risk management policies. Other types of disclosures 
include disclosures on corporate social responsibility risk including health 
and safety risk and environment risk, and compliance. In addition, there 
are some disclosures on strategic risks and environmental risks which fall 
under this category. The following quotation provides an example of 
qualitative/good/non-time risk disclosure. 
The credit quality of counterparties and individual 
aggregate exposures are reviewed annually (United 
Utilities plc, Annual Report 2004). 
The Group's exposure to credit risk is managed by limiting 
credit positions to banks and financial institutions 
maintaining strong credit ratings (Sainsbury (J) plc, Annual 
Report 2001). 
Counter-party positions are monitored on a regular basis 
and dealing activity is controlled through the provision of 
dealing mandates and the operation of standard settlement 
instructions (Sainsbury (j) plc, Annual Report 2001). 
As in Figure 5.9, the second most significant category is 
"qualitative/neutral/future"; and represents 26.05% (see Table 5.2, last 
column) of disclosures made. Although disclosure classified under this 
category may be considered as a positive aspect of risk disclosure as it 
relate to the future, caution is, nevertheless, needed as most information 
reported under this category (qualitative/neutral/future) are neutral 
information and represents a general statement explaining the risk factors 
and sources faced by companies. Companies, for example, report that they 
are facing /or exposed to / or subject to different types of risk such as 
interest rate risk; currency exchange risk; credit risk; commodity and 
price risk; legal and regulatory; political ; economic; social and others. 
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Most of these risks arise from external environmental forces and are 
outside management control, and could create opportunities for 
companies or cause threats. The risk information disclosed under this 
category may not be of great help to the annual report reader. A typical 
example is as follows: 
Fluctuations in currency exchange rates may affect 
Wolseley's reported operating results and its financial 
position (Wolseley plc, Annual Report 2004). 
The "qualitative/neutral/non-time" category falls in the middle range of 
disclosure and represents 15.05% (Table 5.2, last column) of total 
disclosures made (see Figure 5.9). The information falls under this 
category appears to be neutral and covers operational risks, for example, 
on internal control and risk management policies; strategic risks on 
strategic management action and the use of derivatives and financial 
instruments. There is also some information that relates to environmental 
risks. Typical examples of "qualitative/neutral/non-time" risk are as 
follows: 
The system of internal control is designed to manage, rather 
than eliminate, the risk of failure to achieve business 
objectives and can only provide reasonable and not absolute 
assurance against material misstatement or loss (Next plc, 
Annual report 2004). 
Financial instruments are used to finance the Reed Elsevier 
businesses and to hedge transactions (Reed Elsevier, Annual 
Report 2004). 
The "qualitative/good/future" category represents 2.75% (see Table 5.2, 
last column) of disclosures while the "qualitative/bad/future" category 
represents 1.09% (see Table 5.2, last column) (as shown in Figure 5.9). In 
contrast to the above categories explained above, these two categories are 
helpful to the reader of the annual report in that they are quite specific and 
give useful information. The following quotations provide examples for 
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"qualitative/good/future" and "qualitative/bad/future" disclosure 
respectively: 
The growth in domestic gas customer numbers is supported 
by low risk purchase contract which will underpin gross 
margins in the medium term (Centrica plc, Annual Report 
2004). 
We believe bookings in 2003 continue to be impacted by the 
uncertain economic environment and concerns regarding a 
war with Iraq compounded by security alerts issued by 
various national governments. These factors have caused us 
to reduce cruise pricing to stimulate incremental demand for 
the first and second quarters (Carnival plc, Annual Report 
2001). 
As in Figure 5.9, "qualitative/good/past" represents 3.22% (see Table 5.2, 
last column); while "qualitative/bad/past" represents 1.40%. The 
following quotations are examples of "qualitative/bad/past" and 
"qualitative/good/past" disclosures respectively: 
Political uncertainty, oversupply in the market and a poor 
crop contributed to a disappointing performance by the 
Polish sugar business (Associated British Food plc, Annual 
Report 2001). 
On health and safety, the world-wide accident rate fell 
slightly this year (SABMiller plc, Annual Report 2001). 
Considering the quantitative disclosure, the results show that there is 
minimal disclosure reported by companies on quantitative (monetary and 
other numerical disclosure) risk disclosure (see Figure 5.9; and Table 5.2, 
last column). Overall, quantitative disclosures represent 10.05% of total 
average disclosure made. Out of the 10.10%; it was observed that 
numerical disclosures dominate over the monetary ones. Also there are 
more disclosures on "quantitative/past" (5.73%) than on 
"quantitative/future" (2.55%) and on "quantitative/non-time" (1.77%) as 
shown in Figure 5.11. This higher percentage (in comparison to the future 
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and non-time) of quantitative/past suggests that companies are disclosing 
quantitative information related to the past because they are able to 
quantify them accurately. For example, companies report on the number 
of injuries and fatalities that occurred or the impact of volatility incurred. 
Other examples includes the impact of commodity and price volatility 
upon the company. 
o Quantitative/past   Quantitative/non-time 0 Quantitative/future 
Figure 5.11: Quantitative Disclosure 
The low percentage of the "quantitative/future" disclosures is perhaps 
unsurprising if we consider the inherent difficulty in estimating the 
potential monetary impact of a future event. 
Going back to Figure 5.9, the percentages of disclosures on the 
"quantitative/future/good" category; "quantitative/future/bad" category; 
and "quantitative/future/neutral" category are 0.16%; 0.20%; and 2.18% 
respectively. Examples on disclosure of "quantitative/bad/future" are as 
follows: 
We expect some volatility in pricing over the next few yeurs 
but our best estimate of the effect of these proposals will he u 
reduction in operating profit from our sugar operations by 
some £40m per annum in the loncj run (Associated British 
food l)Ic, Annual Report 2004). 
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.... Consequently, it is expected that settlements with patients 
will not reimbursed by insurers and that this will have an 
adverse impact on cash flow of a proximately £40m during 
2005 (Smith and Nephew plc, Annual Report 2004). 
"Quantitative/good/past" represents 1.61%; "quantitative/bad/past" 
represents 0.76%; and "quantitative/past/neutral" represents 3.36% (see 
Figure 5.9; and Table 5.2, last column). Examples of 
"quantitative/past/good" and "quantitative/past/bad" disclosures are as 
follows: 
Stock achieved a 21 % reduction in the number of work 
related injuries during the six months to 31 March 2005 with 
Ferguson achieving a near 14% reduction (Wolseley, Annual 
Report 2004). 
The Company regrets the two contractor fatalities during 
2001, one on a drilling rig contracted to the Group in the UK, 
the other in a road traffic accident in Kazakhstan (PG 
Annual Report 2001). 
5.9 Comparison of Risk Disclosure between 1998 and 2004 
As it was shown in the earlier section of the present chapter, the graphical 
interpretation reveals that the mean of overall risk disclosure increased 
from 50.23 in 1998 to 64.94 in 2001, and 93.5 in 2004. The present section 
statistically examines the differences between disclosures over the six- 
year period in order to test whether there is a significant difference in risk 
disclosure between the three periods. 
Both parametric (e. g. paired sample t test) and non-parametric (e. g., a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test) are conducted to test whether the differences 
between the years examined are significant (e. g., differences between 
1998 and 2001; between 1998 and 2004; and between 2001 and 2004). 
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First, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test is conducted to evaluate whether the 
average level of risk disclosure in 2004 was higher than the average level 
in 2001 and in 1998. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a non-parametric 
and involves comparisons of differences between two populations. It is an 
alternative test to the paired Student's t-test in the case of two related 
samples, requires that the data are measured at an interval level of 
measurement. However, unlike Student's t-test, the assumptions about the 
form of the distribution of the measurements are not required. 
Table 5.4 indicates that there are significant differences between years 
1998-2001; 1998-2004; and 2001-2004. The z value = -4.538; -6.071; and 
-5.711 respectively. 
z -4.538 -6.071 -5.711 
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table 5.4: Results of the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test 
Due to the fact that parametric tests are more powerful and reliable than 
non-parametric tests, a paired Student's t-test for paired samples was also 
performed to determine if there was any significant difference between 
the mean level of risk disclosure in 1998 and 2001; 2001 and 2004, and in 
1998 and 2004. This is an additional test and is conducted to support the 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test. The results, presented in Table 5.5, also 
indicate that there are very significant differences between the mean level 
of 50.23 in 1998 and of 93.50 in 2004 (t statistics = -7.941), and between 
the mean level of 64.94 in 2001 and 93.50 in 2004 (t statistics = -6.088) 
and between the mean level of risk disclosure of 50.23 in 1998 and 64.94 
in 2001 (t statistics = -5.404). 
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t -5.404 -7.941 -6.088 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table 5.5: Results of the Student's T-Test 
Thus, the evidence presented here suggests that there is a significant 
increase in risk disclosure over the period under examination, 1998-2004. 
This supports Hypothesis 1. 
5.10 Examining the Industry Effect 
The 52 firms which constitute the sample of the present study are 
extracted from the FTSE-100 index. These firms were categorized into 
seven major groups based on London Stock Exchange (LSE) classification 
(as shown in the methodology chapter). These groups include Resources 
(4 firms); Basic Industries (5 firms); General Industries (2 firms); Non- 
Cyclical consumer goods (9 firms); Consumer services and Information 
Technology (22 firms); Non-Cyclical Services (4 firms); and Utilities (6 
firms). Table 5.6 displays the average number of risk disclosure sentences 
disclosed by each industry group. 
1998 70 83 51 53 42 42 41 
2001 82 114 49 75 48 74 60 
2004 122 178 102 112 60 92 97 
Table 5.6: Average Number of Risk Disclosure Sentences for Each Industry Group for the Fiscal Years 1998,2001, 
and 2004. 
Key: RE: Resources; BI: Basic Industries; GI: General Industries; NCCG: Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods; CS: Cyclical 
Services; NCS: Non-Cyclical Services; UT: Utilities; IT: Information Technology 
Table 5.6 shows the results of risk disclosure among industries. The table 
yields a number of interesting results. The results show that the average 
risk disclosure increased across the period from 1998 to 2004 for all 
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industries' groups, but for general industries (GI) group disclosure 
decreased slightly to 49 in 2001 from 51 in 1998, but then increased in 
2004 to 102 sentences (figures are in average sentences). Basic Industries 
(BI) group (comprises Chemicals; Construction and Building Materials 
sectors) has the highest level of disclosures ranging from 83 average 
sentences in 1998 to 178 average sentences in 2004. It was followed by 
Resources (RE) group (covers Mining; and Oil and Gas sectors); Non- 
cyclical Consumer Goods (NCCG) group (encompasses food producers and 
processors; health; pharmaceutical; and tobacco sectors); and General 
Industries (GI) group (includes Aerospace and Defence sector). The middle 
range of disclosure found in Utilities (UT) group (covers Electricity; Gas; 
and Water sectors) and Non-Cyclical Services (NSC) respectively. 
Consumer Services and Information Technology group (covers sectors 
such as General Retailers, Leisure, Entertainment and Hotels, Media and 
Photography, Support Services, Transport software, and Computer 
Services) was the least disclosed industry group among the seven industry 
groups. 
Some sectors show a clear and steady increase in risk disclosure while 
other sectors do not. In general, the results provide evidence that firms in 
heavy manufacturing industries disclose more information than firms in 
service industries, given the high level of intangible assets such as R&D, 
customer acquisition, and product development. For certain industries, 
being subject to more complex regulation than others will encourage them 
to increase their disclosure. Companies in certain industries may also need 
to avoid the appearance of failing to meet the standards set by other 
similar companies. 
It was expected to find that sector has an effect on the level of disclosure 
as found in previous accounting disclosure studies (e. g., Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). Although the above results show that 
there is a difference between industries in terms of mean level of risk 
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information disclosed by companies, this difference between groups needs 
to be statistically tested in order to examine whether differences are 
significant or not. A one-way ANOVA test was conducted on the most 
recent year, year 2004. As shown in Table 5.7, a one-way ANOVA test 
demonstrates that there is a significant difference between industrial 
groups, suggesting that disclosure is industry specific. These findings are 
not surprising as they are consistent with the results found in previous 
literature in which the amount of corporate disclosure is found to be 
associated with industry. 
NLG yz 
Utilities 97 
General industries 101 5.091 . 000 
NCCG 112 
Resources 121 
Basic industries 177 
Table 5.7: Testing the Differences in Average Risk Disclosure between Industries for the Year 2004 (ANOVA Test) 
5.11 Discussion of Results 
Previous evidence (e. g., Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Change, 1998; Francis and 
Schipper, 1999) has documented that the value relevance of accounting 
numbers (e. g., accounting earning) in financial statements has declined, 
partly due to the lack of proper recognition of intangibles in the financial 
statements of companies (Lev and Zarowin, 1999). Accordingly, there has 
been a growing interest in non-financial forward-looking information 
which has been deemed by investors to provide important information in 
explaining market valuation. Risk disclosure, as part of forward-looking 
information, is very useful information for investors who need such 
information to aid them in making informed decision (ICAEW, 1997, 
1999b; Solomon et al., 2000; Linsley and Shrives, 2000). 
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On the basis of the comparison made over the period 1998-2004, the 
general observation was that there is, in aggregate, a trend of increasing 
amounts of corporate risk disclosure, although the six-year trends varied 
within different industries. This increase in trends reflects the increased 
importance of risks and uncertainties as well as the increased attention 
given to the topic. 
The graphical presentation in this chapter revealed that the average 
number of risk disclosure sentences increased from 50.2 in 1998 to 64.94 
in 2001 and dramatically increased to 93.5 in 2004. The increase in risk 
disclosure was demonstrated by the vast majority of the sample 
companies. The increase was also statistically significant. 
The sample of the present research comprises companies from different 
industry groups and, therefore, the results should be interpreted with 
caution. The results demonstrate that disclosures vary between 
companies in different industries. Industries such as chemicals, 
construction and building materials, mining, and oil and gas have the 
highest disclosure scores, whereas the lowest disclosures are displayed by 
general retailers, leisure, entertainment and hotels, media and 
photography, support services, transport software, and computer services 
industries. Some industries are subject to more complex regulations than 
others and, therefore, increase their disclosure in order to avoid the 
appearance of failing to meet the standards set for other similar 
companies. The low level of information disclosed by some industries 
reflects the high level of competition. Previous evidence (Verrecchia, 
1983; Dye, 1986) argued that high competition results in lower disclosure. 
Overall, the findings of the present research are consistent with prediction 
of theory, accounting regulatory development and the increased calls for 
improved risk disclosure. Perhaps companies' directors recognised the 
potential benefits of narrative disclosure, including risk disclosure and 
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other forward-looking information, to investors and analysts as well as the 
long-term health and reputation of their companies. However, caution 
must be exercised when interpreting the findings of the present study as 
the increase in disclosure could be a result of the business environment in 
which companies are operating, which has become more risky in recent 
years. 
Aggregating the reporting risk per category, the most frequently disclosed 
category appeared to be related to operational risks followed by 
environmental risks and strategic risks respectively. The results 
demonstrate that the average disclosure for each category increased over 
the six-year period, 1998-2004. However, the operational risk disclosure 
category is the only category demonstrating a clear upward trend whereas 
the other two categories (environmental risk category and strategic risk 
category) showed slight increase. Some items identified under operational 
risk category, mainly health and safety and environment risk, internal 
control and accountability, and risk management policies showed 
significant increase in disclosure and thus received high disclosure scores 
compared to other items. The high scores for some items such as health 
and safety risks and environment risk reflects its growing importance. A 
general note is that the development of accounting regulation together 
with the increase in corporate governance requirements might have 
contributed to the general increase in risk disclosure. However, most 
disclosures are bland statements such as those disclosures related to 
financial risk management and internal control systems. These disclosures 
mirror Turnbull-type disclosure and noticeably reflect the pressures of 
regulations on companies. 
Previous research (AICPA, 1994; ICAEW, 1997,1999b, 2002) has 
emphasised the importance of reporting high-quality and meaningful 
information. For example, the ICAEW suggests that companies' directors 
should report on the key risks that they face; the actions they take to 
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manage each risk; and the measures that they use in risk assessment 
(ICAEW, 1997). 
The results show that companies report on a variety of risk sources, 
mainly downside risks, assigned to factors either external or internal to 
the firm, which could have an adverse impact on the firm's future 
performance. Other information reported tends to be limited to how risks 
are being managed together with descriptions of the systems and 
procedures in place. However, there is still relatively little detailed 
information disclosures provided, for example, on risk assessment and 
measurement methods using, for instance, measures such as sensitivity 
and simulation analysis and value at risk (VaR). Reporting on the use of 
these measures is important to assure investors that risks are being 
evaluated, analysed and measured. These measures also reflect risk and 
uncertainty in a number of ways. The ICAEW (2002, p. 4) points out that 
"companies that are better at measuring risk will be better at allocating 
capital internally and deciding on the most-effective way to manage a risk 
- for example, by transfer or control. Companies that develop better 
measures will therefore gain a competitive advantage". The following 
quotations are examples of using sensitivity analysis in evaluating risks: 
For debt and derivative instruments held, the group utilises a 
sensitivity analysis technique to evaluate the effect that 
changes in relevant rates or prices will have on the market 
value of such instruments (BG Group, Annual Report 1998). 
Energy market risk on our asset and proprietary portfolios is 
measured using various techniques including Value-at-Risk 
(VaR). VaR is used where appropriate and provides a fair 
estimate of the net losses or gains which could be recognised 
on our portfolios over a certain period and given a certain 
probability; it does not provide an indication of actual 
results. Scenario analyses are used to estimate the economic 
impact of sudden market movements on the value of our 
portfolios (International Power plc, Annual Report 1998). 
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The disclosure of this type of information is deemed valuable as it shows 
the effect of potential changes on the financial statements following an 
increase of risks in one or more categories. The findings of the present 
research are corroborated by those of previous studies. For instance, Lajili 
and Zegal (2005) examined the content of risk disclosures of TSE 300 
Canadian companies and found that risk assessment and sensitivity 
analysis are not disclosed. 
The use of content analysis in the present research provides, in addition to 
the type of risk information disclosed, an interesting insight into the 
nature and quality of risk information disclosed (e. g., the type of statement 
made (qualitative versus quantitative) and the type of news conveyed 
(bad, good, and neutral)) by the sample firms examined in this study. In 
addition, the third quality variable was applied on the risk information 
texts to analyse disclosure according to the news time-frame (future, past, 
and non-time). 
Considering the quality variable of 'type of evidence', the results showed 
that risk disclosures are largely disclosed qualitatively yet there is 
information disclosure, although very little, of a quantitative nature found 
disclosed by the sample firms. The results demonstrate a steady increase 
in qualitative disclosure over the years. The very low level of quantitative 
disclosure with its unclear trends has also been noted in the results. The 
results are consistent with previous studies' findings (Linsley and Shrives, 
2005,2006; Woods and Reber, 2003; Lajili and Zegal, 2005; Bujaki et al., 
1999). Quantification of risk disclosure is viewed as beneficial because it 
increases the credibility of the disclosures and makes them ex post 
verifiable (Schrand and Elliot, 1998). Kadous et al. (2005) note that the 
quantification of project proposals increase its credibility so long as the 
project inputs are objective. Linsley and Shrives (2006) argue that placing 
a monetary value of risk facilitates the assessment of its potential impact 
upon the company by annual report readers. Nevertheless, concerns about 
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the narrative nature of risk disclosure may be unnecessary (Deumes, 
2008). Prior research (e. g., Li , 2006) shows that narrative helps investors 
better forecast future firm performance. Hutton et al. (2003) maintain that 
directors can enhance the credibility of their earnings forecasts by 
providing supplementary disclosure such as qualitative "soft talk" 
disclosures or verifiable forward-looking statements about earnings. 
Thus, although directors consider both qualitative and quantitative 
disclosures, the limited amount together with the unclear trend in 
quantitative disclosure affects the quality of the information disclosed by 
companies. Understandably, there are difficulties associated with 
quantifying risk due, for example, to data availability and subjectivity in 
measurement. Therefore, directors avoid providing quantitative 
disclosure in case it may expose them to legal claims if the actual outcome 
turns out to be quite different from the one estimated. 
With regard to the next quality variable 'the type of news conveyed', the 
results show upward trends in both good and neutral news. Bad news, 
however, showed an unclear trend. Neutral and good news dominate bad 
news. Thus, the very low level of bad news disclosure compared to good 
and neutral news disclosures was noted in the results. Bad news 
disclosure was also more related to the past than to the future. Verrecchia 
(1983) explained that the threshold for disclosure is determined by the 
increased level of proprietary cost. For firms operating in highly 
competitive industries, public disclosure of any kind may be regarded as 
potentially costly because of the existence of competitors. If the 
proprietary cost exists and information is withheld, investors will be 
unsure whether the withheld information represent bad or good news. 
This predominant emphasis on good and neutral news was found in 
previous literature which is relevant to this study's findings (e. g., Bujaki et 
al., 1999; Woods and Reber, 2003; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Linsley 
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and Shrives, 2006). The models of Verrecchia (1983) and Dye (1985, 
1986) imply good news will be disclosed more often than bad news. There 
is evidence (e. g., Clatworthy and Jones, 2003) suggesting that managers 
favour positive aspects of their performance, and that (e. g., Rutherford, 
2005) managers are more optimistic in their writing, and are seeking to 
create a positive perception of themselves and their companies (Hyland, 
1998). Thüs, managers may decide not to disclose bad news in annual 
reports when they are engaging in managing their companies' images. This 
happens when managers believe that withholding bad news is necessary 
to avoid excessive legal cost (e. g., Skinner, 1994) or damage to reputation. 
Crombie and Samujh (1999) conclude that directors focus on quite minor 
problems to divert attention from more serious issues, therefore, causing 
longer term credibility concerns. Skinner (1994) concludes that bad news 
will be released promptly to avoid litigation cost when there are large 
stock price declines on earnings announcement days. However, when bad 
news is disclosed, managers may attribute it to external or uncontrolled 
events. 
Nevertheless, only relatively good news will be disclosed (Verricchia, 
1983; Dye, 1985,1986) and directors are more likely to reveal earning 
forecasts when their firms are performing quite well (Lev and Penmann, 
1990), and report positive aspects of their performance. Thus, managers 
prefer to take credit for good performance themselves, attributing such 
good news to their own actions. 
Considering the fourth quality variable (information disclosed according 
to time-frame) the results showed that future-related, past-related, and 
non-time disclosures are all increased over the time period. To be specific, 
non-time disclosure has received the highest score followed by future- 
related disclosure and past-related disclosure respectively. 
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Although historical information (information with backward focus) 
disclosures are deemed helpful for investors (and analysts), forward- 
looking disclosure is deemed more important for investors, for example, to 
assist them in deciding whether the current value of their shares is 
justified by the forecasted future returns (Linsley and Shrives, 2000). 
Prior research (e. g., AICPA, 1994; ICAEW, 1997; Solomon et al., 2000) 
suggests that investors demand more information related to the future to 
assist them in their investment decision-making process. For analysts, 
Walker and Tsalta (2001) find that the quality of forward-looking 
information is positively related to their (the analysts') forecasts. 
Future good news disclosure would give investors information about the 
future opportunities that the company may be able to exploit. Although it 
is interesting to note the reporting of information related to the future by 
managers, caution needs to exercised as most risk disclosures are neutral 
statements (e. g., identified under future/neutral grid) compared to 
disclosure identified under the other grids (e. g., future/bad; future/good). 
Thus, the question of the importance and usefulness of this information to 
investors remains. Similar results were noted in other studies (e. g., Woods 
and Reber, 2003; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). 
However, because of the uncertainty associated with the future, the 
disclosure of future forecasting information involves major difficulties, 
associated mainly with its accuracy. Since future-related information is 
considered to be inherently uncertain or unanticipated, there are concerns 
associated with its reliability and credibility. If companies' directors are 
not able to predict the future precisely by relying on the historical data, 
they will be discouraged to disclose future-related information because 
they fear this may lead them to lawsuit and hold them to fortune. This 
raises the potential litigation cost and reputation concerns. In this regard, 
the AICPA (AICPA, 1994) suggest that if information is outside of 
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management's expertise or for which management is not the best source 
then information should not be reported (AICPA, 1994). 
Some difficulties associated with forecasting and quantifying risk, for 
instance, due to data availability and subjectivity in measurement, are 
highlighted in some companies' annual reports. For example, one company 
writes: 
"As a result of uncertainties, including the current economic 
conditions, it is considered difficult to forecast the level of 
losses for joint ventures and associates in 2002. " 
(Reuters Group plc, Annual Report 2001) 
The above quotation is an example of "future/qualitative/bad news" 
disclosure, and deals exclusively with loss but lacks any quantitative 
information. The difficulty and objectivity associated with measuring and 
assessing risk is notable. 
It was also observed that there is little disclosure on "future/bad news 
disclosure" category. Despite that, it is interesting to note that companies' 
directors provide disclosure under this category. The results show that the 
total of "future/bad" disclosures (both qualitative and quantitative) have 
increased over the period despite the fact that the overall level of bad 
news remains limited. 
The statistical tests conducted demonstrated that there is a significant 
difference between the years. The results showed that risk disclosures 
vary between companies in different industries. Industries such as 
chemicals; construction and building material; mining; and oil and gas 
have the highest disclosure average whereas the lowest average of 
disclosure is displayed by general retailers, leisure, entertainment and 
hotels, media and photography, support services, transport software, and 
computer services industry groups. Some industries are subject to more 
complex regulations than others, and therefore, increase their disclosure 
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in order to avoid the appearance of failing to meet the standards set for 
other similar companies. The low level of disclosure by some industries 
reflects the high level of competition. Prior research (e. g., Verrecchia, 
1983; Dye, 1986) argued that high competition results in lower disclosure. 
5.12 Why Risk Disclosure May Be Limited 
The findings of the present research reveal that risk disclosure is limited, 
suggesting that there is a maximum limit to the amount of information 
voluntarily published by companies; possibly a threshold at which 
disclosure would occur if the costs of disclosure exceed the benefits 
(Verrecchia, 1983). Disclosure is a costly undertaking (Botosan, 1997). As 
is apparent in the discussion, there are three types of costs associated with 
risk disclosure: non-proprietary costs, proprietary costs, and litigation 
cost. Non-proprietary costs are associated with creating and distributing 
timely and accurate risk disclosure information. Proprietary costs are 
imposed when managers perceive that some of the risk information 
disclosure may encourage the entry of competitors, therefore, this might 
affect the competitive position of the company in the products market 
(Verrechia, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Some forward-looking 
information disclosure may create litigation or invite regulatory 
intervention (Richardson, 2001; Field et al., 2003). Litigation might deter 
companies to provide certain type of disclosure. For example, directors 
could withhold negative information, particularly those related to the 
future if they feel that this is necessary to avoid excessive legal costs or 
reputation concerns (Skinner, 1994). Therefore, it is unlikely that 
directors would release forward-looking information without safe- 
harbour protection or when disclosure is deemed too commercially 
sensitive (Linsley and Shrives, 2005; and for evidence see Armitage and 
Marston, 2007). Directors would also probably withhold some information 
deliberately if the competitive pressures and proprietary costs associated 
with such disclosure are significant. 
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The Jenkins committee (AICPA, 1994) recommended that companies 
should not be required to report such information (associated with 
proprietary cost). The avoidance of regulation on specific disclosure may 
support the idea that the market would "punish what it does not like" 
(ICAEW, 1999b, p. 33). The market likes specific disclosure and not just a 
statement of compliance (ICAEW, 1999b). The constraint restricting 
disclosure of competitively sensitive information should not be used as an 
excuse to avoid providing meaningful disclosure (AICPA, 1994). There is 
no real reason to justify secrecy when listed companies want to build 
relationships with providers of capital (ICAEW, 1999b). On the one hand, 
difficult cost-benefit decisions must be made while, on the other hand, 
disclosure must be enhanced to maintain its relevance (AICPA, 1994; 
FASB, 2001). 
5.13 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter sought to examine the extent and nature of corporate risk 
disclosure practices of 52 large UK companies over the period 1998-2004. 
The level of risk disclosure was measured using a content analysis 
approach. Content analysis was used to show trends as well as absolute 
corporate risk disclosure levels of UK companies. 
The analysis revealed a significant increase in the level of risk information 
disclosed by companies in the sample over the examined period. The 
results also showed a general increase in all types of risk information 
disclosed including environmental risks, operational risks, and strategic 
risks categories. Most disclosures err towards being generalised policy 
statements aiming to assure the reader of the annual report that the 
company has an internal control system and risk management procedures 
in place. Therefore, managers are seeking to demonstrate that they are 
accountable to shareholders in managing risk at best. It was also observed 
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that most disclosures that are found are qualitative in nature and that 
quantitative disclosures are minimal. The findings show future-related 
disclosures tend to be much more qualitative than quantitative. However, 
caution is needed when interpreting future-related disclosure as many 
statements found under this category are neutral statements. There is very 
little on what would be the likelihood and potential impact on company 
performance. The other inspiring point was that companies showed the 
desire to provide bad news information in addition to both good and 
neutral disclosure. When providing good news, directors claim that the 
positive impact is the result of the actions that they have taken to mange 
risks. In contrast, they attribute bad news to external events which are 
beyond their control. 
Overall, the findings reveal a low level of disclosure quality based on the 
four quality variables and suggest that risk disclosures are rather vague. 
There is a lack of reliability in risk information included in risk sections 
caused by subjective, open-ended and ambiguous rules (Schrand and 
Elliot, 1998). The present findings are consistent with those of previous 
studies (e. g., Linsley and Shrives, 2005,2006; Woods and Reber, 2003; 
Lajili and Zegal, 2005). 
The tests of statistical analysis that have been carried out on the results 
demonstrated that there are significant differences in risk disclosures 
between the years. Statistical results also reveal that disclosure is 
industry-specific, supporting previous disclosure studies results. Clearly 
firms in sectors such as recourses group, basic industries group, non- 
cyclical consumer goods group, utilities, general industries group, are 
found to disclose more than the other sectors' firms (e. g., non-cyclical 
service, cyclical services and information technology) with cyclical 
services and information technology firms having the lowest level of 
disclosure. The existence of competition may provide an explanation for 
this low disclosure level. 
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Thus, the general increase in risk disclosure could be as a result of 
increasing regulations originated by company law, accounting standards, 
and stock exchange requirements that require disclosing information 
related to risk and uncertainties together with the long debate on the 
importance of enhancing narrative disclosure. The dramatic increase in 
operational risk category is probably a reaction to the development of 
corporate governance frameworks and codes - primarily, the Turnbull 
report issued in 1999. 
The theory (e. g., Dye, 1986) and existing evidence suggest that accounting 
regulation is one of the important factors driving improvement in 
voluntary disclosure. The theory suggests that companies increase their 
disclosure to avoid more detailed and perhaps more costly requirements 
from regulators, stock markets, and accounting standards. In view of the 
fact that large companies have a widespread shareholders base, additional 
disclosure could be motivated to achieve a reduction in agency costs. 
However, large companies may have the incentives to reduce the level of 
forward-looking information (including risk disclosure) to avoid litigation 
cost (Skinner, 1994; Field et al., 2003) and not to harm their competitive 
positions. 
A possible policy implication of these chapter findings may be that 
accounting regulators and policy makers should focus on the risk 
disclosure needs of the users, but with due consideration of the costs and 
benefits associated with information disclosures. The development of 
rules and requirement may be based on the level of voluntary disclosure 
(Dye, 1986). The proposed 'safe harbour' provision in the company act is 
an important step that may provide companies with protection and 
encourage them to provide details moving forward. 
The results presented in this chapter will be utilised in the next chapters 
for conducting further analysis in order to examine the link between 
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disclosure and companies' characteristics and between disclosure and the 
cost of equity capital. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 reported the results of risk disclosure content analysis. The 
results, presented in chapter 5, showed that there exists a variation in the 
level of risk disclosure practices, that is, variations among the sampled 
companies in the level of risk disclosure. This requires further 
investigation to determine the underlying factors (i. e., firm-specific 
characteristics) that might explain disclosure variation. Chapter 3 
explained a theoretical background for several factors which explain such 
variation. Therefore, the present chapter seeks to examine the relationship 
between risk disclosure level and four firm-specific characteristics (i. e., 
firm size, leverage, industry type, and US-dual listing). Appropriate 
statistical tests are performed to test for correlations between variables. A 
multivariate test is also performed to highlight the extent to which each of 
these factors can explain the variations in the risk disclosure level among 
the sampled companies. 
As stated before, the risk disclosures score (dependent variable) which 
was measured by the content analysis in the previous chapter will be used 
in the present chapter to perform the statistical tests. The statistical tests 
are performed using the figures related to the most recent year, i. e., 2004. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The sampled companies are 
presented in the next section (section 6.2). Section 6.3 presents the 
descriptive statistics for disclosure score and firm variables. Section 6.4 
shows the bivariate analysis while section 6.5 presents the multivariate 
test. The results are discussed in section 6.6 followed by a summary of the 
chapter in section 6.7. 
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6.2 Companies in the Sample 
The procedures on the sample choice and selection are explained and 
reported in the research method chapter (i. e., Chapter 4). The sample is 
based on the largest UK non-financial firms and comprises 52 companies 
extracted from FTSE-100 index. Descriptive statistics for the sample are 
displayed in Chapter 4. 
6.3. Descriptive Statistics 
r 
In order to perform statistical tests, companies' variables are screened and 
the data are presented and analysed below. Table 6.1 gives descriptive 
statistics for disclosure score variable(s). As mentioned above, analysis is 
confined to 2004 results. Therefore, all figures are based on the most 
recent fiscal year, that is, 2004. 
Overall risk disclosure score 52 28.00 275.00 93.50 54.12 
Environmental risk disclosure 52 0.00 70.00 19.27 18.77 
Operational risk disclosure 52 14.00 190.00 60.63 33.24 
Strategic risk disclosure 52 1.00 41.00 13.58 9.91 
Future-related disclosure 52 0.00 133.00 31.55 34.35 
Past-related disclosure 52 0.00 47.00 11.00 10.41 
Non-time disclosure 52 13.00 121.00 52.21 21.09 
Good news disclosure 52 5.00 143.00 43.98 24.70 
Bad news disclosure 52 0.00 18.00 3.36 3.79 
Neutral news disclosure 52 8.00 148.00 46.15 38.49 
Qualitative disclosure 52 26.00 250.00 84.10 47.58 
Quantitative disclosure 52 0.00 35.00 9.40 8.24 
Disclosure is the firm's total risk disclosure score (i. e., the sum of three risk disclosure categories 
including environmental risk disclosure, operational risk, and strategic risk disclosure). Future related 
disclosure, past related disclosure, non-time disclosure, good, bad, neutral, qualitative, and 
quantitative disclosure are all partial disclosure (each category represents a part of total). 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics for Risk Disclosure Scores 
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As shown in Table 6.1, all the sampled firms report on risk disclosure. The 
average disclosure score is 93.5 sentences (the average number of risk 
disclosure sentences disclosed by 52 companies in 2004) which is 
approximately 34% of the maximum score of 275 sentences. The table 
shows that there is a fair amount of variation in the disclosure score for 
the sampled companies. The overall disclosure score ranges from 28 to 
275 sentences. In addition, the average disclosure and the variation in 
disclosure tend to vary among industries as explained in the previous 
chapter (see Chapter 5). 
Table 6.1 also provides descriptive statistics for three disclosure 
categories including environmental risk disclosure, operational risk 
disclosure, and strategic risk disclosure. Table 6.1 further displays 
descriptive statistics for the other disclosure attributes (variables) 
including future-related disclosure, past-related, non-time disclosure, 
good news disclosure, bad news disclosure, neutral news disclosure, 
qualitative disclosure, and quantitative disclosure. 
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Table 6.2 provides the descriptive statistics for two independent 
continuous variables (i. e., firm size and leverage). Size is measured by the 
Nat log of turnover. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity. 
Size (Nat log of turnover) 6.57 11.98 8.46 1.23 
Leverage 1.50 527.18 131.15 106.99 
Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics for Two Continuous Independent Variables (Firm Size and Leverage) 
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Table 6.3 offers descriptive statistics for two categorical (discontinuous) 
variables, industry type and US-dual listing. The firms sectors (groups) in 
the sample are classified into industrial and non-industrial companies 
(this is in line with previous literature e. g., Raffournier, 1995; Adams et al., 
1998). Furthermore, a distinction was made between companies 
according to whether or not they have a US-dual listing in addition to their 
UK-listing (this is in line with previous studies e. g., Abraham and Cox, 
2007). 
U5-dual listing 52 28 24 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.50 
Industry 52 26 26 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 
US-dual listing is a dummy variable take the value of 1 for a firm with either a US primary dual listing 
or a level II or level III ADR, and zero otherwise. Industry is a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a 
firm belongs to recourses, basic industries, non-cyclical consumer goods, utilities, general industries 
groups and zero otherwise. 
Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics for Two Categorical Independent Variables (Industry Type and US-Dual 
Listing) 
6.4 Bivariate Analysis 
In this section, various tests are used to measure the relationship between 
variables to test the possibility of cause and effect relationship. These 
include Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients, student's t test, 
and Mann-Whitney U test. Firstly, because the measurement of disclosure 
scores requires judgements by the researcher, it is important, therefore, to 
assess the validity of the disclosure score. Disclosure strategies are 
coordinated across different means, and also disclosure components of the 
disclosure index measure the dimensions of a firm's disclosure policy 
(Botosan, 1997). Thus, the relationship between the overall disclosure 
level and its components should exhibits a positive relation between one 
another. Table 6.4 presents the results of Pearson correlation test between 
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total disclosure score and its components. The results presented in the 
table indicate that the three disclosure components (environmental risk 
disclosure, operational risk disclosure, and strategic risk disclosure) 
exhibit a positive and highly significant correlation with one another 
(p<0.01; p<0.01; and p<0.01 respectively). 
Environmental risk Pearson correlation 0.856** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 
Operational risk Pearson correlation 0.929** 0.637** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 
Strategic risk Pearson correlation 0.723** 0.646** 0.514** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
"Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
'Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Risk disclosure is the overall company disclosure score. Environmental, operational, and strategic risk 
disclosures are proportions of the total risk disclosure score. 
Table 6.4: Pearson Correlation Coefficients between the Components of Risk Disclosure Score 
Secondly, the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients have been 
performed to test the correlation between dependent variable (disclosure 
scores) and two independent continuous variables (firm size and 
leverage). Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients enable the 
measurement of correlation between disclosure scores and other 
variables. Table 6. S reports the results for the test of correlation. 
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Overall risk disclosure Pearson correlation 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Leverage 
Pearson correlation 0.066 0.096 0.025 0.097 -0.066 -0.092 0.144 0.062 0.076 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.660 0.522 0.866 0.515 0.660 0.541 0.336 0.680 0.612 
"Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Size is the log of turnover at the year end of 2004. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity. 
Table 6.5: Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Risk Disclosure and Firms' Variables (Size and 
Ieverage) 
The bivariate statistical results show that the relation between total 
disclosure score (dependent variable) and the size variable is insignificant 
(p=0.554) which is contrary to expectations, although the predicted 
direction of the correlation is in accordance with a priori expectation of 
agency theory. The results also indicate that there is an insignificant 
relationship between other disclosure types and size variable. Although 
the effect of firm size is well documented, the choice of large companies 
(extracted from FTSE-100 index) may lead to this insignificant association. 
Not all corporate disclosure studies have supported a size-disclosure 
relationship (e. g., Aljifri, 2008; Roberts, 1992). 
With regard to leverage variable, the results show no correlations between 
disclosure and leverage (p=0.660). It is important to note that empirical 
evidence on the relationship between disclosure and leverage is mixed 
and still ambiguous. Similar results were found in previous studies (e. g., 
Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Konishi and Ali, 2007; Abraham et al., 2007). 
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Size 
Pearson correlation 0.084 0.137 0.006 0.177 -0.012 0.261 0.085 0.096 -0.005 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.554 0.332 0.964 0.210 0.934 0.062 0.550 0.497 0.970 
Moreover, two further statistical tests were performed to test whether 
industry variable and US-dual listing variable have an impact on the 
overall score of risk disclosure. These tests are a student's t-test and a 
Mann-Whitney U test. The effect of industry type on risk disclosure level 
was tested in the previous chapter. In the previous chapter, the companies 
were initially categorized into seven industrial groups and the relationship 
between disclosure and these groups was tested using analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Here in this section, the companies in the sample were further 
divided into dichotomous groups based on whether they are industrial or 
non-industrial companies. This classification is in line with some previous 
studies (Adams et al., 1998; Raffournier, 1995). The dichotomous 
approach was also followed to classify companies in the sample according 
to whether or not companies have a US-dual listing. Having developed this 
classification, two statistical tests were performed, a student's t test and a 
Mann-Whitney U test. The results are displayed in Table 6.6, suggesting 
that there is a significant difference in disclosure score (p<0.001) between 
the two groups of industries. As hypothesised, firms that belong to 
industrial sectors are disclosing more information than those firms 
belonging to non-industrial sectors. This implies that firms that operate in 
industrial sectors are likely to disclose more information than others. The 
Mann-Whitey U test yields aZ statistic -4.027 (p<0.001), which supports 
the results of the student's t test. 
These two statistical tests were also carried out on the data (results are 
provided in Table 6.7) to test for the differences in mean risk disclosure 
scores between US-dual listing and non US-dual listing. The student's t test 
results show that there is a statistically significant difference (p<0.001) in 
risk disclosure scores between the two groups. It appears that firms with 
US-dual listing as well as a domestic stock exchange have a greater 
propensity to disclose more information than companies without a US- 
dual listing. The Mann-Whitney U test yields aZ statistic of -0.3.89 
(p<0.001), which again supports the results of student's t test. 
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Industrial Non-industrial Student's 2-tailed 
(N=26) (N=26) t-test probability 
Mean disclosure score 121.80 65.19 -4.398 0.000 
Std. Deviation 58.97 28.82 
Mann-Whitney Z= -4.027 
2- tailed probability 0.000 
Table 6.6: Descriptive Statistics and Tests for Total Risk Disclosure Score and Industry Variable 
US Dual listing Non US dual Student's 2-tailed 
(N=28) listing (N=24) t-test probability 
Mean disclosure score 124.08 67.28 -4.193 0.000 
Std. Deviation 60.41 29.65 
Mann-Whitney Z= -3.89 
2- tailed probability 0.000 
Table 6.7: Descriptive Statistics and Tests for Total Risk Disclosure Score and Listing Status Variable 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients have also been 
computed to determine the correlation between the independent 
variables. Table 6.8 reveals statistically significant correlation between the 
following independent variables: firm size and listing (p<0.05); and 
leverage and listing (p<O. 05). 
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Size Pearson correlation 1.000 
Sig, (2-tailed) 
Leverage Pearson correlation 0.006 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.969 
Industry Pearson correlation 0.056 -0.113 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.693 0.449 
US Listing Pearson correlation 0.273* 0.317" 0.154 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.050 0.030 0.275 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Size is the log of turnover at the fiscal year end of 2004. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total 
equity. Listing is a dummy variable of 1 if the company is a US dual listing and 0 otherwise. Industry is 
a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a firm belong to recourses, basic industries, non-cyclical 
consumer goods, utilities, general industries groups and zero otherwise. 
Table 6.8: Pearson Correlations among Independent Variables 
As the correlation test suggests that the statistical significance of 
independent variables in the bivariate analysis may be overstated, 
therefore, a multivariate test was also carried out on the data. 
6.5 Multivariate Test 
The following multiple regression model was fitted to the data in order to 
assess the effect of each variable on risk disclosure score: 
V- [[(, +- /', izc+ /; , IisIitIp + />; IL'vcruiie + iii industry + ,- 
Where: 
Y is risk disclosure score foryear 2001; 
Size is the log of firm turnover at the fiscal year coil rrf 200,1; 
Listing is a dummy variable which equals l il 'a firm hors rr US-dual 
listing and 0 otherwise; 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity; 
Industry is a dummy variable equals 1 if the fir7nr belmlp. to 
recourses, basic industries, non-cyclical consumer goods, utilities, 
general industries groups and zero otherwise; 
e is the error term. 
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Table 6.9 offers a summary of the regression which shows that the 
multiple regression model is highly significant (p<0.001). 
B(coefficient) 79.53 -0.3.90 54.93 -0.021 49.24 
t statistic 1.845 -0.781 3.973 -0.339 3.900 
Sig. t 0.072 0.439 0.000 0.736 0.000 
Adj. R2 = 44.9, F= 10.37, p=0.000 
Table 6.9: Regression Results for Total Risk Disclosure 
The adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted R2) indicates that 44.9 
percent of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by 
variations in the independent variables. The coefficients, representing 
industry, and US-listing are statistically significant, while the coefficients 
on size and leverage are not statistically significant. Replacing total risk 
disclosure score (the dependent variable) with other risk disclosure 
components (e. g., operational risk, environmental risk) produced the same 
results similar to those reported in the above table. 
Performing the multiple regression using the stepwise method confirms 
that the model included two variables only (i. e., industry and listing). The 
other two variables (i. e., leverage and size) were eliminated. Table 6.10 
presents the results. 
B(coefficient) 45.34 50.55 50.16 
t statistic 4.62 4.13 4.10 
Sig. t 0.000 
Adj. R2 = 46.6, F= 21.04, p=0.000 
Table 6.10: Regression Results Using Stepwise Method 
0.000 0.000 
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However, to confirm the results, the disclosure score was transformed into 
ranks first, and then regression using the stepwise method was run on the 
ranked variable. Table 6.11 displays the regression results. 
B(coefficient) 0.21 0.29 0.28 
t statistic 4.32 4.63 4.67 
Sig. t 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. 82 = 52.9, F= 26.83, p=0.000 
Table 6.11: Regression Results for Risk Disclosure Ranks 
To test the data normality assumption of the regression model, a 
histogram of the distribution of the residuals was plotted together with a 
P-P normality plot (Figures 6.1 and 6.2). The distribution was not far from 
a normal curve, suggesting that the data conform reasonably well to the 
normality assumption. 
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Figure 6.1: Distribution of the Residual 
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Figure 6.2: P-P Normality Plot 
6.6 Discussion of Results 
The empirical evidence based on both bivariate and multivariate analysis 
indicates that industry variable and US-dual listing variable are 
statistically related to the level of risk information disclosed by the 
sampled UK companies in their annual reports. These findings provide 
support for the theoretical arguments (e. g., agency theory, capital need 
theory, and political cost theory) discussed in Chapter 3. The findings are 
also consistent with that found in previous disclosure studies (e. g., 
Abraham and Cox, 2007; Aljifri, 2008; Roberts, 1992; Patten, 1991; Cooke, 
1989; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). The results suggest that disclosure is 
industry-specific. Some industries such as resources, basic industries, non- 
cyclical consumer goods, utilities, and general industries disclose more 
than other industries (e. g., non-cyclical service, cyclical services and 
information technology) perhaps because some certain industries may be 
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subject to more complex regulations than other industries. Companies 
may increase their level of disclosure in order to avoid the appearance of 
failing to meet the standards set by other similar companies (i. e., the result 
of a herd instinct or bandwagon effect). 
Also, UK companies quoted on the US stock exchanges appear to have a 
greater propensity to disclose more risk-related information in their 
annual reports than other firms. The results of both statistical tests were 
significant. This can be explained by the fact that UK companies listed in 
the US had to follow US. reporting rules; the annual reports prepared 
under the UK rules are not the same ones for US listing. UK firms with a US 
listing are facing additional risk reporting requirements under the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations. The SEC 
regulations require foreign securities registered in the U. S. to reconcile 
financial statements from their domestic accounting standards to U. S. 
accounting standards and submit this via a form 20-F. For example, the 
instructions for form 20-F require that "the document shall prominently 
disclose risk factors that are specific to the company or its industry" (SEC 
2008, p. 11, Item 3D). UK firms are not required to disclose this additional 
information within their UK annual reports, however, the information 
made available to investors in other market give rise to a stock market 
expectation that the same information must not be held back from 
investors in the UK (Abraham and Cox, 2007). In addition, for the 
information is already published in another jurisdiction, there are few 
preparation costs and there are no proprietary costs as the information is 
presumably publicly available (Abraham and Cox, 2007). UK companies 
with a US listing are required to provide more detailed discussion about 
the principal risk factors that may affect their businesses. These factors 
differ from one business to another. For example, PG Group, an oil and gas 
company, reports on a number of risk factors including exploration and 
new ventures, project pre-scanning definition and commercialisation, 
project delivery and other factors (PG Group, Annual Report 2004). These 
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risk factors are required under US reporting rules but not under UK 
reporting rules. Another explanation put forward is that foreign listing 
provides firms with an opportunity to raise capital through international 
markets. By disclosing more, companies may attract foreign investors. In 
addition, disclosure may better enable greater foreign investors to 
monitor their interests. The evidence found in this study is also consistent 
with that found in other studies (e. g., Abraham and Cox, 2007; Inchausti, 
1997; Wallace et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 1994; Cooke, 1989a; Firth, 1979; 
Singhvi and Desai, 1971). 
Size has been shown to be an important explanatory variable of corporate 
disclosure in previous studies (e. g., Huafang and jianguo, 2007; Oliveira et 
al., 2006; Kent and Ung, 2003; Naser et al., 2002; Depoers, 2000; 
Raffournier, 1995; Hossain et al., 1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987), but here the results of statistical analyses indicate 
otherwise. This is not consistent with the arguments contained in the 
theoretical framework that disclosure helps to overcome agency costs, 
political costs, and other opportunities costs as a firm grows in -size. Of 
course, the sample was selected from the FTSE-100 index so all the 
sampled firms could be classed as 'large'. If this research had surveyed a 
greater range of UK firms, a positive association between size and 
disclosure may be more obvious. However, some previous research (e. g., 
Aljifri, 2008; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007; Kou and Hussain, 2007; Deloitte, 
2006; Mak, 1996; Gray et al., 1995a; Roberts, 1992; Davey, 1982; Ng, 1985; 
Stanga, 1976) did not find a positive relationship between size and 
disclosure. Abraham et al. (2007) found a positive, albeit weak, 
relationship between the size of a company and the total risk disclosure 
quality. Large firms might have the incentives for reducing the level of risk 
disclosure if firms believe that the information disclosed may impose a 
proprietary cost, hence putting a company at a competitive disadvantage 
and affecting the company negatively (e. g., Field et al., 2003; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2000; AICPA, 1994; Skinner, 1994). 
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As with size variable, leverage was not significant in either the bivariate or 
multivariate analyses. Theory suggests that highly leveraged firms would 
incur monitoring cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Thus, 
additional disclosure would be made for monitoring purposes, that is, 
firms would seek to reduce these monitoring costs by disclosing more 
information (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). However, an important note is 
that the association between leverage and disclosure is ambiguous. Prior 
research testing the relationship between disclosure and leverage has not 
been conclusive (Ahmad and Courtis, 1999) and produced mixed results. 
Some evidence (Huafang and Jianguo, 2006; Naser et al., 2002; Hossain et 
al., 1994; Bradbury, 1992) found a significant relationship between 
leverage and disclosure, while other evidence (e. g., Aljifri, 2008; Konishi 
and Ali, 2007; Abraham et al., 2007; Oliveira et al., 2006; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Wallace and Naser, 1995; 
Inchausti, 1997; Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987) 
found leverage to have insignificant association with the level of 
disclosure. However, as with the size variable, the choice of the sample 
(i. e., which constitutes largest UK firms) should be considered when 
interpreting the results. Another possible explanation of the results is that 
the UK is an equity-financed country relying more on financial markets 
than on the banks, and also has a rich disclosure environment compared to 
debt-financed country. 
6.7 Summary and Conclusion 
The present chapter sought to investigate some factors influencing the 
level of risk disclosure in company annual reports. Drawing from previous 
literature on corporate risk disclosure, four firm-specific characteristics 
were selected and investigated namely firm size, industry type, US-dual 
listing, and leverage. The dependent variable (risk disclosure level) was 
computed for the year 2004 using a content analysis (the result of which is 
presented in Chapter 5). 
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Thus, considering the hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d, the extent of risk 
disclosure has been found to be significantly related to industry type and 
US-dual listing variables. Inversely, no significant relationship was found 
between leverage and risk disclosure and between risk disclosure and 
firm size. It is important to note that the association between disclosure 
and some firm's factors (e. g., leverage) is still ambiguous. It could also be 
argued that the factors affecting the level of risk disclosure are different 
from those affecting the level of other types of corporate financial 
disclosure examined in prior accounting literature. 
Therefore, the main conclusion of this chapter is that risk disclosure 
systematically varies depending upon industry type and US-dual listing 
variable. For certain industries, being subject to more complex regulations 
than others will encourage them to increase their level of disclosure to 
avoid the appearance of failing to meet the standards set by other similar 
companies. Also, for British companies, with a US listing, that are used to 
meeting a multiplicity of US reporting rules and regulations, they are likely 
to disclose more information than other listed firms. Thus, taken as a 
whole, the results suggest that risk disclosure in annual reports is driven 
more by regulation than by market. Although regulations and risk 
reporting proposals have influenced (i. e., increased) the level of risk 
information disclosed, the type of risk information disclosed, as can be 
seen from the discussion in Chapter 5, is of questionable quality, hence its 
relevance to investors. The findings of Abraham et al. (2007) reveal an 
overall low score for disclosure quality in their sampled companies. The 
question of information quality was also raised in other previous studies 
(e. g., Lajili and Zegal, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2005,2006; Konishi and 
Ali, 2007). 
Thus, in view of the potential benefit of risk disclosure in reducing 
information asymmetries and thereby increasing investors' confidence, it 
would be valuable to test whether there is any negative relationship 
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between risk disclosure and cost of equity capital reflecting this 
improvement in investor attitude. Thus, the impact of risk disclosure on a 
company's cost of equity capital will be examined in the next chapter. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The present chapter investigates empirically the relationship between risk 
disclosure level in the annual report and the company's cost of equity 
capital. This is at the same time an indirect test of the usefulness of the risk 
information disclosed in the annual report for investors. Only when risk 
information disclosed in the annual report is useful (i. e., information 
meets the characteristics of being reliable and relevant), should a negative 
relationship between risk disclosure level and the cost of equity capital be 
expected. 
However, empirical evidence on the relationship between disclosure level 
and the cost of equity capital experienced major methodological 
difficulties in developing measures both for disclosure levels and for the 
cost of equity capital. In the present research, the cost of equity capital is 
estimated using a Four-Stage Dividend Growth Model. In addition to this 
direct measure of the cost of equity capital, the bid-ask spread is used as 
proxy for information asymmetry (information asymmetry is a component 
of the cost of capital). Another proxy, stock volatility, was also used. For 
the risk disclosure level, a measure was developed based on content 
analysis (results of which are presented in Chapter 5) because no such 
measure is available from professional sources. Having developed 
measures for both disclosure level and the cost of equity capital, the next 
step is to regress the cost of equity capital on the disclosure level after 
controlling for other potentially influential variables such as firm size and 
beta. These two variables (size and beta) were chosen based on prior 
literature (e. g., Botosan, 1997; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000; Botosan and Blumlee, 2002; Hail, 2002; Froidevaux, 
2004; Petersen and Plenborg, 2006). Therefore, the following model was 
developed: 
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r= ßo + ß1 Beta+ ß2 Size + ß3 risk disclosure +£ 
Where: 
r is the measure of the cost of equity capital/ proxies for information 
asymmetry; 
Beta is the measure of systematic risk; 
Size is the log of turnover; 
Risk disclosure is the firm total risk disclosure score for the year 
2004; 
E is the error term. 
The analysis is based on the year 2004 because the missing forecasts data 
made it impossible to calculate the cost of equity capital for 1998 and 
2001. The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows. First, 
descriptive statistics and correlation tests for different variables are 
presented in section 7.2. Section 7.3 presents the results of multivariate 
analysis. Discussion of the results is presented in section 7.4. The 
summary of the chapter is given in section 7.5. 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Tests 
Table 7.1 displays the descriptive statistics of the cost of equity capital 
(IRR) and proxies for information asymmetry (e. g., bid-ask spread, and 
Stock volatility). The table also offers descriptive statistics for risk 
disclosure and other variables related to the cost of capital (e. g., beta, 
leverage, DY, Tobin q). 
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IRR (%) 4.50 17.20 9.99 2.69 
Volatility 15.02 51.31 26.01 7.10 
Bid-Ask spread 0.0009 0.005 0.002 0.001 
Beta 0.15 1.67 0.92 0.33 
Leverage 1.50 527.18 131.15 106.99 
Size (Em) 6.57 11.98 8.46 1.23 
DY 0.46 7.19 2.96 1.40 
Tobin q -0.15 1.45 0.17 0.36 
Risk disclosure level 28.00 275.00 93.50 54.12 
IRR is the cost of equity capital measured by a four-stage dividends growth model. Volatility is the annual stock 
volatility. Bid-ask spread is the average bid-ask spread, that is, the absolute spread divided by the average of bid 
and ask. Beta is the measurement of systematic risk. Size is the log of total turnover at the year end of 2004. 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity. DY is captured as the ratio of annual dividend per share at the 
year end to the share price. Tobin q is captured as the ratio of market value divided by asset value. Risk disclosure 
level is the total firm disclosure score on three risk disclosure categories (i. e. environmental disclosure, operational 
disclosure, and strategic disclosure). 
Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7.1 shows the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation 
for different variables. It shows that there is a broad range of variation in 
the sample. Risk disclosure level ranges from 28 to 275 sentences with a 
mean of 93.50 and a standard deviation of 54.12. Size ranges from 6.57 to 
11.98 with a mean of 8.46 and a standard deviation of 1.23. Leverage 
ranges from 1.5 to 527.18 with a mean of 131.15 and a standard deviation 
of 106.99. 
The cost of equity capital measure, IRR, ranges from 4.50% to 17.20°/u 
with a mean of 9.99% and a standard deviation of 2.69%. Assuming a risk 
free rate of 4.5% (long-dated UK yield), the IRR average of 9.99% reported 
here indicates a risk premium of 5.49%. This is comparable to historical 
risk premium estimates. For example, Dimson et al. (2006) showed that 
the UK equity risk premium lies at 4.7%. The study by Hirst et al. (2007) 
assumed and used an equity risk premium of 6%. Thus, the magnitude of 
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the risk premium obtained from the cost of equity capital measure 
reported in this study supports the validity of IRR measure. The IRR mean 
of 9.99% is considered reasonable compared to other studies. The mean of 
9.99% here is significantly lower than the mean of 20.1% reported by 
Botosan (1997) on the US firms and higher than the mean of 6.18% 
reported by Hail (2002). For bid-ask-spread, Table 7.1 shows a mean of 
0.002. 
Stock volatility ranges from 15.02 to 51.31 with a mean of 26.01 and a 
standard deviation of 7.10. Market beta (beta) is a measure for systematic 
risk and was used in previous studies (e. g., Botosan, 1997; Botosan and 
Blumlee, 2002; Hail, 2002; Froidevaux, 2004; Petersen and Plenborg, 
2006) that examined the relationship between disclosure level and the 
company's cost of equity capital. The mean of beta is below 1 indicating 
that the sample has a market risk below the average of the FTSE-100 index 
of 0.99 (the average beta for FTSE-100 index). DY was regarded as a proxy 
for the cost of equity in previous literature (e. g., Haque, 2006; Ang and 
Bekaert, 2007; Bekaert and Harvey, 2000) and was considered a good 
proxy for its advantage of being directly measurable. DY is more 
dependent on forward-looking growth prospects and less prone to be 
influenced by the market specific noise (Drobetz et al., 2004). DY is not 
affected by changes in dividend growth rate (e. g., Errunza and Miller, 
2000). Table 7.1 shows that DY ranges from 0.46 to 7.19 with a mean of 
2.96 and a standard deviation of 1.40. 
Table 7.2 gives the results of the Pearson correlation coefficients between 
the variables (e. g., IRR, bid-ask spread, and stock volatility) and different 
firm variables related to the cost of equity capital (size, leverage, Beta, DY, 
asset cover, and Tobin q). The results show that there is a positive and 
significant relationship (p < 0.01) between leverage and IRR supporting 
the measure of IRR validity. This implies that firms with high leverage 
experience a higher cost of equity capital. This is consistent with 
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predictions. The results also show a positive and significant relationship 
between IRR and dividends yield (DY) (p < 0.01). In addition, there is a 
negative and significant relationship between IRR and Tobin q ratio (p < 
0.05). 
However, with regard to the relationship between IRR and size, the 
correlation is not as significant as may have been expected (p = 0.353). 
The results also reveal no relationship between beta and IRR (p = 0.448); 
although beta has the expected sign suggesting that the cost of equity 
capital is not related to market beta. Previous studies had difficulties 
documenting this relationship empirically (e. g., Hail, 2002; Froidevaux, 
2004; Petersen and Plenborg, 2006). Gebhardt et al. (2001) found a 
negative relationship between cost of equity and beta although the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) suggests that a stock market beta should be 
positively correlated with its cost of capital. Similar findings were reported 
by Froidevaux (2004) and Peterson and Plenborg (2006). The lack of a 
significant association is somewhat surprising and could be caused by 
some deficiencies in the beta measure itself as documented by Fama and 
French (1992) who did not support the most basic prediction of the 
positive relationship between market beta and average stock return. It is 
argued (e. g., Hail, 2002) that the CAPM provides no role for risk factors 
other than market beta to create variation in cost of capital unless one 
assumes these factors are directly linked to market beta itself. Thus, 
market beta might be a poor measure of market risk, hence poorly suited 
for examining the impact of disclosure on the cost of capital. 
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Size Pearson correlation 0.131 -0.516** -0.110 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.353 0.000 0.442 
Beta Pearson correlation 0.108 0.114 0.583" 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.448 0.425 0.000 
Leverage (gearing) Pearson correlation 0.400** 0.017 -0.048 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005 0.913 0.750 
DY Pearson correlation 0.552** -0.130 -0.194 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.353 0.173 
Asset cover Pearson correlation -0.117 -0.295* 0.042 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.417 0.039 0.776 
Tobin q Pearson correlation -0.332* -0.116 -0.038 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.018 0.423 0.795 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Size is the log of turnover at the year end of 2004. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity. DY is 
captured as the ratio of annual dividend per share divided by the share price. Asset cover is the ratio of total asset 
minus liabilities divided by total debt outstanding. Tobin q is the ratio of market value divided by asset value. Beta 
was obtained from Risk Measurement Service published by London Business School (beta figures were compared 
to my measure of the variance of 60-month stock returns). 
Tale 7.2: Pearson Correlations between IRR, Bid-ask Spread, and Stock Volatility and Other Related 
Variables. 
Bid-ask spread was found to be negatively and significantly correlated 
with size (p < 0.01) which is consistent with predictions that the bigger the 
firm the lower the bid-ask spread. The correlation between bid-ask spread 
and asset cover is also significant (p < 0.05) and behaves in the predicted 
direction. The signs of correlation behave as predicted in the opposite 
direction. Asset cover ratio was regarded as a measure of risk level (e. g., 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006). The higher the ratio, the lower the risk. Thus, 
the results are consistent with theory and predictions. 
Stock volatility is found to be significantly associated with beta (p < 0.01). 
As predicted, this implies that firms with high beta experience higher 
volatility in their stocks. The relationship between stock volatility and size 
was found to be insignificant but the sign behaves in the predicted 
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direction. No significant association was found between stock volatility 
and other variables. 
It may be more useful to see volatility not so much as a proxy for cost of 
capital but rather as an indirect measure of information asymmetry 
because rapid fluctuations in share price may, to a large extent, be caused 
by uncertainty on the part of buyers and sellers who are not privy to 
management decisions about the firm's operation. 
Table 7.3 displays the results of Pearson correlations between total risk 
disclosure (and different types of risk disclosure) scores and the cost of 
capital variables (IRR, Bid-ask spread, and stock volatility). The table also 
presents the correlations between disclosure scores and beta. 
IRR 
Pearson correl. -0.081 -0.133 -0.021 -0.119 -0.029 -0.033 -0.092 -0.091 -0.009 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.567 0.346 0.880 0.400 0.838 0.819 0.514 0.522 0.947 
Bid-ask 
Pearson correl. -0.201 -0.249 -0.134 -0.141 -0.033 -0.296' -0.212 -0.208 -0.123 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.157 0.078 0.348 0.325 0.819 0.035 0.135 0143 0.390 
Volatility 
Pearson correl. -0.164 -0.081 -0.180 -0.138 -0.193 -0.313" -0.073 -0.131 -0.299' 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.251 0.571 0.206 0.335 0.175 0.025 0.611 0.360 0.033 
Beta 
Pearson correl. -0.176 -0.127 -0.218 0.013 -0.159 -0.149 -0.130 -0.157 -0.247 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.213 0.370 0.120 0.928 0.261 0.291 0.357 0.266 0.077 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 73: Pearson Correlations between Risk Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital Variables 
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The results displayed in Table 7.3 above indicate that there is no 
significant association between total risk disclosure level and the cost of 
equity capital, IRR. The results also indicate, contrary to expectations, that 
there is an insignificant relationship between different disclosure types 
and IRR. Similarly, the results indicate an insignificant relationship 
between disclosure and beta. The results are consistent with the results of 
previous studies (e. g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006) in finding an insignificant 
relationship between risk disclosure and beta. 
For the relationship between disclosure scores and the variable of bid-ask 
spreads, the results show that there is a negative and significant 
association between bad news risk disclosures and bid-ask spreads (p < 
0.05). The results also show a negative and significant relationship 
between bad news risk disclosures and stock volatility (p<0.05) and 
between quantitative risk disclosure and stock volatility (p<0.05). This 
implies that firms with higher disclosure of bad news reduce information 
asymmetry as measured by bid-ask spread and stock volatility. Likewise, 
the results indicate that firms with higher quantitative risk disclosure 
levels reduce stock volatility. The result is consistent with previous studies 
(e. g., Welker, 1995; Healy et al., 1999; Frankel et al., 1999; Peterson and 
Plenborg, 2006). 
The Pearson correlations between dependent (IRR, Bid-ask spread, and 
stock volatility) and independent (i. e., size, and beta) variables are 
presented in Table 7.2, whereas Table 7.3 displays the Pearson 
correlations between dependent variables (IRR, Bid-ask spread, and Stock 
volatility) and risk disclosure scores. However, before performing the 
multivariate tests, Pearson correlation coefficients have also been 
computed to determine the correlations between the independent 
variables. Table 7.4 displays the correlation matrix between dependent 
and independent variables. The table reveals no statistical significant 
correlations between the independent variables suggesting that the 
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independent variables (size, beta, and risk disclosure) are not related to 
each other. 
IRR 
Pearson correlation 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Bid-ask spread 
Pearson correlation -0.080 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.575 
Stock volatility 
Pearson correlation -0.015 0.257 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.918 0.069 
Size 
Pearson correlation 0.131 -0.516" -0.110 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.353 0.000 0.442 
Beta 
Pearson correlation 0.108 0.114 0.583" -0.002 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.448 0.425 0.000 0.991 
Risk disclosure 
Pearson correlation -0.081 -0.201 -0.164 0.084 -0.176 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.567 0.157 0.251 0.554 0.213 
Bad news 
Pearson correlation -0.033 -0.296' -0.313` 0.261 -0.149 0.445" 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.819 0.035 0.025 0.062 0.291 0.001 
Quantitative disc. 
Pearson correlation -0.009 -0.123 -0.299* -0.005 -0.247 0.822" -0.299` 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.947 0.390 0.033 0.970 0.077 0.000 0.031 
Table 7.4: Correlations Matrix between D ependent a nd Independent Va riables 
208 
7.3 Multivariate Analysis 
As stated above, the following multiple regression model was fitted to the 
data in order to assess the effect of each variable on cost of equity capital: 
r= /30 + ßl Beta+ ß2 Size + ß3 Risk disclosure +c 
Where: 
r is the measure of cost of equity capital (IRR)/ proxies for 
information asymmetry; 
Beta is the measure of systematic risk; 
Size is the log of total turnover at the year end of 2004; 
Risk disclosure is the firm risk disclosure score for 2004; 
F is the error term. 
The results of IRR regression on total risk disclosure level (and on 
different types of risk disclosure) were not discussed further because 
Table 7.3 showed no association between the two variables, IRR and total 
risk disclosure (although this was checked explicitly by running the 
regression of IRR on total disclosure). 
The results of regression analysis for stock volatility and risk disclosure 
are displayed in Table 7.5. The multiple regression model is highly 
significant (p<0.001). The adjusted coefficient of determination (Adjusted 
R2) in Panel A indicates that 31.3 (35.7 in Panel B; 33.8 in Panel C) percent 
of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by variations in the 
independent variables. 
Panel A of Table 7.5 shows that the coefficients on total risk disclosure and 
on size are negative but insignificant (p=0.626 and p=0.391 respectively). 
Beta takes on the expected sign and is significant at the 0.001 level. This 
implies that firms with high beta experience a higher stock volatility, 
which is consistent with expectations. The regression model is highly 
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significant (p<0.001). The adjusted coefficient of determination (Adjusted 
R2) indicates that 31.3 percent of the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by variations in the independent variables. 
Similarly, the results presented in Panel B show a negative coefficient on 
bad news but less significant than for beta. The coefficient on size is 
negative but insignificant. The coefficient on beta is negative and 
significant at the 0.001 level. 
Intercept 
PC 
B (coefficient) 20.531 
t statistic 3.249 
Sig. T 0.002 
Adj. R2=31.3, F=8.59, p=0.000 
Total disclosure Size Beta 
(ß1) (M: ) (Y3) 
-0.009 -0.582 12.029 
-0.490 -0.865 4.818 
0.626 0.391 0.000 
Intercept Bad news Size Beta 
disclosure Ro (a? ) (ß; ) 
(01) 
B (coefficient) 19.000 -0.415 -0.282 11.754 
t statistic 3.172 -1.863 -0.420 4.806 
Sig. T 0.003 0.069 0.677 0.000 
Adj. R' = 35.7, F= 10.25, p=0.000 
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Intercept Quantitative Size Beta 
disclosure 
ßo (ßZ) (ß3) 
A) 
B(coefficient) 22.022 -0.150 -0.618 11.382 
t statistic 3.527 -1.429 -0.941 4.574 
Sig. T 0.001 0.160 0.351 0.000 
Adj. R2=33.8, F=9.52, p=0.000 
Table 7.5: Regression Results (Stock Volatility is the Dependent Variable) 
Panel C (of table 7.5) shows the regression results of stock volatility on 
quantitative disclosure, size and beta. It shows that the coefficient on 
quantitative disclosure is negative but insignificant (p=0.160). Size takes 
on the expected negative sign but insignificant (p=0.351) while the 
coefficient on beta is positive as expected and significant at the 0.001 level. 
Performing the multiple regression (with stock volatility as dependent 
variable) using the stepwise method confirms that the model included two 
variables only, beta and bad news disclosure. The other variable (size) was 
eliminated. Table 7.6 displays the results. 
B(coefficient) 16.730 11.538 -0.440 
t statistic 6.571 4.836 -2.069 
Sig. T 0.000 0.000 0.044 
Adj. R2 36.8, F= 15.56, p=0.00 
Table 7.6: Regression Results Using the Stepwise Method (Stock Volatility is the Dependent Variable) 
Spearman Rank correlations were also performed to check the robustness 
of the regression results and in order to give greater assurance of the 
regression results. Results are displayed in Table 7.7. 
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Stock volatility Correlation coefficient 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 
Total disclosure Correlation coefficient -0.200 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.159 
Size Correlation coefficient -0.168 0.206 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.240 0.143 
Beta Correlation coefficient 0.624** -0.128 0.057 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.000 0.366 0.690 
Stock volatility Correlation coefficient 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 
Bad news Correlation coefficient -0.309* 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.027 
Size Correlation coefficient -0.168 0.216 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.240 0.125 
Beta Correlation coefficient 0.624** -0.097 0.057 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.000 0.496 0.690 
Stock volatility Correlation coefficient 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 
Quantitative news Correlation coefficient -0.259 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.067 
Size Correlation coefficient -0.168 0.148 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.240 0.295 
Beta Correlation coefficient 0.624** -0.162 0.057 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.000 0.252 0.690 
Table 7.7: Spearman Rank Correlations 
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1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
Table 7.8 displays the regression results of bid-ask spreads on risk 
disclosure, size and beta. Panel A shows the coefficient on total risk 
disclosure is negative but insignificant (p=0.295) and the coefficient on 
beta is positive and insignificant (p=0.468), while the coefficient on size is 
negative and significant (p<0.001). 
Panel B shows that the coefficient on bad news is negative and 
insignificant (p=0.226) and the coefficient on beta is positive and not 
significant (p=0.467), while the coefficient on size is negative and 
significant (p<0.001). 
In Panel C, size takes on the expected negative sign and is significant 
(p<0.001). Beta takes on the positive sign and insignificant (p=0.489). 
Quantitative disclosure behaves in the expected direction but insignificant 
(p=0.427). 
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Intercept Total disclosure Size Beta 
(01) 
PO (p2) (03) 
B (coefficient) 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
t statistic 6.152 -1.059 -4.076 0.732 
Sig. t 0.000 0.295 0.000 0.468 
Adj. R2 = 25.1, F=6.58, p=0.001 
Intercept Bad news Size Beta 
disclosure (ßiJ ß0 2) (02) / (133) 
B (coefficient) 0.006 -4.480 0.000 0.000 
t statistic 5.975 -1.226 -3.748 0.733 
Sig. t 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.467 
Adj. R2=25.7, F=6.76, p=0.001 
Intercept Quantitative size Beta 
disclosure (3) 
ßo (ßZ) (ß3) 
B(coefficient) 0.006 -1.372 0.000 0.000 
t statistic 6.050 -0.801 -4.195 0.697 
Sig. t 0.000 0.427 0.000 0.489 
Adj. R' = 24.4, F=6.36, p=0.001 
Tables 7.8: Regression Results (Bid-ask Spreads is the Dependent Vari able) 
Again, Spearman Rank correlations were also performed to check the 
robustness of the regression results and in order to give greater assurance 
of the regression results. The results are displayed in Table 7.9. 
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Bid-Ask spread Correlation coefficient 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 
Total disclosure Correlation coefficient -0.285* 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.043 
Size Correlation coefficient -0.431** 0.206 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.002 0.143 
Beta Correlation coefficient 0.091 -0.128 0.057 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.526 0.366 0.690 
Bid-Ask spread Correlation coefficient 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 
Bad news Correlation coefficient -0.299* 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.033 
Size Correlation coefficient -0.431** 0.216 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.002 0.125 
Beta Correlation coefficient 0.091 -0.097 0.057 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.526 0.496 0.690 
Bid-Ask spread Correlation coefficient 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 
Quantitative disclosure Correlation coefficient -0.145 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.310 
Size Correlation coefficient -0.431** 0.148 1.000 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.002 0.295 
Beta Correlation coefficient 0.091 -0.162 0.057 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.526 0.252 0.690 
Table 7.9: Spearman Rank Correlations 
1.000 
1.000 
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Overall, the results show that risk disclosure level is not related to IRR. 
Stock volatility was found to be negatively and significantly related to bad- 
news disclosure and also to quantitative disclosure in the bivariate 
analysis. However, the multivariate results shown in Table 7.5 revealed 
otherwise. This may be partly due to multi-collinearity effects among the 
independent variables. The results (displayed in Table 7.6) suggest the 
following stepwise regression model: 
Stock volatility = ßo + ßl Beta+ ß2 bad news disclosure +E 
The bivariate and multivariate tests also produced contradictory results 
for the bid-ask spread. Bid-ask spread was found to be significantly and 
negatively related to bad-news disclosure in bivariate analysis, whereas 
the multivariate model revealed otherwise (see Table 7.8). As with stock 
volatility, this may due to multi-collinearity effects between the 
independent variables. 
Using Spearman Rank correlations (Tables 7.7 and 7.9) confirm the results 
of the correlation analysis presented in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 but with 
exception of that bid-ask spread was found to be significantly (although 
marginally) and negatively related to total disclosure, suggesting that 
greater risk disclosure reduces investors' uncertainty. 
The results suggest that there is some doubt as to whether the risk 
information revealed in the annual reports reassures investors, and 
thereby reduces the risk premiums in required rates of return on equity. 
7.4 Discussion of Results 
In the present research, content analysis has been performed to measure 
the level of risk information disclosure so a numerical measure for the 
level of disclosure has been assigned for each company in the sample. The 
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cost of equity capital has been directly estimated for each company. Other 
company characteristics, related to both disclosure level and the cost of 
equity capital, have been identified and estimated. Both bivariate and 
multivariate analyses have been performed to test the relationships 
between variables and to test whether the level of annual report risk 
disclosure is negatively related to the cost of equity capital, after 
controlling for other factors that might affect the cost of equity, such as 
company size and beta. 
The findings of this study did not show a significant relationship between 
total risk disclosure score and the cost of equity capital variables, a finding 
that contradicts the expected negative relationship between disclosure 
level and the cost of equity capital. 
However, the results of the statistical tests revealed a significant and 
negative relationship between bid-ask spreads and bad news disclosure 
(in bivariate analysis), and between stock volatility and bad news risk 
disclosure (in both tests), and between stock volatility and quantitative 
risk disclosures (in bivariate analysis). These findings underline the 
importance of bad news risk disclosure and quantitative risk disclosures. 
The findings support the arguments put forward by previous literature 
(Schrand and Elliot, 1998; Kadous et al., 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). 
These studies suggest that quantitative disclosure enhances the credibility 
(hence reliability and relevance) of the information disclosed. Only when 
disclosure facilitates the assessment of the potential impact upon 
company, is it considered relevant to investors. Directors would be 
motivated to disclose bad news disclosure to avoid the incident of 
credibility concerns (e. g., Crombie and Samujh, 1999) and to avoid 
litigation cost when there are large stock price declines on earnings 
announcement days (e. g., Skinner, 1994). The results of Kothari and Short 
(2003) indicate that negative news affects cost of capital while positive 
news does not. 
217 
In academic literature, it is assumed that enhanced disclosure will result in 
greater transparency and a higher liquid market, hence, a lower cost of 
equity capital. In practice, however, more disclosure might well increase 
the cost of capital. It is possible to raise cheap capital if you misrepresent 
or fail to reveal some of the risks to which an investment will be exposed. 
However, that is barely a basis for sustained access to capital markets 
(ICAEW, 1999b). 
Previous literature (e. g., Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Blumlee, 2002; 
Richardson and Welker, 2001; Hail, 2002) on the relationship between 
disclosure level and the cost of equity capital produced mixed results. 
Botosan (1997), for example, found a negative relationship between the 
two variables but only for firms with low analyst following, whereas for 
firms with high analyst following the author found no such relationship. 
Botosan and Blumlee (2002) also produced mixed results. While the 
authors found a negative relationship between the cost of equity capital 
and annual report disclosure, they found a positive relationship between 
the cost of equity capital and the level of more timely disclosures such as 
the quarterly report. They explain the contrary results with the opinion of 
managers claiming that more timely disclosure increases the cost of equity 
possibly through increased stock price volatility. Finally, the authors found 
no relationship between the cost of equity and the level of investor 
relations activities. They conclude that the relationship between the two 
variables depends on the type of disclosure and the aggregation of 
different types of disclosure to a measure of total disclosure will lead to no 
association. Richardson and Welker (2001) found that financial disclosure 
reduces the cost of equity capital. However, in contrast, the authors found 
a positive relationship between environmental disclosure and the cost of 
equity capital. Hail (2002) concludes that the lower overall disclosure 
level of Swiss firms, comparing to US firms, may provide an explanation 
for her results of a strong relationship between disclosure and the cost of 
equity capital. Armitage and Marston (2007) indicate that UK finance 
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directors do not believe that there is a clear relationship between 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital probably because their companies 
already provide at least a good practice disclosure level. Some 
respondents believe that there is no link at all. Others believe greater 
disclosure can increase the cost of equity capital. The fact of whether 
improved disclosure cuts the cost of capital is often asserted as an 
indisputable fact, however, "it is clear that not everyone is convinced by 
the research so far... " practitioner's input would be helpful (ICAEW, 2004b, 
p. 15). 
The focus of this research is on the UK environment (and similarly a US 
environment) which is viewed as having high disclosure standards. This 
may provide an explanation for the insignificant association between risk 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital. In other words, it was considered 
tough (e. g., Hail, 2002; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Botosan, 1997) to 
document a significant negative relationship between disclosure and the 
cost of equity capital in a rich disclosure environment. 
Even when companies that are regarded as high risk and perceive their 
high level of risk, the level of disclosure in their annual reports may not be 
effective in or for the aim of reducing the cost of equity (Peterson and 
Plenborg, 2006). It could be that company managers are unable or 
unwilling to disclose the information of the greatest value to the market. 
Even when information disclosed is regarded as high quality, the quality of 
disclosure itself may not affect a company's share price. Thus, it may not 
be the level of disclosure that drives the results but rather a firm's general 
policy. In other words, voluntary disclosure may be a proxy for a firm's 
disclosure policy in general (Peterson and Plenborg, 2006). 
If it is to be assumed that large companies, such as those contained in this 
research sample, follow a benchmark of good practice communications 
and meet the market expectations, then there would be little advantage in 
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disclosing more than what was expected. Effort beyond the good-practice 
benchmark has little effect on the cost of equity, and eventually yields very 
little or none beyond a level of best practice effort (Armitage and Marston, 
2007). 't'his is supported by the view of respondents who believe that 
disclosure matters in theory and not in practice (Armitage and Marston, 
2007). This stage is "inferred from the fact that neither practitioners nor 
academics suggest that the 'information risk premium' is the major part of 
the cost of equity for listed companies. Therefore, even if investors had as 
much information as the managers, the company's cost of equity would 
not be much lower than under modern best-practice communication" 
(Armitage and Marston, 2007, p. 10). Figure 7.1 shows the effect of 
disclosure on the cost of equity. The figure was drawn based on the views 
of respondents to the survey carried out by Armitage and Marston (2007). 
The key point in the figure is that, beyond a certain point, further 
disclosure has little effect on the cost of equity. 
Cost of 
equity 
Figure 7.1: Effect of Disclosure on the Cost of Equity 
Source: Armitage and Marston (2007) 
Perhaps the annual report is not the most important vehicle of 
communication, in conveying information to the market, which affects the 
cost of capital. Other effective methods of communication include 
presentations to groups of analysts and investors, or one-to-one meetings, 
and news announcements. In Bence et al. (1995), analysts gave higher 
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Good practice Best practice 
Level ol disclosure 
ranks to preliminary announcements, Personal interviews, interim 
statements and company presentations than the rank given to annual 
report, while investors ranked annual reports top equal along with 
Personal interviews. Direct contact and analysts meeting received the 
highest rank from fund managers (Barker, 1998). Analysts view the annual 
report as an important source of information but behind private contact 
and analysts meeting (Epstein and Palepu, 1999). Face-to-face contact is 
viewed by companies and investors as important in adding value since it 
gives investors the opportunities to question companies (Holland, 2006). 
Thus, when it comes to reducing a company's cost of equity, different 
information sources have different effects. Also, different types of 
information have different effects (e. g., quantitative versus qualitative; bad 
versus good versus neutral). 
7.5 Summary and Conclusions 
In closing, the present chapter sought to test the claim that greater annual 
report risk disclosure reduces the company's cost of equity capital. It has 
been put forward that companies employ risk reporting as a mechanism to 
inform investors and reduce information asymmetry, which leads to a 
lower information risk premium and, in turn, to a lower cost of capital. In 
this chapter, both bivariate and multivariate analyses have been 
performed to test the research hypotheses (H3). The results of these 
analyses were then presented and explained. 
The results do not support a negative association between risk disclosure 
level and the cost of equity capital. Only when investors perceive that the 
information is credible and relevant, risk information disclosed in the 
annual report can lead to a reduction in the cost of equity capital. 
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The companies in the research sample are classified as large and are 
followed by a high number of analysts. As the average sample firm, in this 
research, is followed by approximately 17 analysts (see Table 4.5 in 
Chapter 4), this suggests that the selected companies are operating in a 
high disclosure environment (Hail, 2002). It is possible that for listed 
companies with lower analyst following, some correlation would have 
been found between disclosure level and the cost of equity capital 
(Botosan, 1997). However, no such relationship exists for large UK 
companies. Botosan (1997) found a negative relationship between 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital for companies with low analyst 
following only. However, she did not find such a relationship for firms with 
high analyst following. 
While risk disclosure is nowadays increasingly required by regulations, 
there is debate whether the current requirements for risk disclosure in 
annual reports are effective. Or, alternatively, it could be that companies 
follow a benchmark of good practice communications and meet market's 
expectation, therefore any increase in disclosure has either a low effect or 
no effect on the cost of equity capital. It could be that these companies 
have no or low information asymmetry particularly in risk disclosure. It 
could be that investors rely on other sources of information rather than 
the annual report to make their decisions. 
However, the findings revealed in this chapter show that bad news risk 
disclosure reduces bid-ask spread. The findings also show that 
quantitative risk disclosure and bad news risk disclosure are effective in 
driving a reduction in stock volatility. These findings clearly demonstrate 
that annual report disclosures are of substantial significance. 
The following chapter presents a summary of the findings, draws key 
conclusions and highlights potential areas for future research. 
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8.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of the present research was to study different types of 
risk information disclosed in the UK non-financial companies' annual 
reports. The research examined corporate risk disclosure in three 
different periods to study current practices and establish trends in risk 
reporting. The research also examined the relationship between risk 
disclosure and four firm factors including firm size, leverage, industry 
type, and US-dual listing. Furthermore, the research provided evidence of 
the relationship between risk disclosure and a company's cost of equity 
capital. Evidence (e. g., Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002; Botosan and Blumlee, 
2002; Chen et al., 2003) to date almost exclusively focuses on other types 
of disclosures, for example, financial and environmental disclosure, 
investors' relation disclosure, and corporate governance mechanisms. The 
relationship between cost of capital and disclosure level varies by 
disclosure type (see, for example, Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Blumlee, 
2002). It would be interesting to know if risk disclosure reduces the cost 
of equity capital since there has been some debate on the issue (ICAEW, 
1997,1999b, 2002; ICAEW, 2003,2004b; Armitage and Marston, 2007). 
The present research serves to provide further contribution to these three 
issues. 
The core aim of the present chapter is to bring together and highlight the 
primary conclusion related to the research objectives set out in Chapters 1 
and 4. A summary of the research aims and objectives, questions, and the 
approach adopted in achieving these aims and objectives are outlined. The 
conclusions of the main findings of the present research and the 
contributions to the literature on disclosure are summarised. Next, key 
limitations of the research are identified. Finally, further areas that could 
potentially be explored comprise the section on future research. 
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8.2 Summary 
8.2.1 Overview 
The present research has explored the current state of corporate risk 
reporting and disclosure practices in the UK environment, and examined 
whether the extent of risk disclosure in the annual reports of UK 
companies has changed over time. The rationale was to examine whether 
the risk disclosure practices of UK companies indicated any changes in 
attitude in their risk reporting, and to ascertain any limitations of such 
disclosure practices. Accounting regulations and accounting rules have 
increasingly developed over the past years. The past years have witnessed 
a constructive and long debate on the Operating and Financial Review 
(OFR) statement to improve the quality of financial reporting and satisfy 
the information needs of users. New frameworks and codes of corporate 
governance have been developed together with the many 
recommendations and proposals published by accounting institutions to 
promote risk disclosure in the annual reports. There is a need for 
additional risk disclosure studies to fill the gap identified in the literature 
(Schrand and Elliot, 1998; ICAEW, 1999b, 2002,2003,2004b; Solomon et 
al., 2000). This research provides a comprehensive and longitudinal study 
of the extent of risk disclosure. It is interesting to examine risk reporting 
in the light of recent developments. Some previous accounting disclosure 
studies' findings are relevant to the findings of this research. For instance, 
Patten (1992) and Deegan et al. (2000) provided examples of event 
studies where the volume of environmental disclosure was shown to 
respond to the increased exposure to criticism experience after a 
particular event. Longitudinal studies of corporate social disclosure 
(Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) indicated increases 
in the extent of information being disclosed by companies. 
Furthermore, the present research related the level of annual report risk 
disclosure to its possible relationship with some corporate attributes (firm 
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factors) including firm size, leverage, industry and US-dual listing. These 
attributes are referred to as determinants of disclosure. The aim was to 
examine what motivates companies to go beyond disclosure requirements 
and disclose more information needed by various users of the corporate 
report. 
In addition, the present research examined the benefits of enhancing risk 
information by empirically testing the impact of risk disclosure level on a 
company's cost of equity capital. Theoretical arguments suggest that 
greater disclosure enhances stock market liquidity and thereby reduces 
cost of equity capital through reduced transaction costs and increased 
demand for securities (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991). However, empirical evidence (e. g., Botosan, 1997; 
Richardson and Welker, 2001; Botosan and Blumlee, 2002) produced 
mixed results. The present research, therefore, sought to provide 
comprehensive and systematic examination of the effect of different types 
of risk disclosure on the cost of equity capital. 
Thus, the following three research questions have been formulated: 
Research Question 1: What are the current practices of corporate risk 
disclosure and to what extent did UK listed companies respond to recent 
developments that lead to the increased pressure on companies to 
enhance their risk disclosure (i. e., whether risk disclosure in the annual 
reports changed over time)? This question is extended to include the 
following sub-questions: 
  Do differences exist in the extent and variety of annual report risk 
disclosure of UK companies between 1998,2001, and 2004? 
  What information is being disclosed? 
  How is the information being disclosed? 
  Does reporting practice vary between industries? 
This question was investigated based on Hypothesis 1 formulated in 
Chapter 2: 
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Hypothesis 1: There are significant differences in risk 
disclosure over the period under examination (1998-2004). 
Research Question 2: Does risk disclosure relate to the following firm 
attributes (factors): size, industry, US-dual listing, and leverage? 
This question was investigated based on Hypothesis 2 (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d) 
formulated in Chapter 3: 
Hypothesis 2(a): there is a positive relationship between 
risk disclosure level and firm size. 
Hypothesis 2(b): there is a positive relationship between 
risk disclosure level and industry type. 
Hypothesis 2(c): there is a positive relationship between 
risk disclosure level and US-dual listing variable 
Hypothesis 2(d): there is a positive relationship between 
risk disclosure level and leverage. 
Research Question 3: Does risk disclosure affect the company cost of 
equity capital? 
This question was investigated based on Hypothesis 3 formulated in 
Chapter 3: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative association between 
disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. 
8.2.2 Research Design 
8.2.2.1 Annual Report as the Disclosure Proxy 
Disclosure by an organisation is communicated to its stakeholders in a 
number of ways. Risk information may be disclosed in a variety of media, 
such as the annual report, interim report, press releases, newsletters, 
conference calls and direct communication with analysts. This research 
focuses on risk-related information disclosure made in narrative sections 
of the annual report for several reasons. Firstly, the annual report is a 
mandatory document required by legislation and is produced on a regular 
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basis. Secondly, the annual report is widely recognised as the principal 
means for corporate communication and is seen as an important vehicle 
for financial communication between managers and stakeholders. Thirdly, 
the annual report is viewed as the least costly, but most effective, means of 
communication and has been widely used in previous studies. Fourthly, 
most proposals that recommended companies to enhance risk disclosure 
have focused on the disclosure made in the annual report. Previous 
research (Lang and Lundholm, 1993) suggests that annual report 
disclosure scores are correlated positively with other media of financial 
communication, suggesting that firms coordinate their disclosure policies 
across different media (Botosan, 1997). 
8.2.2.2 Measuring Disclosure Level 
Different approaches have been used in the literature to measure the level 
of information disclosure. Instead of a mere count of the number of items 
disclosed, the present study adopted content analysis in order to classify 
and analyse the diverse aspects of corporate risk disclosure. This is in line 
with previous studies. An appropriate coding scheme that lists three broad 
categories (e. g., environmental risk, operational risk, and strategic risk) 
and different risk items related to these categories was developed. A 
checklist was developed to capture, in addition to the volume of 
disclosure, the quality dimensions of the information disclosed. The 
additional quality dimensions that were considered include the type of 
statement made (quantitative and qualitative), the type of news conveyed 
(good, bad, neutral), and news time-frame (future, past, non-time). 
Narrative sections (mainly the chairman statement, CEO report, OFR, 
director's report, and CG section) of each company's annual report for 
1998,2001,2004 were fully analysed and risk disclosure (measured by 
the number of sentences) classified on an individual recording sheet. The 
checklist containing categories and items was used and a set of decision 
rules were applied. A pilot sample of reports was analysed and a number 
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of procedures were followed to ensure the reliability and validity of 
disclosure measure. 
8.2.2.3 Measuring the Cost of Equity Capital 
A four-stage dividend growth model was adopted to directly estimate the 
company's cost of equity capital. Bid-ask spread was used to proxy for 
information asymmetry (a component of the cost of capital). Stock 
volatility was also used to test with the level of risk disclosure. 
8.2.2.4 Other Variables 
Among many factors existing in the literature, four variables were chosen 
to test what determines UK companies to disclose risk disclosure in the 
annual report. These factors are: firm size, leverage, US-dual listing, and 
type of industry. 
8.2.2.5 Sample Selection 
The sampled firms comprise 52 UK non-financial companies drawn from 
FTSE-100 index. The research focuses on a time span covering six years 
(i. e., 1998-2004) to allow more in-depth examination of trends. Thus, 156 
annual reports relating to the fiscal years 1998,2001, and 2004 were 
sought, obtained and analysed. 
8.3 Conclusions 
8.3.1 Results 
8.3.1.1 Trends in Risk Disclosure 
The findings of the present study confirmed, in aggregate, a trend of 
increasing amounts of corporate risk disclosure. Risk disclosure among UK 
companies was found to be primarily focused on operational risk. The 
findings showed that risk disclosures are typically of a neutral and positive 
(good) nature with very little bad (negative) news disclosed. The findings 
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also indicate that qualitative disclosures dominate over quantitative 
disclosures. Another important finding relates to disclosures (news) time- 
frame. The findings show that non-time disclosure received the highest 
score followed by future disclosure and past disclosure respectively. 
However, caution is needed when interpreting disclosure related to the 
future as many statements found under this category are neutral 
statements. 
From the content analysis, it can be concluded that there is some useful 
risk-related information disclosed by companies in their annual reports. 
However, quantitative information is limited, and future-related 
information tends to be limited to neutral (rather than positive or 
negative) disclosures. This means that when future-related information is 
disclosed, it is poorly provided despite the fact that this kind of 
information is important to investors. An important conclusion is that 
companies provide substantial but rather inadequate explanations in their 
annual reports. 
There might be a bias towards positive, neutral, and qualitative news 
which may hinder managers in providing effective news (e. g., warning 
signals or quantitative disclosure). The texts that describe every minor 
risk without giving details on the likelihood and potential impact can 
obscure major risks (Deumes, 2008). In this case, that which is omitted is 
as significant as that which is included in the texts (Jameson, 2000). 
Disclosure regulations intend to deal with information gaps in the market 
so information becomes available to investors. The results of this research 
suggest that accounting regulations and rules together with many 
proposals issued by accounting organisations have influenced the 
increases in the level of risk information sentences disclosed but cannot 
ensure the quality of the disclosed information. Previous research has 
found that while regulation is efficient in increasing the level of disclosure, 
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there is no impact on the quality of information (see O'Shea et al., 2008). 
Thus, more effort on providing information would, therefore, further 
enhance the usefulness of risk reporting. 
8.3.1.2 Determinants of Risk Disclosure 
With regard to the second research question, the findings show that the 
key underlying factors that affect the extent to which risk information is 
disclosed are industry type (Hypothesis 2b) and US-dual listing 
(Hypothesis 2c). The significant relationship between US-dual listing and 
risk disclosure level suggests that companies with US-dual listing disclose 
more risk information than other firms. Similarly, the significant 
relationship between industry variable and risk disclosure level suggests 
that companies in certain industries (such as resources, basic industries, 
non-cyclical consumer goods, utilities, and general industries) disclose 
more than other industries (e. g., non-cyclical service, cyclical services and 
consumer goods). However, the results show no evidence that firm size is 
positively associated with disclosure (Hypothesis 2a). Nor do the findings 
show that risk disclosure is highly correlated with leverage (Hypothesis 
2d). Of course, the sample was selected from the FTSE-100 index so all 
firms could be classed as large. If a greater range of UK firms had been 
surveyed, a positive association between risk disclosure score and firm 
size may have been more apparent. It is important to note that the 
association between risk disclosure (and other type of accounting 
disclosure) and some corporate attributes (e. g., leverage) is still 
ambiguous. The results suggest that risk disclosure in companies' annual 
reports is driven more by regulations than by the market. 
8.3.1.3 Risk Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital 
Regression analysis was used to explain the impact of increased risk 
disclosure level on the company's cost of equity capital. The findings 
showed no relationship between the total risk disclosure level and the cost 
of equity capital. The different components of risk disclosure 
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(environmental risk, operational risk, and strategic risk disclosures) also 
have no effect on the cost of equity capital. This is contrary to predictions 
made on the basis of disclosure theory (e. g., agency theory and capital 
needs theory). This is perhaps because, for these sampled firms with a 
high analyst following, the disclosure measure was limited to the annual 
report and accordingly may not provide a powerful proxy for overall 
disclosure level when analysts play a significant role in the communication 
process (Botosan, 1997). It is, of course, possible that for smaller listed 
companies with lower analyst following, some correlation between risk 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital would have been found (Botosan, 
1997). However, no such correlations exist for large UK listed companies. 
It might also be claimed that UK firms, like US firms, already operate in a 
high risk disclosure environment (Hail, 2002). 
However, the research found a significant negative association between 
bad news disclosure and stock volatility, and also between quantitative 
disclosure and stock volatility. The proxy of Bid-ask spread was also found 
to be related to bad news risk disclosure. This implies that firms with 
greater disclosure of bad news enjoy a reduction in information 
asymmetry as measured by bid-ask spread and a reduction in stock 
volatility. The results also showed that firms with greater quantitative 
news enjoy a reduction in stock volatility. The finding on reduction in 
information asymmetry clearly demonstrates that annual report 
disclosures are of substantial information significance. 
An important conclusion is that different types of information have 
different effects (e. g., information presented in financial statements could 
have a different effect from those presented in other sections; forward- 
looking information has a different effect from historical and non-time; 
and quantitative disclosure has a different effect from qualitative 
disclosure). 
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The absence of any effect on cost of equity capital may suggest that 
managers are unable or unwilling to disclose the information of greatest 
value to the market. In the defence of the directors, it must be said that 
this research only examines information in annual reports. It is 
acknowledged that, in practice, investors are likely to use different sources 
of information to make informed decisions. The ICAEW (ICAEW, 1999) put 
forward that companies provide extensive risk disclosure in prospectuses 
rather than in annual reports. Frankel et al. (1999) found that conference 
calls convey material information. This research highlights the type and 
nature of the risk information disclosed. Evidence on the issue of risk 
disclosure outside the annual report and cost of equity capital is still 
limited and requires further investigation, and is, therefore, a potential 
area for future research. 
Overall, the findings of the present research supported the view that 
companies disclose substantial but rather incomplete information in 
annual reports. 
8.3.2 Contribution 
The present research contributes to the existing literature in several ways. 
First, although the merits of risk disclosure have been acknowledged in 
the literature, our understanding of actual risk disclosure is limited. Thus, 
this research fills the gap in the literature by providing a comprehensive 
and longitudinal study of the type and nature of corporate risk 
information disclosed in the annual reports. The goal is to allow more in- 
depth examination of trends. Changes over a six-year period are more 
likely to reveal interesting insights. 
Second, the present research tested the claim that enhancing risk 
information disclosed in corporate annual reports would benefit 
companies with a reduction in their cost of equity capital. Thus, this study 
adds to the existing research on the benefits of corporate disclosure. This 
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fills a gap in the existing literature by empirically testing the impact of risk 
disclosure on the company's cost of equity capital. 
Third, the risk disclosure score obtained from content analysis required 
the development of a disclosure measure for measuring the level of risk 
information in the annual report. A wide range of literature on risk and 
risk disclosure was utilised together with content assessment procedures 
(applied on a sample of annual reports) to develop an appropriate detailed 
coding scheme (that lists broad content categories and different risk items 
related to these categories). The coding scheme is detailed and 
encompasses four different quality variables to allow the examination of 
content and style of information disclosed. These variables include risk 
disclosure categories (strategic risk, operational risk, and environmental 
risk), news time-frame (future, past, non-time), the nature of evidence 
(qualitative and quantitative) and the type of news (good, bad, and 
neutral). 
Fourth, the findings of the effect of bad news and quantitative disclosure 
on bid ask-spread and stock volatility confirms the claims about the 
usefulness of these types of information (e. g., Schrand and Elliot, 1998; 
Kadous et al., 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Only when disclosure is 
informative and facilitates the assessment of the potential impact upon a 
company, it is considered relevant to investors. 
Fifth, the research enhances the understanding of the underlying factors 
that could affect risk disclosure in UK companies' annual reports. The 
research also underlines the usefulness of quantitative and future-related 
information. 
Finally, this research enhances our knowledge of difficulties determine 
improving risk disclosure in the context of recent efforts made by 
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professional institutions and accounting regulators to improve the quality 
of risk reporting. 
In conclusion, it is argued that this research makes a positive contribution 
to expanding our knowledge of corporate risk disclosure and reporting 
practices in the annual reports, and contributes to the growing debate on 
risk management and risk disclosure in annual reports. The increases in 
the risk information disclosed in the annual reports would be seen as 
evidence and endorse recent efforts of regulatory reforms (including 
corporate governance reforms) and advices and recommendations made 
by professional institutions. 
8.3.3 Implications 
Examining the current state of risk disclosure in annual reports can make 
clear to financial reporting practitioners if risk disclosure in annual 
reports can be viewed as an area of best practice for corporate risk 
communication. This research might be of assistance to companies, 
regulators, and users (mainly investors) who have an interest in corporate 
reporting. The users of financial reports may wish to extend their 
investigations and verify such reporting practices. 
The increased public demand for relevant risk disclosure has 
demonstrated the need for tighter rules and guidance for risk disclosure to 
restore confidence in corporate reporting. The results of this study, which 
suggest that risk disclosure in annual reports is incomplete, suggest that 
the information needs of users are not fully met at the present time. 
General statements of risk policy were found to be dominating risk 
disclosures. 
Policy makers, accounting bodies, accounting institutions and the 
academic community are aware of the importance of issuing guidelines on 
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how to improve risk disclosure. Policy makers should devise the means to 
enhance companies' involvement in risk disclosure. The efforts should be 
focused on developing a framework for risk disclosure and guidance for 
companies to provide relevant risk information that can be of use to 
investors in evaluating the risk profile of the company. Institutional 
investors cited in the Solomon et al. (2000) study agreed that increased 
risk disclosure would help them in their portfolio investment decisions. 
General statements of risk policy disclosures, although provide some 
evidence for the continuing development of risk management, are not the 
type of disclosures requested by the institutional investors. Rather, they 
require more specific and detailed risk discussions. 
There is a need to push companies to provide a statement of key business 
risk factors with emphasis on the key risks that are specific to each 
company or its industry. Recent reporting rules should encourage 
companies to make efforts to enhance the quality of risk information 
disclosed in their annual reports. They should assess carefully what their 
principal risks are and report on their potential impacts alongside details 
on managing and mitigating approaches. 
Mandating risk disclosure, however, may have a limited effect on risk 
reporting quality and may impose adverse disclosure incentives as well. 
Managers may withhold risk information available due to a number of 
reasons include commercial drawbacks, i. e., cost. Mandating disclosure 
can have unfavourable effect for the firms and economy (Dobler, 2008). 
Therefore, when assessing the information needs of the investors, 
regulators should ensure that any new standards increase disclosure 
quality so that investors can make informed decisions founded on quality 
information though with careful consideration of the costs and benefits 
associated with such risk disclosures. 
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The proposed 'safe harbour' provisions in the Companies Act 2006 may 
encourage companies to give greater details moving forward (ASB, 2007). 
Information may be enhanced and become more user-focused, hence users 
of annual reports may be better served. 
The resistance to change can be mitigated through education. Risk 
disclosure should be incorporated in university accounting degree 
programmes. 
8.4 Limitations 
This research extends the empirical knowledge and adds to the prior 
disclosure, and most importantly, to risk disclosure and cost of capital 
literature. The research, however, has its own limitations that have to be 
considered when interpreting the results. 
The first limitation is the use of sampling unit, the annual report. The 
present research focused on risk disclosure available in the corporate 
annual report. While the annual report is considered to be the principal 
document for communication, companies do employ other channels such 
as press releases, conference calls and individual meetings to 
communicate with their stakeholders. It is quite likely that companies 
provide risk disclosure through these channels which may affect the 
amount of risk information available in the annual report. Therefore, the 
sample data (information in the annual report) is somewhat incomplete 
and may not provide a powerful proxy for overall risk disclosure level. 
The second limitation of the present research is the use of content 
analysis. As with other approaches of measuring disclosure, subjectivity 
cannot be wholly eliminated. However, the other disclosure measures are 
fraught with difficulties because they require subjective judgements to be 
made by the researcher. In addition, the selection of alternative units of 
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measurement (e. g., words, pages) is subject to debate. A related limitation 
is that the research examines disclosure quantity (in terms of the number 
of sentences disclosed) but not quality (although efforts have been made 
throughout the content analysis process to enrich analysis and gain some 
sense of quality, for example, by using different quality dimensions). In 
other words, 'more is better' is not always the case. Again, assessing the 
quality of the information disclosed is, however, problematic in the 
absence of a reliable disclosure measure. 
The third limitation of this research is in its sample size and selection. The 
sample was chosen from the FTSE-100 index, and was, therefore, limited 
to the largest firms with high analyst following. Hence, the results may not 
be generalizable to small companies. Gomes et al. (2004) found that small 
firms faced higher cost of equity capital compared to large firms when 
they lose some of analyst following. Small firms have lower liquidity so 
they may need to make selective disclosure to attract and maintain 
analysts following. O'Shea et at. (2008) found that the volatility impact of 
disclosure is greater for small- and medium-sized firms than large firms. 
This limitation provides an interesting avenue for future research. A larger 
sample consisting of small and large firms can be explored by applying the 
same techniques. 
A further limitation of the present research arises from the examination of 
a single environment (e. g., UK) and a series of three one-year periods. The 
results cannot be generalized for other markets and other time horizons. 
Future research would consider a comparison study examining different 
markets and time periods. 
8.5 Future Research 
Whereby the findings of the present study suggest that the annual report 
risk disclosure level does not have an impact on the firm's cost of equity 
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capital, it is difficult to judge whether annual report risk disclosure is 
useless to investors or contains useful information about other potential 
outcomes that are not examined in this study. Future research is needed to 
further investigate why risk disclosures are made. Future research may 
also be carried out by increasing the number of firms examined to include 
financial firms as well as firms from other sectors and by adding more 
variables to increase the robustness of evidence beyond that presented in 
this study. 
Future research could also be conducted to ascertain the view of analysts 
and investors regarding the importance of dominant risk categories and 
other risk items detected in annual reports. This will reflect user perceived 
importance of different risk disclosure items. 
This research focuses on a time span from 1998-2004. Future research 
could be conducted over a longer time period to examine, for example, the 
effects of the UK Company Law Review of 2006 on disclosure of risks and 
uncertainties made in the annual reports. In addition, other alternative 
disclosure media to annual report such as interim reports, press releases, 
and the internet may be considered as potential subjects for future 
research. 
The comparability of risk disclosure across countries and across time is 
another potential area for future research. Future research could examine 
risk disclosure in other developed countries such as Canada and France 
and also in developing countries such as China in order to gain a useful 
and relevant insight into risk reporting practices in different countries. 
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Appendix 1: Companies in the Sample 
1 BP plc Resources 
2 Royal Dutch Shell plc Resources 
3 BG Group plc Resources 
4 Antofagasta plc Resources 
5 Wolseley plc Basic Industry 
6 BOC Basic Industry 
7 Imperial Chemical Industries plc Basic Industry 
8 Johnson Matthey plc Basic Industry 
9 Hanson plc Basic Industry 
10 Unilever plc Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
11 Cadbury plc Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
12 Imperial Tobacco Group plc Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
13 Smith & Nephew plc Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
14 Associated British Foods plc Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
15 SABMiller plc Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
16 Gallaher Group plc Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
17 Shire Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
18 Tate & Lyle plc Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
19 WPP Group plc Cyclical Services 
20 Kingfisher plc Cyclical Services 
21 Marks and Spencer Group plc Cyclical Services 
22 Reed Elsevier plc Cyclical Services 
23 Pearson plc Cyclical Services 
24 Compass Group plc Cyclical Services 
25 Carnival plc Cyclical services 
26 Rentokil Initial plc Cyclical Services 
27 Next plc Cyclical Services 
28 British Airways plc Cyclical services 
29 Dixon plc Cyclical Services 
30 Whitbread plc Cyclical Services 
31 DMGT Cyclical Services 
27: 3 
32 Rexam plc Cyclical Services 
33 Emap plc Cyclical Services 
34 InterContinental Hotels Group plc Cyclical Services 
35 Capita Group plc Cyclical Services 
36 Enterprise Innes plc Cyclical Services 
37 Hays plc Cyclical Services 
38 British Sky Broadcasting Group plc Cyclical Services 
39 Reuters plc Cyclical Services 
40 Vodafone Group plc Non-Cyclical Services 
41 Tesco plc Non-Cyclical Services 
42 BT Group plc Non-Cyclical Services 
43 Sainsbury J plc Non-Cyclical Services 
44 Centrica plc Utilities 
45 Scottish and Southern Energy plc Utilities 
46 United Utilities plc Utilities 
47 Severn Trent plc Utilities 
48 Kelda Group plc Utilities 
49 International Power plc Utilities 
50 BAE Systems plc General Industries 
51 Smiths Group plc General Industries 
52 Sage Group plc Information Technology 
274 
Appendix 2: Decision Rules 
Risk disclosure texts are those containing risk-relevant information that 
facilitate the reader to be better informed about past and potential 
threats or opportunities arising from internal or external variables (all 
sources of risk are considered, including uncertainty, volatility, and 
upside and downside risk). 
  Sentence will be coded as risk disclosure if it falls within any category 
given in the definition. 
  All disclosure sentences should be classified according to the grids in the 
disclosure checklist (see table 4.4 in chapter 4). This checklist was 
constructed to capture the amount of risk disclosure. 
  The word 'risk' does not have to appear within any given sentence for 
that sentence to be identified as a risk disclosure sentence. All disclosure 
must be specifically stated to better informed the reader about risk 
  The presence of the word 'risk' does not automatically mean the sentence 
is to be coded as risk disclosure (e. g., when risk management is provided 
by a company as a product or service). 
  If a disclosure is implicit or too vague in its reference to risk, then it 
should not be recorded as a risk disclosure. 
  If the sentences have more than one possible classification (i. e., contain 
more than one category of disclosure), they should be prorated 
accordingly. 
  Within the recording sheet (disclosure checklist), disclosure is classified 
as "quantitative disclosure" if it contains and primarily relates to actual 
numbers of financial and non-financial nature; and "Qualitative 
disclosure" if it includes information that is not numerical in nature. 
  When a disclosure sentence contains quantitative information (monetary 
or non-monetary), disclosure should be classified as quantitative. 
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  Tables (quantitative and qualitative) that provide risk information 
should be interpreted as one line equals one sentence and classified 
accordingly. Heading to the tables are also classified. 
  Any disclosure sentence repeated shall be recorded as a risk disclosure 
sentence every time it is discussed. 
  Within the recording sheet (disclosure checklist), disclosure sentence is 
classified as "past disclosure" if it relates to the past; "future disclosure" if 
it relates to the future; and "non-time disclosure" otherwise 
" Within the recording sheet (disclosure checklist), disclosure is classified 
as: 
> "Bad news" if contains any statement which reflects discredit on 
the company (e. g., increase number of accidents; negative impact 
of volatility); 
> "Good news" if contains statements beyond the minimum which 
include, for example, specific details where these details have a 
creditable reflection on the company; any statements which 
reflect credit on company, upbeat 
analysis/discussion/statements; 
> "Neutral news" if contains statements of general policy or intent 
within statutory minimum with no details of what or how, 
statement of facts whose credit/discredit to company is not 
obvious unaccompanied by editorializing. 
Source: Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Gray et al., 1995b 
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Appendix 3: IRR 
This spreadsheet provides the solution (IRR) to a4 stage dividend growth 
model. 
The 4 stages of growth are: specific growth projections for each of the next 
two years; the long-term growth trend (assumed to continue for a further 5 
years; a 10 year period during which the growth rate gradually converges to 
a very long-term maturity rate 
A common maturity discount rate is assumed (long-dated UK bond yield + 
3%) 
Input 
Share price 
Last dividend 
Year 1 growth f/c 
Year 2 growth f/c 
Long-term growth trend 
Maturity growth 
Discount rate - Year 31 onwards 
Reduction factor 
Projections Total cash flows 
Year Growth -300 
1 15.00 9.20 9.20 
2 12.00 10.30 10.30 
3 10.00 11.33 11.33 
4 10.00 12.47 12.47 
5 10.00 13.71 13.71 
6 10.00 15.09 15.09 
7 10.00 16.59 16.59 
8 9.30 18.14 18.14 
9 8.65 19.71 19.71 
10 8.04 21.29 21.29 
11 7.48 22.88 22.88 
12 6.96 24.48 24.48 
13 6.47 26.06 26.06 
14 6.02 27.63 27.63 
15 5.59 29.17 29.17 
16 5.20 30.69 30.69 
17 4.84 32.18 32.18 
18 4.50 33.62 33.62 
19 4.50 35.14 35.14 
20 4.50 36.72 36.72 
21 4.50 38.37 38.37 
22 4.50 40.10 40.10 
23 4.50 41.90 41.90 
24 4.50 43.79 43.79 
25 4.50 45.76 45.76 
26 4.50 47.82 47.82 
27 4.50 49.97 49.97 
28 4.50 52.22 52.22 
29 4.50 54.57 54.57 
30 4.50 57.02 2043.29 
Price 30 1986.27 
300 
8 
15 
12 
10 
4.5 
7.5 
0.929981 
Implied discount rate 
10.1 
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